Jeffrey Tan JC:

On the plaintiff's ex-parte application heard on 12 November 1994 the Court:

(a) granted to the plaintiffs, an injunction restraining the defendant and/or the defendant's servants or agents from stopping or hindering in any manner whatsoever the entry of the plaintiffs and/or those permitted by the plaintiffs, into premises known as 38-C, Queen Street, Pulau Pinang until the disposal of the action, and,

(c) directed the service (i) of all documents relating to (a) above, and (ii) notice of the hearing fixed for 19 November 1994, on the defendant.

The defendant was duly served with the documents relating to the injunction obtained exparte and notified of the inter partes hearing, but despite the opportunity to contest, failed to attend the inter partes hearing on 19 November 1994.

This grounds of judgment is written, not so much as to expatiate the law relating to injunctions, but to explain the Court's reception of applications ex-parte and inter partes with the advent of O. 29 r. 1 (2B) of the Rules of the High 1980 which reads:

Unless sooner revoked or set aside, an interim injunction obtained on an ex-parte application shall automatically lapse at the end of 2 weeks from the date on which it was obtained.

Sub rule 1(2B) being an absoluta sententia expositore non indiget plainly and resolutely provides that an injunction obtained ex-parte if not sooner revoked or set aside will automatically lapse.In the absence of any provisions extant for renewal or extension it will be fully spent after 14 days from the date of its grant.This 14 days term is set and rigid and repeated applications will be futile gambits, for the requirement in O. 29 r. 1(2Af) for a disclosure of any previous similar ex-parte applications by an applicant, is to alert the Court to any such abuse of process, unless fresh grounds are relied on. Even conjecture or construction that a lapsed injunction can metamorphose in character or form or take on new life cannot be admitted, for r. 1(2B)in claris non est locus conjecturis lacks the ambiguity for any such or other departure.

The primary rule regulating applications for injunctions is O. 29 r. 1(1), while sub rules 1(2), 1(2A) and 1(2B) are supplementary sub rules accommodating a special situation; while an application for an injunction under O. 29 r. 1(1) is heard inter partes, an ex-parte application under sub rule 1(2) is applied ex-parte in a case of an urgency (seePermodolanMBF Sdn. Bhd. v. Tan Sri Datuk Seri Hamzah bin Abu Samah & Ors. [1988] 1 CLJ 244 (Rep). The term ex-parte in sub rr. 1(2), 1(2A) and 1(2B) denotes an application for which only an applicant will be heard with no requirement of any notice being given to the party adversely interested.

As a departure from the r. 1(1) , an ex parte application under r. 1(2) is restricted fittingly to urgent cases, such as:

(i) of some imminent danger to property (ii) where the refusal of an injunction will expose the suit to irreparable injury or defeat the very purpose for which the action has been brought, and (iii) other compelling circumstances, where the plaintiff cannot wait or afford notice to be given and for the application to be heard inter partes, and (iv) where it is genuinely impossible to give notice without defeating the purpose of the application (seePacific Centre Sdn. Bhd. v. United Engineers (Malaysia) Bhd. [1984] 1 MLRH 210, [1984] 2 MLJ 143 .

It is therefore indubitable that an injunction granted ex-parte in urgent cases, is designed and intended as a preventive remedy for the preservation of the status quo, but solely on the facts and arguments presented by only one side, until:

(i) such time as the applicant can give notice of his application for a temporary injunction to the other side, and, (ii) the application is heard with arguments and facts presented from both sides or there is an answer or contest to the application;

In limiting its time span, r. 1(2B) is declaratory of the status of ex-pa