Low Hop Bing JCA:

Appeal

[1] On 16 July 2008, by a majority decision (Nihrumala Segara a/l MK Pillay JCA, dissenting) we allowed the appeal by the appellant Sistem Penyuraian Trafik KL Barat Sdn Bhd ("SPRINT") against the decision of the learned High Court judge who had dismissed the appellant's application for leave to intervene in a land reference in which the first respondent, Kenny Heights Development Sdn Bhd ("Kenny Heights"), had objected to the quantum of compensation awarded by the second respondent, the land administrator of the Federal Territory ("the land administrator") for compulsory acquisition of Kenny Height's lands.

[2] Having granted SPRINT leave to intervene, I now give my grounds.

Factual Background

[3] Kenny Height's lands were acquired on 17 February 2000 by the land administrator for the purpose of building the public highway known as SPRINT Highway ("the Highway").

[4] SPRINT's affidavit in support refers to and annexes the relevant portions of the privatization agreement entered into on 23 October 1997 between SPRINT and the Federal Government ("the privatization agreement") appointing SPRINT as the concessionaire of the Highway.

[5] Pursuant to the privatization agreement, SPRINT has to bear the compensation. The compensation payable by SPRINT was also known to Kenny Heights from the outset.

[6] Being dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, Kenny Heights proceeded to the High Court by way of land reference.

[7] In the land reference, SPRINT applied for leave to intervene and to lodge Form N under the Land Acquisition Act 1960. (A reference hereinafter to a section is a reference to that section in the Land Acquisition Act 1960 ("the Act"), unless otherwise stated).

[8] The learned judge of the High Court had dismissed SPRINT's application for leave to intervene.

[9] In refusing leave to intervene, the Court below:

(1) questioned the very existence and validity of the privatization agreement and the functions of the Highway Authority Malaysia, Lembaga Lebuhraya Malaysia ("LLM") under the Highway Authority Malaysia (Incorporation) Act 1980;

(2) drew an adverse inference against SPRINT for not producing the entire privatization agreement; and

(3) declined to accept SPRINT's obligations to pay the compensation pursuant to the privatization agreement.

[10] At the hearing of the appeal before us, learned senior federal counsel, Dato' Abdul Karim bin Abdul Rahman, representing the land administrator did not resist the appeal by SPRINT. However, Kenny Heights objected vehemently.

Legal Interest

[11] In submitting that SPRINT has no direct legal interest in the land reference and that the learned judge of the High Court is correct in dismissing SPRINT's application for leave to intervene in the land reference, Kenny Height's learned counsel Mr Joy W Appukuttan relied on, inter alia:

(1) Pegang Mining Ltd v. Choong Sam & Ors, [1969] 2 MLJ 52 PC;

(2) Tohtonku Sdn Bhd v. Superace (M) Sdn Bhd, [1992] 2 MLJ 63 SC;

(3) Sections 2 and 37;

(4) Universiti Malaya & Anor v. Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, [2003] 3 MLJ 185;

(5) Sri Permata Sdn Bhd v. PPH Realty Sdn Bhd, [2002] 1 MLJ 552;

(6) Tai Choi Yu v. Syarikat Tingan Lumber Sdn Bhd, [1998] 4 MLJ 275 CA;

(7) Menteri Besar Negeri Sembilan (Pemerbadanan) v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Seremban, [1995] 3 MLJ 710 CA; and

(8) United Malacca Rubber Estates Bhd v. Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Johor Bahru & Anor, [1997] 4 MLJ 1 HC.

[12] SPRINT's learned counsel, Ms Rajashree Suppiah assisted by Mr Paramjit Singh contended that being the concessionaire of the LLM, SPRINT has a direct legal interest in the compensation for the lands acquired and should be granted leave to intervene and lodge Form N in the land reference. They cited:

(1) O 15 r 6(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Rules of the High 1980;

(2) Ss 2 and 37;

(3) Magasu Sundram T Magasu & Ors v. Pentadbir Tanah Wilayah Persekutuan Kuala Lumpur, [2003] 5 MLJ 470 HC and

(4) Arab Malaysian Merchant Bank v. Jamaludin bin Mohd Jar