Peh Swee Chin FCJ:

[1] We have earlier dismissed this appeal and indicated we would give our reasons later. We hereby do so now.

[2] The appeal was against the order of the Court of Appeal confirming an order of High Court at Ipoh which had earlier dismissed the appellant's writ action for declarations that his dismissal as a chief store keeper of the Prison Department be declared void; and an enquiry be heard into arrears of salary etc.

[3] Summarising the facts which were not disputed; briefly the appellant joined the government service in 1960 and rose to the rank of chief store keeper at the detention camp at Kamunting, Taiping at the time of his disputed dismissal. According to the appeal, he had incurred heavy debts in trying to assist his father in the latter's bicycle business, that being pursued by creditors, he sought the advice of one Dato' Ibrahim, the head of his department who advised him in effect to present against himself a bankruptcy petition as a debtor for an indebtedness to the tune of more than RM300,000.

[4] It is to be borne in mind that under the former Public Officers (Conduct and Discipline) (Chapter D) General Orders 1980 applicable to the present appeal, (and hereafter called the said General Orders), the appellant's indebtedness being more than six times the amount of his monthly salary, the appellant became, ipso facto, liable to disciplinary proceeding for reduction in rank or dismissal etc.

[5] For the purpose of the appeal which concerned only a very short legal but important point, it would not be necessary to set out in detail the three charges framed against the appellant, the show-cause letter and his representations in reply. The gist of such representations was that he had served faithfully the Government for 28 years; his indebtedness being due to helping his father, and that he otherwise was of good character.

[6] The rules of natural justice appeared to have been applied and the appellant even admitted in cross-examination that he was given opportunity to answer all charges; that his dismissal was bona fide and that his rights were not infringed.

[7] The main contention of the appeal before us was therefore that he should be meted out a lesser punishment than the order of dismissal made by the disciplinary authority in question.

[8] The Public Services Commission, after deliberating on the appellant's representations had dismissed him from service and maintained the order of dismissal after further consideration on an appeal from the appellant. The appellant then launched the present civil suit which was subsequently dismissed as stated earlier. The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed his appeal from the High Court's decision.

[9] The appellant applied for leave to appeal to the Court which granted such leave to appeal limited to one question of law (vider 47(4) of Rules of the Federal 1995), it being as follows.), it being as follows.

Samada Pemohon telah dibuang kerja dengan sah dan samada Mahkamah mempunyai kuasa untuk menyentuh hukuman yang telah diberikan oleh Lembaga Tata Tertib berkenaan.

[10] The said question of law meant in effect as to whether the appellant had been dismissed from public service validly and whether a Court had power to interfere with any punishment meted out by the Disciplinary Board. The second part of the said question had of course, reference to the persisted contention of the appellant that he deserved a lesser punishment that the order of dismissal from public service.

[11] On the first part of the said question about whether the appellant was validly dismissed, nothing really turned on this except that a new point was raised for the first time in this appeal before us, it being that of unfair procedure. We disallowed it to be so raised.

[12] On the second part of the said legal question as to whether the Court could interfere with the nature of the punishment meted out by the Disciplinary Board, the English case of Bolton v. Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 513