JUDGMENT

Abdul Malik Ishak J:

The plaintiff was awarded getting-up fees at RM5,000 by the Senior Assistant Registrar and being dissatisfied he applied for a review (enclosure 48). The Senior Assistant Registrar ("SAR") awarded that sum on the assumption that the case was settled.

This was certainly a wrong assumption.

Though the issue of liability was agreed between the parties without the necessity of calling witnesses yet the case proceeded to trial on the sole issue of the quantum for damages

Two witnesses were called for this purpose and some efforts must have been put into it.

The following propositions are quite settled and reflected in the numerous decided cases

Firstly, "for purposes of taxation of costs running down actions could be considered to be the simplest of cases" (Canopee Investment Pte Ltd & Ors ] Landmarks Holdings Bhd. & Ors [1990] 1 MLJ 292). The present case falls squarely as a runner case and should be an easy matter to handle.

Secondly, the guidelines to determine the amount of getting-up fees are clearly set out in s 1 (2) of Appendix 1, Part X of Order 59 of the Rules of the High 1980 ("RHC") and this was adverted to in the case of United Malayan Banking Corporation Berhad v. Indah Sejati Sdn Bhd[1992] 1 MLRA 261, [1992] 2 MLJ 349:77. The taxing officer must consider:-

(a) the complexity of the item or of the cause or matter in which it arises and the difficulty or novelty of the questions involved;(b) the skill, specialised knowledge and responsibility required of, and the time and labour expended by the solicitor or Counsel;(c) the number and importance of the documents (however brief) prepared or perused;(d) the place and circumstances in which the business involved is transacted;(e) the importance of the cause or matter to the client;(f) where money or property is involved, its amount or value;(g) any other fees and allowances payable to the solicitor or Counsel in respect of other items in the same cause or matter, but only where work done in relation to those items has reduced the work which would otherwise have been necessary in relation to the item in question.

See Welltrade Middle East Ltd & Anor v. P.J. Wakelin & Ors [1984] 1 MLJ lxiv for comparison with the Singapore's version.

Thirdly, in allowing the amount for getting-up fee the taxing officer should be chiefly concerned and guided by the amount at stake together with the importance of the issue involved: Chin Cham Sen v. Foo Chee Sang & Anor.

Fourthly, the taxing officer is bound by the prescribed scale of costs as set out in the RHC: JP Finance (M) Bhd. v. Tanswan Brothers Enterprise Sdn Bhd & Ors, [1994] 3 CLJ 318: 3105; [1994] 1 MLJ 47.

Fifthly, when the law is reasonably clear despite the research in which both Counsel appear to have indulged, the getting-up fee should not be unduly inflated: John Tan Chor-Yong v. Lee Chay Tien - this was a defamation case.

Sixthly, gathering indiscriminately all documents which had some connection with the case and compiling them into bundles without giving sufficient care and attention to the preparation and compilation of relevant documents for trial would bar the plaintiffs' Counsel from obtaining costs in respect of several items of getting-up: L & M Airconditioning & Refrigeration (Pte) Ltd v. SA Shee & Co (Pte) Ltd [1993] 3 SLR 482.

Seventhly, the Court will not interfere with the decision of the taxing officer upon a mere question of quantum if the taxing officer has exercised his discretion after consideration of all the circumstances and if no question of principle arises

It is only when such discretion has been exercised on some wrong principle or the quantum allowed is obviously wrong that a Judge will interfere.

It follows from these principles that there may well be cases in which a 'getting up' done before the issue of the writ would be held to be necessary and proper and a fee for it allowed.

One example of such a case would be a libel action (Starlite Ceramic Industry Ltd v. Hiap Huat Pottery).

Ei