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2016 MarsdenLR 913

COURT OF APPEAL PUTRAJAYA
LEE HENG MOY & ORS – Appellant
Versus
PACIFIC TRUSTEES BERHAD & ORS – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: W-02-(NCVC)(A)-1455-09-2015]



A vexatious litigant must obtain leave before instituting appeal proceedings following a consent order regarding estate distribution, enforcing its binding nature.

Headnote:The court considered the implications of a consent order concerning the distribution of an estate under the Courts of Judicature Act 1964. It was determined that the 1st defendant is a vexatious litigant requiring leave to appeal. The court concluded that the consent order remains binding, and thus the appeal was dismissed as maintainable.

Table of Content
1. understanding the background and proceedings of the estate distribution. (Para 1 , 2 , 4 , 5)
2. resistance faced during estate administration and court application for clarity. (Para 8 , 9 , 10 , 11)
3. interpretation of the term 'instituting legal proceedings' regarding vexatious litigants. (Para 21 , 22 , 25)
4. affirmation of consent order binding effects on estate distribution. (Para 29 , 33)
Mary Lim Thiam Suan JCA:

[1] This is an appeal by the appellant against the decision of the High Court at Kuala Lumpur which had allowed the application by the 1st respondent, in relation to the distribution of the estate of Tan Hok Low, deceased. For convenience, the parties shall be referred to or how they were referred to at the High Court.

Background Facts

[2] By an amended originating summons dated 24 March 2015, the plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of Tan Hok Low, deceased, sought the following orders:

a. a declaration that the defendants are the lawful beneficiaries of the estate of Tan Hok Low, deceased;

b. that the defendants are entitled to the estate of Tan Hok Low, deceased, in the following proportions:

c. that the plaintiff shall proceed with the administration of the estate and distribute the estate in accordance with the law to the above beneficiaries in the aforesaid proportion.

[3] In order to understand why the plaintiff was in Court for the above orders, one needs to go a bit further back in time. The antecedent facts are well narrated by the learned High Court Judge.

[4] The late Tan Hok Low ("Tan") died intestate on 2 January 2003. At the time of his death, Tan had three wives and nine children. He was lawfully married to the 1st defendant with whom he had four children, namely the 3rd to the 6th defendants. Tan also had two common law wives. The first was Gan Chiew Wan with whom he had three children, the 7th to the 9th defendants; the second was Tan Pui Sim with whom he had two children, namely the 10th and 11th defendants. The 2nd defendant is Tan's mother.

[5] Because Tan had died intestate, there were several suits filed by various parties in respect of the grant of letters of administration and the distribution of his estate. One of those suits was an appeal filed by the 1st defendant in the Court of Appeal, that is, Civil Appeal No: B-02-1140-2007. On 29 July 2011, the Court of Appeal successfully mediated between the parties. A consent order was recorded in the Court of Appeal resolving not just Civil Appeal No: B-02-1140-2007 but also several other consolidated suits including Civil Suit No: MT4(MT3)(MT2)-22-180-2003 where the 1st defendant acted not just for herself but for her four children who are the 3rd to the 6th defendants in the present originating summons ("consent order").

[6] Amongst the terms of that consent order was the appointment of the plaintiff as administrator of the estate of Tan. Letters of administration were duly granted to the plaintiff on 28 August 2013 at the High Court at Kuala Lumpur. Another critical term of the consent order relevant for the purpose of the originating summons pertains to the distribution of the estate of Tan, deceased. In the consent order, it was agreed that the estate of Tan shall be distributed as follow:

a. the 1st defendant shall be entitled to 25%;

b. the 2nd defendant shall allow her 25% entitlement to be distributed equally to the nine children, namely the 3rd to 11th defendants; and

c. the remaining 50% of the estate would be distributed to the 9th and 11th defendants equally.

[7] The net effect of the agreement in the consent order was that the 1st defendant would be entitled to 25% and the 3rd to the 11th defendants, that is, all nine children of Tan, would each be entitled to 8.33% of the estate.

[8] In the course of administering the estate, the plaintiff faced some resistance from some of the beneficiaries who felt that the estate ought to be distributed in accordance with the Distribution Act 1958 instead of the manner it had been p

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