An interim injunction in defamation cases requires a serious issue to be tried, weighing the balance of justice, and damages may suffice as an adequate remedy.

Introduction

[1] On 9 May 2025, the Plaintiffs filed the instant suit against the Defendants. The Plaintiffs' cause of action against the Defendants is based on defamation.

[2] Eleven days later, on 20 May 2025, the Plaintiffs filed an application in encl 4 for an ex parte interim injunction against the Defendants. Enclosure 4 is made under O 29 of the Rules of Court 2012.

[3] On 22 May 2025, I dismissed encl 4. Here are my reasons.

Interim Injunction

[4] Via encl 4, the Plaintiffs seek the following order:

"1) Satu perintah injunksi interim bahawa Defendan Pertama dan Defendan Kedua sama ada dengan diri sendiri, ejen-ejen atau pekerja-pekerjanya atau dengan apa jua cara lain, daripada terus menyiarkan sebarang kenyataan yang membawa maksud dan / atau bererti kepada maksud kenyataan fitnah terhadap Plaintif-plaintif sama ada secara ternyata atau tersirat berkenaan dengan tindakan ini sehingga pelupusan tindakan ini;"

Decision

[5] In deciding whether to grant the interim injunction sought by the Plaintiffs, I follow the approach laid down by the Court of Appeal in Keet Gerald Francis Noel John v. Mohd Noor @ Harun Abdullah & Ors ; ; [1995] 1 AMR 373 ; at pp 460-461.

[6] Firstly, I ask whether there is a bona fide serious issue to be tried. Bearing in mind that the pleadings and evidence are incomplete at this stage, I refrain from making any determination on the merits of the claim. I am to identify the issues raised and decide whether they are serious enough to merit a trial. If I find that no serious question is disclosed, that is the end of the matter and the interim injunction is refused. On the other hand, if I find that there are serious questions to be tried, I move on to the next step.

[7] Secondly, having found that an issue has been disclosed which requires further investigation, I consider where the justice of the case lies. In making this assessment, I take into account all relevant matters, including the practical realities of the case. I weigh the harm that the interim injunction would produce by its grant against the harm that would result from its refusal. If I conclude that the Plaintiffs would suffer greater injustice if relief is withheld, I would be entitled to grant the interim injunction. Conversely, if I conclude that the Defendants would suffer the greater injustice by the grant of an interim injunction, I would be entitled to refuse relief.

[8] Thirdly, I am mindful that the remedy that I am asked to administer is discretionary. It is intended to produce a just result for the period between the date of encl 4 and the trial proper. And intended to maintain the status quo. Accordingly, I am entitled to take into account all discretionary considerations. For instance, whether there is any adequate alternative remedy that would satisfy the Plaintiffs' equity. Such as an award of monetary compensation, in the event that they succeed in establishing their claim at the trial.

[9] Having undertaken this line of enquiry, my decision was to refuse the interim injunction sought by the Plaintiffs. Here are my reasons.

Damages Would Be An Adequate Remedy

[10] In essence, the Plaintiffs want an interim injunction to restrain the Defendants from defaming them. In the exercise of my discretion, I declined to grant the interim injunction. The main reason is because I consider that damages would be an adequate remedy, if it is proven that the Defendants have defamed the Plaintiffs.

[11] At para 32.2 of their affidavit in support dated 20 May 2025 (Enclosure 6), the Plai