JUDGEMENT

Raja Azlan Shah AG CJ (Malaya):

[1] (delivering the judgment of the Court): Mr. Louis Blom-Cooper is a Queen's Counsel in the United Kingdom. He has wide experience in constitutional and administrative law, especially in the field of law touching on civil liberties, and since taking silk he has engaged in some important criminal trials in the United Kingdom and has also appeared in at least two criminal appeals from this country to the Privy Council. He applied under s 18 of the Legal Profession Act, 1976 for an order that he be admitted and enrolled as an advocate and solicitor of the High Court in Malaya to act as leading counsel with Mr.Karpal Singh for the defence of Mr. Lim Kit Siang who is charged in the High Court in Kuala Lumpur with five offences under the Official Secrets Act, 1972. The Bar Council and the Selangor Bar Committee did not object to the application, but the Attorney-General objected on the grounds that there are no special circumstances or facts to justify the granting of an order and that there are sufficient lawyers of experience in this country to represent the accused. The learned Chief Justice upheld the objection and he dismissed the application. The applicant now appeals to this Court.

[2] We note that there are many senior advocates and solicitors who are in active practice in criminal law in this country today, and who are, we are quite sure, ready, able and willing to offer their services to Mr. Lim Kit Siang. But Mr. Lim Kit Siang does not want their services. He wants the applicant to act for him as leading counsel. It is as simple as that. Whether it is morally right for him to embark on that course, it is not for us to say. We are not here sitting as a Court of morals.

[3] What is the proper test to apply in a case like this? We are ofthe opinion that no general test applicable to all cases can safely be laid down. We do not think much assistance is to be derived from what has been said inother cases when the question has arisen in other circumstances. We therefore make no attempt, where others have failed, to rationalise the proper test. Each case must be looked at separately. We must accordingly interpret s 18 as it stands and with reference to what is there enacted, and then it seems that the problem is solved without the smallest difficulty. s 18(1) ofthe Legal Profession Act enacts as follows:

"(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act, the Court may, in its sole discretion for the purpose of any one or more specific causes or matters, admit to appear as counsel any person --

(a) who holds Her Britannic Majesty's Patent as Queen's Counsel or has special qualifications or experience for the purpose of such cause or matter or has been in active practice as an advocate and solicitor in Singapore for not less than seven years immediately preceding the filing of the application for admission;

(b) who does not ordinarily reside in Malaysia but who has come orintends to come to West Malaysia for the purpose of appearing in such causes or matters; and

(c) who is or will if admitted be instructed by an advocate and solicitor."

[4] All that the s says is that any person who belongs to anyone of the 3 categories of persons is qualified to apply for admission. Parliament has there set out the "guide lines" indicating some of the considerations to which the judge should have regard. Beyond that it has by clear words conferred on him a virtually unfettered discretion to admit any of the classified category of persons as an advocate andsolicitor. In such circumstances it is plain that this Court can reverse the decision of the learned Chief Judge only if this Court is satisfied that the exercise of discretion is plainly wrong.

[5] Is the learned Chief Judge wrong in the exercise of the discretion? His reasoning is as follows:

"It is common ground that the Court has sole discretion in deciding whether or not to allow an application under s 18 of the Act. For the exercise of th