This is an application by Lee Wah Bank Limited for an Order of Certiorari to quash that part of the decision of the Industrial Court in Award No. 148 of 1979 directing payment of any benefits due under any collective agreements or agreements to a dismissed employee. In the Industrial Court the employee was the applicant in a reference under section 26 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967. In the reference document (PI) the dispute between Lee Wah Bank Limited and the National Union of Bank Employees was expressly stated to be "the dismissal of one Mr. Chia Kim Swee on November 30, 1977."

The application for certiorari was based on a number of grounds as set out at pages 2 and 3 of the statement but at the commencement of the hearing the applicant proceeded only on grounds (1), (2) and (3) which are reproduced below:—

"(1) The Industrial Court had no jurisdiction and/or exceeded its jurisdiction and/or acted without jurisdiction in awarding relief to a workman whose dismissal had been upheld by it.

(2) The Industrial Court misconstrued its powers under section 30 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967 in awarding relief to a workman whose dismissal it had held to be for a just cause and excuse.

(3) The Industrial Court erred in law in awarding the said relief to the workman in that the said relief was granted on the erroneous premise that the workman's misconduct resulting in his dismissal was not criminal in nature. Earlier the Industrial Court had held that the said workman contravened section 51 of the Banking Act, 1973 relating to acts of corruption by employees of commercial banks."

The Industrial Court had upheld the dismissal of the employee as being just and proper. The Industrial Court had also found as a fact that the employee was using his wife's account to indulge in transactions of the bank and he had derived substantial benefits from these transactions. After referring to section 51 of the Banking Act, 1973 (which makes it a criminal offence for an employee of a licensed bank to indulge in certain transactions) the Industrial Court had also found that "on this ground alone the bank was entitled to dismiss the employee." Aa regards the allegation of the Union that natural justice was denied to the employee during the inquiry the Industrial Court had held that the complaints were made known to the employee beforehand and that sufficient opportunity had been given to the employee to exculpate himself. The last paragraph of the award of the Industrial Court reads as follows:—

"The court now awards that the dismissal of the claimant by the Bank do stand. However, in view of his long service with the Bank and the fact that the complaints in question are not of a criminal nature, the court directs that any benefits due under the relevant collective agreements or agreement up till date of dismissal shall be paid over to him."

The second portion of the paragraph emphasized is the subject of the application for certiorari.

The whole question would seem to centre around what interpretation should be given to the powers of the Industrial Court in making an award under section 30 of the Industrial Relations Act, 1967. More specifically, how wide are the powers of the Industrial Court under section 30(6) of the Act? The question which necessarily follows is whether the impugned part of the award was made outside the powers of section 30(6) of the Act and therefore outside jurisdiction.

On behalf of the respondent it was urged firstly that a study of the history of section 30 of the Act would show that the powers of the Industrial Court in handing down awards under that section should be construed liberally. It was argued that the trend was towards liberalising the powers of the Industrial Court. Thus under the earlier legislation (former section 16A) all dismissals were dealt with under one provision and that the specific reliefs were reinstatements with arrears of wages or compensation. This whole sect