Corporations must prove that defamatory statements affect their trading reputation to maintain a defamation action, differing from individual claims.

[1] The appellant/defendant appeals against the decision of the learned trial judge who allowed an action for defamation by the respondent/plaintiff.

[2] It was the appellant's contention that limited companies (incorporated under the Companies Act 1965) cause of action in defamation is limited in nature as opposed to individual person; and when it involves public corporation and/ or Governmental bodies and/or institutions which deals with matters related to public then such corporation, bodies and/or institutions cannot maintain an action for defamation based on the House of Lords' decision in Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd & Others [1993] AC 534.

[3] In essence, the appellant asserts that: (i) the respondent cannot maintain an action for defamation in respect of the words which reflect solely upon its individual staff and not upon itself; (ii) further, the staff was not the alter ego of the respondent. The appellant in anchoring the argument relied, inter alia, on the following cases, namely: (i) John Holland Group Pty Ltd & Anor v. John Fair Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd & Anor [2006] ACTSC 34, (ii) Kerajaan Negeri Terengganu & Ors v. Dr Syed Azman Nawawi & Ors, [2013] 7 MLJ 52, (iii) Dato' Sri Diraja Haji Adnan Haji Yaakob v. Utusan Melayu (Encl 30); [2015] 7 CLJ 960, (iv) Government of the State of Sarawak & Anor v. Chong Chieng Jen; [2016] 5 CLJ 169; [2016] 5 AMR 85; etc in particular the judgment of His Lordship David Wong Dak Wah JCA.

[4] In short, the appellant attempts to make a distinction that: (i) the parameters of libel for person and that of a company is not one and the same in relation to the cause of action; (ii) when it relates to public corporation and/or Government bodies and/or institutions, there cannot be a cause of action in tort even though they may in law have locus to sue; (iii) a limited company also will have locus to sue but only on limited parameters and it may have a cause of action. The Memorandum of Appeal, inter alia, reads as follows:

"1. Yang Arif Hakim telah terkhilaf di sisi undang-undang dan fakta apabila membenarkan tuntutan responden terhadap perayu.

2. Yang Arif Hakim telah terkhilaf di sisi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal memutuskan bahawa kenyataan berkenaan dengan tuduhan bahawa kakitangan responden telah memberi kontrak pengiklanan kepada seorang kakitangan lain telah merujuk kepada kakitangan-kakitangan responden dan bukan responden dan oleh yang demikian, tiada kausa tindakan oleh responden terhadap perayu.

3. Yang Arif Hakim telah terkhilaf di sisi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal memutuskan bahawa hanya kakitangan-kakitangan responden yang dirujuk dalam kenyataan berkenaan mempunyai kausa tindakan (sekiranya ada) terhadap perayu.

4. Yang Arif Hakim telah terkhilaf di sisi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal memutuskan bahawa kenyataan berkenaan dengan kerugian besar yang dialami oleh responden tidak munasabah dan bahawa sebuah firma akauntan antarabangsa harus dilantik tidak merupakan fitnah.

5. Yang Arif Hakim telah terkhilaf di sisi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal memutuskan bahawa perayu sebagai kaunselor Dewan Bandaraya Petaling Jaya hanya membuat satu pengesoran di bawah Building and Commons Property (Maintenance and Management) Act 2007 dan oleh yang demikian laporan yang dibuat oleh perayu tidak merupakan fitnah.

6. Yang Arif Hakim telah terkhilaf di sisi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal memutuskan bahawa laporan yang dibuat oleh perayu dilindungi oleh perlindungan bersyarat.

7. Yang Arif Hakim telah terkhilaf di sisi undang-undang dan fakta apabila gagal memutuskan bahawa responden telah gagal membuktikan niat jahat oleh perayu.

8. Yang Arif Hak