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2014 MarsdenLR 693

FEDERAL COURT PUTRAJAYA
KIJAL RESORT SDN BHD – Appellant
Versus
PENTADBIR TANAH KEMAMAN & ANOR – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: 01(f)-39-09-2013(T)]



Petitioner Advocates:Rosli Dahlan,Bahari Yeow,Ho Ai Ting ,Respondent Advocate: Azhar Abd Hamid

The time limit for filing a judicial review application under the Rules of High Court 1980 begins from the date of publication of the Notice of Intended Acquisition in the gazette, not the service of Form H.

Headnote:(A) Land Acquisition Act 1960 - Section 8(4) - Rules of High Court 1980 - Order 53 r 3 - Judicial review application - Dismissal of judicial review application on grounds of non-compliance with time limit for filing application, which is 40 days from publication of notice of intended acquisition (Form D) in gazette on 21 July 2005. Appellant filed application for judicial review on 6 January 2008, clearly beyond the stipulated time frame. Court held that failure to adhere to time frame affects jurisdiction to hear application (Paras 84, 106, 134).

(B) The court held that Form H issued by Land Administrator does not constitute communication of the acquisition decision under Section 8(4) nor does it extend the timeline for judicial review; time starts from the gazette publication of Form D (Paras 106, 134).

Facts of the case:
The appellant sought to challenge the acquisition of its land by the State Authority via a judicial review application after the gazettement of Form D on 21 July 2005. The appellant's leave application was initially granted ex parte, and subsequent procedural issues arose regarding compliance with the Rules.

Findings of Court:
Judicial review application dismissed due to its filing outside the stipulated 40-day period. Court affirmed that preliminary objections regarding jurisdiction were valid and upheld by the appellate court (Paras 84, 106, 134).

Issues: Whether time limit for judicial review is from the service of Form H or the publication of Form D; whether respondents could raise preliminary objections at appellate stage (Paras 1, 85, 106).

Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the mandatory nature of complying with time limits for judicial review, asserting that without adherence to prescribed rules, jurisdiction to consider the application is negated (Paras 71, 134).

Result: Appeal dismissed with costs.

Table of Content
1. judicial review application process and parties involved. (Para 1 , 2)
2. arguments about timely filing of judicial review. (Para 3 , 5)
3. background facts leading to the appeal. (Para 4)
4. summary of preliminary objections and appeals. (Para 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 12)
5. issues regarding the service of notices and legal requirements. (Para 10 , 11 , 13 , 20)
6. interpretation of the land acquisition act. (Para 15 , 54 , 56)
7. jurisdictional issues in non-compliance with timeframes. (Para 30 , 66 , 72 , 73)
8. dismissal of appeal with costs. (Para 84)

[1] This is an appeal, by the appellant, Kijal Resort Sdn Bhd against the unanimous decision of the Court of Appeal dated 1 August 2012 dismissing the appellant's appeal on preliminary objections against the decision of the High Court dated 21 June 2009 dismissing the appellant's application for judicial review to quash the decision of the Land Administrator. The appellant had on 30 July 2013 obtained leave to appeal to the Federal Court pursuant to s 96 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 (CJA 1964).

Factual Background

[2] The appellant, at all material times, was the registered proprietor of part of the land known as Lot 3168, Mukim Kijal, Daerah Kemaman, Negeri Terengganu. The State Authority of Terengganu had decided to acquire the said land for public purpose. For that purpose an official notification as in Form D of the Land Acquisition Act 1960 (the LAA ) was gazetted in the government gazette on 21 July 2005 pursuant to s 8(1) of the Act. The acquisition exercise also included part of the adjacent land, known as Lot 33, Mukim Kijal, Daerah Kemaman, Negeri Terengganu, belonging to the 2nd respondent.

[3] Subsequently, a notification in Form E of the LAA was issued on 28 February 2006 and served on the appellant on 7 March 2006. Later the 1st respondent served upon the appellant a notice of award in Form H of the dated 27 November 2007. By letter dated 19 December 2007, the appellant rejected the award and indicated its intention to set aside the entire award and the acquisition.

[4] The appellant then filed an ex parte application in the High Court on 6 January 2008, for leave to proceed with judicial review pursuant to O 53 r 3 of the RHC 1980, naming the Pentadbir Tanah Daerah, Kemaman as the 1st respondent and a company known as Maju Timor Sdn Bhd as the 2nd respondent. As required by O 53 r 3(3) of the RHC 1980, the appellant had given to the Attorney General Chambers a notice of the application. Accordingly, a Senior Federal Counsel from the Attorney General's Chambers was present at the hearing of the ex parte application. The 1st and 2nd respondents were neither present nor represented and did not participate at the ex parte leave stage. Leave was accordingly granted to the appellant to proceed with the judicial review, on 20 May 2008.

[5] Pursuant to the leave granted, the appellant filed its substantive application for judicial review on 1 June 2008 and served the same on the 1st and 2nd respondents, who then filed their respective affidavits in reply and opposition to the application. The 2nd respondent was named as a party in the proceedings as it was alleged that the acquisition was ultra vires the LAA because it was for the sole benefit of the 2nd respondent.

[6] At the hearing of the substantive judicial review application, the 2nd respondent raised preliminary objections on 2 points, namely:

(a) that the judicial review application was filed outside the stipulated 40 days period provided for under O 53 r 3(6) of the RHC 1980 (the applicable provision then) and consequently the application should be dismissed in limine (1st Objection); and/or

(b) that the proper party, the State Authority, was not named as the respondent (2nd Objection).

[7] Apparently from the notes of proceedings and the grounds of judgment, the High Court did not deal with the two preliminary points at all; instead it proceeded to hear substantive submissions on the application fo

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