Thomson CJ:

[1] This appeal came before us for rehearing under the provisions of s 34 of the Courts Ordinance. We dismissed it but intimated that we would state our reasons for doing so at a later stage.

[2] Before discussing the facts of the case it will be desirable to set out the course which the proceedings have taken.

[3] On the 5 October 1956, the appellant was convicted in the Sessions Court at Kuala Selangor of two offences in contravention of s 3(c) Of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, 1950 and in respect of each was sentenced to three months imprisonment, the sentences to run concurrently.

[4] On the same day he gave notice of appeal against these convictions and sentences. On 3 November 1956, which was within the statutory period of ten days after being served with the grounds of decision in the case, he filed a Petition of Appeal which set out a number of grounds of appeal to which I shall refer as the old grounds of appeal.

[5] There then occurred a very considerable delay, for which neither the appellant nor his legal advisers were in the slightest measure responsible, in arranging a date for the hearing of the appeal and in the event this was only fixed for 25 January 1952 and then for 18 March 1957. In the meantime the appellants solicitor who had appeared for him at the trial and who had filed his Notice of Appeal and Petition of Appeal retained Senior Counsel and on 12 March 1957 a document was filed which was entitled "Further Grounds of Appeal" and which set out a great number of grounds of appeal not contained in the original Petition to which I shall refer as the new grounds of appeal.

[6] I pause at this stage to observe that forensically speaking there was no excuse for the delay which in fact attended the filing of the paper setting out the new grounds of appeal. In the past there has been considerable (and deplorable) laxity in this connection, and it is not unfair to suppose that what really happened was that the appellants advisers thought that so long as Notice was given of these new grounds of appeal a few days before the date fixed for hearing of the appeal no point would be taken as to the delay and the Court would permit the new grounds to be argued.

[7] If that be so, the appellants advisers were disappointed because when the appeal came on for bearing on 18 March the point was taken by Counsel for the Public Prosecutor. After some discussion, the nature of which is not clear from the record, the hearing of the appeal was adjourned to 25 March 1957 and on 19 March the appellant filed a Notice of Motion "for an Order that the appellant be permitted to urge in support of his appeal" the new grounds of appeal. That Notice was supported by an affidavit, the effect, though not the terms, of which has already been indicated.

[8] The matter came before Smith J on 25 March when His Lordship heard argument on the appellants Motion of 19 March and reserved judgment.

[9] On 1st April Smith J delivered a considered judgment to the effect that he felt himself compelled by the judgment of Bellamy J, in the case of Dickinson v. PP, [1955] 1 MLJ 191 to rule that the new grounds of appeal should not be argued. Counsel for the appellant then said that if he was precluded from arguing the new grounds of appeal he had nothing to say in support of the appeal and it was accordingly dismissed. After some further discussion the learned Judge agreed to give a certificate under s 34(1) of the Courts Ordinance to enable the matter to be taken further and in that certificate which he has now given he has stated that the points of law which it is desirable in the public interest to have determined by this Court are:

2

In a criminal appeal to the High Court from the judgment, sentence or order of a Subordinate Court what are the powers, principles and procedure that government.

(1) the grant of an extension of time to lodge a Petition of Appeal, and

(2) the permitting of amendments to a Petition of appeal by the addition