Thomson LP

This appellant was convicted in the High Court in Singapore on 10th October, 1963, on three charges of murder in contravention of section 302 of the Penal Code. He applied for leave to appeal against these convictions and for leave to call additional evidence. On 26th February, 1964, we granted him leave to call certain evidence as to the state of his mind. We then proceeded to treat his application for leave to appeal as an appeal and heard the evidence of Dr. Yap Meow Foo. In the event we set aside the three convictions for murder and substituted for them convictions for culpable homicide not amounting to murder in contravention of section 304 of the Penal Code and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment in respect of each such conviction. We stated that we would give our reasons for the course we took at a later stage and we now proceed to do so.

The facts of the case were never in any real dispute. The appellant and one Chenchal Singh had been employed as watchmen on a building estate in Singapore, but the appellant had ceased to be so employed though he continued to live on the estate. The two men were not friends and on the evening of 5th April, 1963, they had some sort of quarrel over allegations that Chenchal Singh had damaged the appellant's boot and put sand in his rice bowl. Early the following morning the appellant went to the partially completed house where Chenchal Singh was living with his wife and family and killed Chenchal Singh, his wife Gurnam Kaur and his son Harban Singh. He did so by inflicting most terrible injuries upon them with a "parang". He disappeared but was arrested some eleven weeks later on another building estate where he had found employment.

The appellant was committed for trial on three charges of murder in contravention of section 302 of the Penal Code and after some preliminary objection by the defence Winslow J. held that the three charges should be tried together.

The trial commenced on 7th October, 1963. Eighteen witnesses gave evidence for the prosecution and the appellant gave evidence on his own behalf. In view of the course the case has taken it is unnecessary to deal with the evidence in detail. It is only necessary to observe that no evidence was called for the defence as to the mental condition of the appellant nor was any question having any bearing on the subject addressed either to a medical witness who had examined the appellant for injuries or of any of the other witnesses.

On the third day of the trial, after the conclusion of the evidence, counsel for the appellant addressed the jury and from the trial judge's summing up it is clear that in addition to what appeared to be the main defences, that is that the case for the prosecution was not sufficiently proved, and/or that there was provocation and/or the appellant was acting in the exercise of his right of private defence, he raised the questions of insanity and diminished responsibility.

The following day the trial judge charged the jury in a long and careful summing up that has not been in any way criticised before us and in the course of which he dealt with the question of diminished responsibility in terms which counsel for the appellant has agreed are both fair and adequate. In the event the jury returned a unanimous verdict of guilty on each of the three charges and the appellant was accordingly convicted and sentenced to death.

While he was in prison the appellant was minded to appeal and apparently was unwilling or unable to retain the services of counsel who had appeared for him at the trial. He accordingly intimated through the jailor that he wished to appeal on the ground that "the conviction is unreasonable". That intimation was properly treated as an application for leave to appeal and the matter being a capital one counsel was assigned by the Court who proceeded to file a notice setting out a very great number of grounds of appeal of no great substance which it is not necessary to relate here.