Terrell A-G CJ:

The facts and arguments sufficiently appear from the judgment.

This was an application to review a taxation by the Registrar on the ground that only $500 having been recovered on the claim in Suit 132 of 1937, any costs recovered should have been on the District Court scale.

The appeal to the Supreme Court was prima facie out of time and the summons asked for an extension of time for appealing.

As regards time, the matter is covered by O. 62 rr. 71, 72 and 73. Under r. 71 a party who is dissatisfied with a taxation may carry in objections within two days after receiving of signing of the allocatur. This procedure was correctly followed, the Registrar considered the objections and in a written judgment confirmed his certificate on 4 July 1940. Then under r. 73 there is a right of appeal to the Judge within 14 days after the date of the certificate or allocatur. This rule does not say that 14 days run from the date when notice of the allocatur has been given. It appears from the affidavits filed that the defendants' solicitors were not aware of the Registrar's certificate until 18 July and did not take the necessary steps until some days later. They were therefore out of time. Under the rules it is clear that it was the duty of the solicitors to discover when the allocatur was signed, and slackness on the part of a solicitor's clerk in obtaining the necessary information has never been held to provide an adequate reason for an extension of time for appealing (see Re Cole & Ravenshear 1907, 1 KB para. 1 at p. 5).

In my opinion, therefore, the appeal was out of time and leave to extend the time should be refused.

As, however, I have heard the application upon the merits, and certain points of interest have arisen, I will deal also with the substance of the application.

The rule which is relevant is O. 62 r. 13 which reads as follows:

If any action is brought in the High Court, without special leave under s. 53 of the Courts Ordinance (Cap. 10), which would have been within the jurisdiction of a District Court, or in which the plaintiff recovers by judgment a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to any more costs than he would have been entitled to if the proceedings had been brought in a District Court, unless in any such action a Judge certifies that there was sufficient reason for bringing the action in the High Court.

It will be necessary to give short details of the claim which were adjudicated upon. In suit 132 of 1937 the plaintiff claimed under para. 5 $1,000 and under para. 6(a) $500 and under para. 6(b) and (c) two declarations. In the same suit the defendant counterclaimed for various declarations, and a sum of nearly $3,000 for repairs alleged to have been carried out on the plaintiff's implied authority. In Suit 174 of 1938 the plaintiff claimed a sum of nearly $5,000. The subject matter of both suits was a lease of a pineapple canning factory in Johore made by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant.

By the order of Pedlow J made on 29 August 1938, it was ordered by consent that the two suits be consolidated and tried thenceforth as one action. It is abundantly clear that the matters in issue could never have been determined by the District Court.

The effect of the judgment of Manning J, which is dated 6 December 1939, is as follows: The plaintiff recovered $500 on his claim under para. 6(a) and a declaration that he was entitled to $700 for rent, such sum to be deducted from the $2,000 deposited by the defendant with the plaintiff and which was repayable to the defendant. There was also a declaration that the rent was $100 per month and not $500 per month. These declarations were in accordance with the defendants counterclaim and not in accordance with the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff also recovered the sum of $561.30 in respect of his claim in Suit 174/38. The costs were dealt with as follows:- On the claim in Suit 132/37 the plaintiff re