1935 MarsdenLR 116
HOWES
MS MAHENDRAM - Appellant
Versus
CHAIRMAN SANITARY BOARD, LOWER PERAK - Respondents
MAGISTRATES CIVIL APPEAL NO 39 OF 1934
Decided On : 09/30/1935
IW Blelloch, Deputy Public Prosecutor, for the respondent.
This is an appeal from the order of the Magistrate, Telok Anson, made under Section 53 (i) of the Sanitary Boards Enactment, 1929, refusing to stay attachment proceedings in connection with arrears of water rate, conservancy fees &c, in respect of which the appellants goods had been attached.
The appellant for a number of years ran a school,--the Nagaratnam Memorial School,--and on 20th July, 1927, the then British Resident exempted the school buildings from assessment of rates, by a minute, (of which a copy is produced) "Exemption from assessment approved."
This, apparently, was done by the Resident under section 14 of the then Sanitary Boards Enactment, 1916, which authorised him to exempt schools ( inter alia) "from payment of any rate", i.e., any of those mentioned in that Enactment, namely rates for, ( a) general purposes; ( b) public lighting; and ( c) the extinction and prevention of fire.
In July, 1927, the Water Supply Enactment, 1926, was in force, and section 4 thereof authorised the levy of a water rate, within a Sanitary Board area, which was to be collected by the Sanitary Board and paid to the State Treasurer as general revenue.
Under section 7 of that Enactment, power was given to the Sanitary Board to exempt from water rate lands, houses &c, not sufficiently supplied with water, but no power of exemption was given to the Resident.
From this, it is clear that the "Exemption from assessment" given by the British Resident to the Nagaratnam Memorial School on 20th July, 1927, could not have included exemption from water rate.
Notwithstanding this, from 1927 onwards, no rates of any kind were collected from the school; and it was not till 1931 that the oversight was discovered.
The fact that the exemption given by the Resident in July, 1927, was misinterpreted, cannot affect the appellants liability to pay water rate, and the contention that this exemption included water rate, raised in his first supplementary ground of appeal, must necessarily fail.
In his argument, the appellant confined his appeal to the above point, and to grounds 4 and 5 of the Memorandum of Appeal.
In his affidavit, sworn on 31st August, 1934, in objection to the attachment of his goods in satisfaction of the arrears, the appellant based his objection solely on the fact that, in his view, the school had been exempted from all assessment.
At the inquiry before the Magistrate, he introduced a fresh objection, viz, that it was a condition precedent to the levying of any rate, that Section 39 (iii) of the Sanitary Boards Enactment, 1929, should be complied with. That subsection says that "in all cases in which any holding is for the first time assessed or the assessment thereon is increased, the Chairman shall also give notice to the owner or occupier thereof."
The appellant contends that until it was proved before the Magistrate that this notice was given, it must be assumed that the assessment on his holding was invalid and therefore the levying of the water rate was illegal. He does not dispute his liability to pay $ 67.50, arrears of conservancy fees.
The Deputy Public Prosecutor, for the respondent, has argued that since this point was not raised in the appellants first affidavit objecting to the attachment, the appellant was debarred from raising it in the course of the inquiry before the Magistrate. I do not agree. There is nothing in Section 53(i) to require the objector to state his grounds of objection. All he need do, if he disputes the propriety of the attachment, is to apply to the Court for an order to stay the proceedings.
The Court then makes "Such inquiry as may be necessary"--an elastic term,--which does not suggest a strict procedure, such as would be followed in (say) an appeal. At such inquiry, I think, the objector is entitled to raise any point, which is material in support of his objection.
The appellant has referred to Enactment 31 of 1934, an Enactment passed to validate certain a