HYNDMAN-JONES, J.

The difficulty in this case has been in finding the facts. The main question to consider is whether there was a mistake on the part of the Defendant? And if there was, was he led into making that mistake by the vendors or did it arise from his own negligence or want to reasonable care?

Turning to the particulars and conditions of sale (read) there is no word of a sale by acre, but it was said that the land being described as of a certain area, viz., 15 acres 1 road 20 poles, that in itself negatived the idea of the land being put up as a whole. Leslie v. Tompson 9 Hare 2783, in which Tuner, V.C., said "the actual designation of the number of acres negatives the presumption of any intention on the part of the Vendor to sell in the lump." I cannot impute knowledge of the Vice-Chancellor's dictum to the Defendant who probably never heard of it; and if I cannot do that it cannot operate as a notice to him that the land was being put up otherwise than by lot, and after all, it is not what was the vendors' intention, but what was the reasonable belief of the Defendant that we have to consider. There can be no doubt that the particulars and conditions as they stood were themselves misleading. Mr. LLOYD was at great pain to correct the particulars and conditions, and he said quite candidly "unless people heard it was per acre they would suppose they were bidding for the lot." The Defendant, in common with others, may have well fallen into a mistake owing to a misrepresentation or misleading statement on the part of vendors.

But it was said that this misrepresentation was corrected at the time of the sale. It was no doubt competent for the auctioneer to make such a correction, though as to the value of it, Lord Ellenborough said in Jones v. Edney 3 Camp. 285: "I should have paid "very little attention to what he (the auctioneer) said from his "pulpit. Men cannot tell what contracts they enter into if the "written conditions of sale are to be controlled by the babble of the "auction room." Still the correction was no doubt made, and the question is whether it reached the ears of the Defendant. That is a matter which must be very jealously considered: "Where a "material representation has been made calculated to induce a person "to enter into a contract, it is a strong inference of fact that he was "induced by it to enter into the contract": Smith v. Land and House Property Corporation L. R. 28 Ch. Dic, 7. and the burden of the proof in such a case as this lies on the vendors to prove that the purchaser was not deceived or was not induced by the representation to enter into the contract. In Flight v. Booth 1 Bing. N.C. 370, even where the lease itself was read out at the sale, the particulars of sale as to the lease being misleading, the purchaser was held entitled to rescind. How then stand the facts in this case? We have Mr. LLOYD and the crier saying that they announced that the lot was being sold per acre. We have the Defendant denying that he ever heard such an announcement, and declaring that he thought he was buying by lot. As against that, we have TEH TEK MOH, a grandson of TEH HOO SEH and a beneficiary under his will. But I doubted the evidence of Mr. TEH TEK MOH, for I thought his manner was rather too pronounced when he said that the Defendant was sitting next to him all the time. As to the others, I did not understand either Mr. LLOYD or the crier to swear that they had the Defendant individually under their eyes, so to speak, when the announcement was made; and it seems to me very unlikely that they would have had. A great number of persons were present at the sale of these lots which were only two portions of the general sale that day, and there was nothing to induce either Mr. LLOYD or the crier to keep the Defendant under observation during the whole proceedings. No doubt they both saw him at the sale. No doubt they may have seen him when lot I was put up, but I did not gather that they said