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2003 MarsdenLR 694

COURT OF APPEAL, KUALA LUMPUR

GOPAL SRI RAM JCA, PAJAN SINGH GILL JCA, RAHMAH HUSSAIN JCA


MARATHAEI SANGULULLAI
versus
SYARIKAT JG CONTAINERS (M) SDN BHD

CIVIL APPEAL NO: W-02-554-1998

Decided On : 02-18-03

Advocates:
For the appellants - Sivarasa Rasiah (M Mogannambal & Lateefa Koya); M/s Daim & Gamany
For the respondents - S Ravichandran; M/s Gomez & Assoc

JUDGMENT

Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

This appeal raises a short but important point of public law. The facts relevant to the point lie in a narrow compass.

As long ago as 22 July 1989, the Industrial Court made an award in favour of one Thangayah Aupulley, now deceased, who had been in the employment of the respondent herein. We will refer to him as "the workman". The award was for a very small sum: RM15,592.10. The respondent paid RM10,000. It did not pay the balance. The reason it gave was that the workman had agreed to waive the balance. The workman was unhappy. So, the workman moved the Industrial Court under s. 56 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 ("the Act") by way of a complaint of non-compliance. The workman was represented by an officer from the Malaysian Trade Union Congress ("MTUC"). The respondent was represented by an officer of the Malaysian Employers Federation ("MEF"). At the outset the MEF officer objected to the workman being represented by the MTUC representative. The president of the court upheld the objection and held that the workman should represent himself. On a subsequent date of hearing, Mr. Sivarasa Rasiah, an advocate and solicitor, and counsel for the appellants in this appeal, appeared for the workman before the same president. Again an objection was taken and upheld. As a result the appellant was required to represent himself whilst the respondent had the advantage of representation. The workman then died and his legal representatives moved the High Court for certiorari to quash the award of the Industrial Court denying the workman representation and for a consequential order of mandamus. The High Court dismissed the application and the present appeal is directed against that order.

At the heart of this appeal lies the interpretation to be given to s. 27(1)(d) of the Act. For completeness we reproduce the whole of s. 27(1) below:

27(1) In any proceedings before the Court a party may:

(a) where the party is a trade union, be represented by an officer or employee of the trade union;

(b) where the party is an employer, appear himself personally or be represented by his duly authorized employee, or by an officer or employee of a trade union of employers of which he is a member;

(c) where the party is a workman (in proceedings under section 20 (3)), appear himself personally or where he is a member of the trade union of workmen, be represented by an officer or employee of the trade union;

(d) where the party is a trade union, or an employer, or a workman (in proceedings under section 20 (3)), be represented with the permission of the President or the Chairman, by an advocate, or, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any written law relating to the registration of trade unions, by any official of an organisation (not being a trade union) of employers or of workmen, as the case may be, registered in Malaysia.

The Industrial Court held that the workman was not entitled to have legal or other representation at a non-compliance hearing and that finding was upheld by the High Court in proceedings for certiorariunder the former O. 53 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. The present appeal is directed against the refusal of prerogative relief by the High Court.

The central question in this appeal is whether s. 27(1)(d) precludes a workman who has obtained an award in his favour pursuant to a reference under s. 20 from having legal or MTUC representation in a non-compliance hearing under s. 56 of the Act. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, then both the Industrial Court and the High Court were correct in their respective decisions and this appeal must fail. On the other hand, if the answer is in the negative, then, of course, the Industrial Court was plainly wrong in the sense that its decision is flawed by an error of law.

In our judgment it is the latter answer that is the correct response to the question posed. There are two reasons for this. First, the construction of s. 27(1)

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