Murray-Aynsley CJ:

These are proceedings under s. 13(1) of Ordinance No. 22 of 1953.The only ground on which the Court can interfere is that the decision of the Board is wrong in law.This Court is not a Court of Appeal so far as the Rent Board is concerned.

The proceedings were taken before the Board under s. 9(1)(b). By that part of the Ordinance the Board has power, subject to a proviso, to fix rent at such figure as "to the Board may seem just and proper." Unless the Board gives reasons bad in law when it fixes the rent of premises the Court has no power to interfere.In the present case the Board refused to exercise its powers under s. 9(1)(b). If they had been content to let the matter remain there the Court would have no power to do anything about it. The Board however proceeded to give reasons.They seem to have been under the impression that they were prevented from increasing the Rent under s. 9(1)(b) by reason of what was said by Taylor J in Originating Motion No. 57 of 1953(1).

The report does not show what the Court had to decide in that Case.An examination of the record shows that the only point of law raised in that case was that there having been an increase of rent on other grounds the Court could not make an increase under s. 9(1)(b). The motion proceeded to ask for review on grounds of fact, namely that there was "no good or sufficient evidence" to justify the finding of the Board.That was not a ground on which the Court could interfere in any case.In his judgment the learned Judge does not seem to have dealt with the question of law raised in the motion, but he proceeded to deal with the application of the proviso to s. 9(1)(b) which does not seem to have been in question, and then to have given his views on the way in which the Board should exercise its discretion under this part of the Ordinance.These views seem to be based on the ground that "the manifest object (of the Ordinance) is to stabilize rents of pre-war buildings at standard plus the specifically authorised additions where those apply". I cannot agree with this.The whole object of s. 9(1)(b) is to give discretion to the Board to fix rents at a figure (subject to the proviso) which seems to them just and proper apart altogether from the question of what is the standard rent.

The words of the Ordinance are "just and proper". I do not think there is anything in the Ordinance to give those words any artificial or restricted meaning.

Some question arose as to the effect of consent of the tenant to the increase applied for.Of course, if the Board had thought that they were obliged to approve of any increase applied for where the tenant had assented, they would have been wrong in law. I do not think that they ever thought such a thing.Where a figure has been agreed between people, particularly business people, as the result of free bargain, I do not think that the fact that they have so agreed is irrelevant in deciding what is just and proper.

The matter is referred back to the Board to fix the rent at a figure which to the Board shall seem just and proper or to refuse to make any order, in its discretion.

Order accordingly.