Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1] These appeals, which were heard together, arise in the following way. The learned Judge in the Court below was in the process of recording evidence that is proposed to be used in criminal proceedings in Hong Kong. He was acting pursuant to an order made under O 66 and O 39 of the Rules of the High , 1980, upon letters of request issued by the Supreme Court of Hong Kong. In the midst of carrying out that task, he was required to deal with a summons taken out by the first, second and third respondents asking for certain declarations. I will say more about this in a moment.

[2] The first and second respondents are officers of the third respondent bank. They are potential witnesses in the proceedings before the learned Judge. They have also expressed their willingness to give evidence before the Court in Hong Kong. But they and their employer were concerned about the resultant implications of giving evidence. They genuinely entertain a fear that by doing so they may be prosecuted for offences under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act, 1989, or "BAFIA', as that Act is commonly referred to. They are also concerned that they may become liable civilly in the event of their making disclosure of confidential information in the course of giving evidence. Before proceeding any further, I must make mention of the fact that on 4 March 1992, the High Court had made an order under s 6 of the Bankers Books (Evidence) Act, 1949, (referred to in the Court below as the "BBEA) requiring the first respondent to make disclosure upon a number of matters.

[3] The apprehension operating upon the minds of the first, second and third respondents is summarised in paras 10, 11, 15, 17 and 18 of the affidavit of the first respondent affirmed on 6 May 1994, and they read as follows:

10. The bank was also advised that the BBEA order obtained in Malaysia would not operate to exempt the officers from any such disclosure in Hong Kong as the order would only operate in relation to the giving of evidence in these proceedings in Malaysia. Further, I am advised and verily believe that in all events, the BBEA order would only apply to exempt the officers/ the bank in relation to the disclosure of information relating to the areas covered by the BBEA order itself.

11. In view of the advice, the officers feel that they are unable to give evidence in Hong Kong. However, as the issue has, to the best of my knowledge, not been considered by the Malaysian Courts, the bank and the officers have authorised the filing of this application for a ruling by this Honourable Court.

15. Depending on the reasoning of and orders made by this Honourable Court in this application, the officers may opt to give evidence in Hong Kong. However, as matters stand it appears that the examination of the officers and other employees of the bank will take place in Malaysia.

17. 1 have been advised by my solicitors and verily believe that the BBEA order will exempt the officers from any offence with respect to s 97(1) of BAFIA and the breach of any common law obligation of secrecy in the event of disclosure during the course of these proceedings in Malaysia.

18. However, I am further advised by my solicitors and verily believe that the BBEA order is limited in its operation and the protection will only apply to exempt the officers from their obligations of secrecy in relation to the areas set out therein. Accordingly, I believe that the examination and cross-examination of the officers should be limited to the areas set out in the BBEA order so as to protect the officers from committing any offence or from breaching any obligation of secrecy.

[4] On 6 May 1994, the first to the third respondents took out a summons asking for certain declarations. I will not set them out here. The learned Judge rightly formed the view that the declarations sought were too wide. He invited the parties before him to narrow down the scope of the declarations prayed for. Counsel set about t