Wee Chong Jin (Singapore) CJ:

This appeal arises from an action which was dismissed in the High Court.

In his specially indorsed writ, the appellant claimed against the respondent a sum of $2,500 for money lent by him to the respondent payable under an agreement in writing signed by the respondent on 14 June 1962. The defence to that claim was a denial of the loan.

The respondent in his defence admitted signing the written agreement referred to in the statement of claim but averred that the document was signed by him as the result of improper and illegal pressure and threats used by the appellant and his companions and was therefore without any consideration whatsoever and was a null and void agreement. It was also a defence to the claim that the document was a promissory note and not having been duly stamped in accordance with the provisions of the Stamp Ordinance, was not admissible in evidence.

At the trial before Mr. Ambrose J, the question as to the admissibility of this document, by reason of it not having been duly stamped, was argued and in the result the learned trial Judge ruled that the document was inadmissible in evidence and could not be acted upon by the Court, but ruled that evidence other than the document could be given in proof of the terms of the alleged contract of loan. As a result of the ruling, the statement of claim was amended to a claim for $2,500 for money lent by the appellant to the respondent, and the defence was amended leaving only the defence denying the receipt of the sum claimed.

The trial proceeded and on the oral testimony before the trial Judge, he rejected the evidence of the appellant and his witnesses, accepted the respondent's evidence that he did not borrow the sum claimed and accordingly gave judgment for the respondent.

There are two main grounds of appeal which have been argued before us. First, it is said that the trial Judge should have, under the provisions of the Stamp Ordinance, through the Registrar or Deputy Registrar, impounded this document, and that the document was one which could properly be stamped, even after execution on payment of a penalty and thereafter be receivable in evidence in support of the appellant's claim. I take the view insofar as this appeal is concerned that even assuming that the appellant's contention is right on this ground of appeal, the same issue was before the trial Court - namely whether the sum claimed was in fact lent by the appellant in the circumstances as set out in his evidence and that of his witnesses, or that no sum of money was ever lent by the appellant to the respondent.

The other main ground of appeal is the usual ground, apart from ground 3 which was not seriously pressed before us by appellant's Counsel, when an appellant comes before this Court to persuade this Court to come to a conclusion that a trial Judge's finding of facts was against the weight of the evidence in the Court below. The story so far as the appellants claim is concerned was that on 14 June 1962 at some time in the afternoon, the respondent came to his house, pleaded with him for an immediate loan of $2,500 which he needed to pay in order to avoid seizure of his cattle. This request after persisting begging by the respondent, according to the appellant, he acceded to and thereupon in the presence of his wife and a companion of the respondent, this money was lent to the respondent who agreed to put his signature to a document to be prepared as evidence of this loan. I do not propose to go through the evidence in detail except that later in the afternoon according to the appellant, at the house of one of his witnesses in this action, the document was drawn up by a person known as Subedhar Singh in terms containing an admission by the respondent that he had taken the sum of $2,500 and promising to pay the sum and this document was signed by the respondent and by four persons as witnesses, including Subedhar Singh, the person who had made out t