Whitton J:

This is an application by the executrix of the Will of the late Lim See Quee for directions as to whether in the events that have happened the plaintiff has forfeited his share in the deceased's estate under the Will.The application arises out of certain transactions in relation to his share entered into by the plaintiff, who is a son of the testator, between 21 February 1951 and 2 September 1953 and the question for the determination is whether in consequence of these transactions a forfeiture clause in the Will now operates against the plaintiff.It is common ground that the period of distribution was 11 December 1953.

The forfeiture cl (25) reads as follows:

I declare that if any beneficiary hereunder shall become bankrupt or assign charge encumber or attempt to assign charge or encumber his or her share or shares in my estate or suffer something whereby the same or some part thereof would by operation of Law or otherwise if belonging absolutely to him or her

become vested in some other person or persons such beneficiary shall forfeit his or her share or shares which shall thereupon devolve as hereinbefore provided in case of his or her death.

Mr Munro in arguing that the plaintiff's share has been forfeited pointed out that there were two main points to be decided in determining the issue - (1) Is cl 25 valid in itself? (2) Do any of the transactions of the plaintiff referred to above attract the operation of the clause? I shall proceed to deal with these two points in turn.

In contending cl 25 was valid Mr. Munro relied on Re Forder [1927] 2 Ch 291.The wording of the forfeiture clause in that case and in the present case is to all intents and purposes the same, and so the English case is clearly helpful in considering our problem.It had been held earlier in Re Smith [1916] 1 Ch 369 that the forfeiture clause could not be split up so as to be pronounced valid as to contingent gifts only, and that consequently in that case the whole clause was void for repugnancy.But in Re Forder [1927] 2 Ch 291, while this principle was fully acknowledged, the forfeiture clause was held to be good on the ground that it did not extend to any interest in possession, but only to interests in reversion.In holding this to be the position it seems to me that both Sargant LJ and Lawrence LJ regarded the words "devolve as hereinbefore provided in case of his or her death" as being conclusive.As our cl 25 contains these identical words it appears to me that anyone maintaining the position is the same in the present case is on strong ground.Moreover I think the inclusion of these words answers both Mr. Hilborne's submission that the clause is bad as laying down no limitation to the time within which forfeiture is to take place and that of Mr. Hoalim that it is bad as applying to absolute as well as to contingent gifts.As to Mr. Hilborne's submission I would say that, while the wording of the clause can literally be interpreted in the way for which he contends, it seems to me much more likely what the testator contemplated was once a share had actually vested in a beneficiary the situation could not in fact arise in law of such share devolving under the Will in any other manner provided, and so I think a time limit that the forfeiture clause was meant to apply only to the time prior to the period of distribution is clearly implied.With regard to Mr. Hoalim's point I think it is obvious that the Will contains no provision cove red by the words "shall thereupon devolve as herebefore provided" in respect of the absolute interests created by cll 13, 14 and 15, and, if this contention is accepted there is no reason to believe cl 25 was intended to have any reference to the absolute gifts of the testators.For these reasons I hold the forfeiture clause to be valid.Before leaving this point I would add I find myself unable to accept the suggestion that the plaintiff's interest was a vested interest subject to divestment.

I now turn to the s