Rigby J (after stating the facts a reproduced in the head notes, and continued):

The argument before the learned Registrar was virtually the same argument as was repeated before me in somewhat greater detail. The issue for consideration was whether the defendant, upon his written defence, had raised a triable issue which, on its merits, entitled him to be granted leave to defend and this, in turn, resolved itself into the short but important question as to whether, as a matter of law, upon the facts pleaded by him he was entitled to avail himself of the protection of the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1956. Having regard to the definition of "premises" as now defined in the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1956, 1 had no doubt that, as a matter of law, the defendant was not protected under that Ordinance, although I was, and am, clearly of the opinion that he would have been so protected under the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1948, is amended by the 1949 amending Ordinance.

Section 12(1) of the 1956 Ordinance enacts that:

No order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any premises comprised in a tenancy shall be made or given.................

except in the cases therein specified. For a tenant, therefore, to claim the protection of the Ordinance he or she must first bring the subject matter of the tenancy within the definition of "premises comprised in a tenancy.

The word "premises" is defined in s. 2 of the Ordinance. The relevant part of that definition reads:

Any dwelling-house, flat, factory......... and any part of any premises let or sublet separately and includes any land......... occupied therewith.

Then follow certain exceptions which are irrelevant for consideration in this instance. It seems to me clear beyond argument that the words "includes any land......... occupied therewith" relate back to the earlier part of the definition and that land, as such, cannot come within that definition of "premises" unless it is land occupied with a dwelling-house, flat, etc. The decisions of McElwaine, CJ in the case of ALMM Muthukaruppan Chettiar v. Haji Ibrahim [1941] MLJ 150 appears to me directly in point. Land is not "premises" within the meaning of this Ordinance. The plaintiff is not asking for an Order for the ejectment of her tenant from any premises. She is asking for the recovery of possession of a piece of land now in the occupation of the defendant. In my view, on the definition of "premises" as it now stands in the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1956, land, qua land, does not come within the definition of "premises," and therefore if a person chooses to take a lease of a piece of land and build a house on it, whether it be with or without the consent of the owner of the land, he cannot thereafter avail himself of the protection of this Ordinance as it now stands.

The position was clearly different under the Control of Rent Ordinance, 1948, as amended by the 1949 amending Ordinance. By that amending Ordinance "premises" were specifically defined to include "any land whereon any such building is or has been erected with the consent of the Iandlord." That definition has not been included in the 1956 Ordinance, although it is interesting to observe that it was, in fact, included in the Bill itself as published in the Supplement to the Federation of Malaya Gazette dated the 22 September 1955. Why this part of the definition was not included in the Ordinance itself must remain a matter of pure speculation. But it seems to me that the only inference that one is entitled to draw from its omission is that those responsible for its legislation came to the conclusion that it should be deliberately omitted. If that be so, it strengthens the argument that it was the deliberate intention of the legislature to revert to the position under the 1948 Ordinance and that land whereon buildings had been erected by a ground tenant, even with the consent of the landlord, should no longer be regarded as protected premises for the p