Rigby J (delivering oral judgment):

At about 12.15 a.m. on 16 July 1960, a motor car accident took place at the junction of Burmah Road and Kinta Lane, Penang, as the result of which a trishaw rider was killed. The police were on the scene shortly after the accident had occurred and as the result of investigations made by them the respondent Frank Thomas Nelson was charged with dangerous driving. At the hearing of that charge a preliminary point was submitted on behalf of the respondent that he was not liable to prosecution and that the trial could not proceed on the ground that there had not been a valid compliance with the provisions of s. 56(b) of the Road Traffic Ordinance, 1958. That section provides that where a person is prosecuted for an offence under s. 35 or s. 36 of the Road Traffic Ordinance - and those sections deal with charges of dangerous driving and careless and inconsiderate driving:

He shall not be convicted unless within 14 days of the commission of the offence either (a) a summons for the offence was served on him, or (b) a notice in writing of the intended prosecution, specifying the nature of the alleged offence and the time and place where it is alleged to have been committed, was served on or sent by registered post to him or the person registered as the owner of the vehicle at the time of the commission of the offence.

It would appear that after the accident had occurred a notice of intended prosecution was served on the respondent at the RAAF Leave Centre, Tanjong Bungah, at 1.05 p.m. that same day -just over 12 hours after the accident had occurred. Due to some apparent carelessness on the part of the Police Traffic Officer who had drafted that notice the time of the offence was stated as "12.30 a.m." instead of "12.15 a.m." and the date of the offence was stated as "16 May 1960" instead of "16 July 1960". When the case came for trial, as I have stated, it was contended on behalf of the respondent that having regard to the provisions of s. 56(b) there had not been a valid and sufficient compliance with the provisions of that section in that both the time and date had been wrongly stated. The learned Magistrate accepted that submission, and acquitted and discharged the respondent on the ground that the provisions of that section were mandatory and they had not been properly complied with.

As Lord Goddard, the former Lord Chief Justice of England, repeated on no less than two occasions, the provisions of this section, to which the counterpart is s. 21 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930, require to be considered with a modicum of common sense. It has repeatedly been stated in the English Courts that the object of this section is to enable a notice to be served on the driver of the motor car to call his attention to the time and circumstances of the accident in respect of which he might be charged so as to give him an opportunity in good time while memories are still fresh to prepare his defence. In the case of Pope v. Clarke [1953] [1953] 2 All ER 704, which was a case in which the time had been inaccurately stated in the notice of intended prosecution. Lord Goddard made it clear that while the notice of intended prosecution was itself mandatory the requirements to be included in that notice were directory and not mandatory. In this case it was abundantly clear from the question asked by the respondent's own Counsel that the respondent was not present in Penang on 16 May 1960, so that there was no possible question of him having been misled by the charge. The notice of intended prosecution, I repeat, was served upon him just over 12 hours after this accident had occurred. It is inconceivable that he could in any way have been misled by the inaccuracy either as to the time or date as stated in the notice of intended prosecution, having regard to the fact that the place at which the accident had occurred had been stated to be in Burmah Road, Penang. He was informed by the notice of intended prosec