1961 MarsdenLR 44
HIGH COURT (PENANG)
RIGBY, J
PITCHAYKUTTY
versus
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 11 OF 1961
Decided On : 07-24-61
For the appellant - Triptipal Singh For the respondent - Raja Redzuan bin Tengku Yaacob (DPP)
Rigby J:
The appellant in this case was convicted by the learned Magistrate of an offence under s. 182 of the Penal Code, in that he made a complaint on 7 July 1960, to the Magistrate, Enche' Eusoff bin Chin, to the effect that on 5 June 1960, he had been assaulted by three male Indians, two of whom had broken the lock of his cupboard and taken away money amounting to $900, intending thereby to cause such public servant to do something, to wit, to cause investigation into the said information, which such public servant ought not to do, if the true state of facts was known by him. Upon conviction the appellant was bound over for a period of six months in his own recognisance in the sum of $100. He now appeals against the conviction.
During the hearing of the appeal Mr. Triptipal Singh, on behalf of the appellant, at the eleventh hour raised the point that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain the charge at all and that the whole proceedings were null and void by reason of the fact that there was no valid sanction, as required by s. 139 of the Criminal Procedure Code, before the Magistrate empowering him to try the appellant upon the offence as charged. Since objections as to jurisdiction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings and it is the duty of the Court, if necessary of its motion, to consider whether jurisdiction has been properly exercised, I adjourned the appeal and directed Mr. Triptipal Singh to serve further grounds of appeal upon the Legal Adviser. The matter now comes before me on resumed hearing. Before dealing with the argument raised by
Mr. Triptipal Singh on the issue of jurisdiction, I think it desirable to deal briefly with the facts of the case and with the earlier arguments raised by Mr. Triptipal.
The brief facts of the case were that on 5 June 1960, the appellant was assaulted upon his own premises by three Indians, as a result of which he was rendered unconscious and had to be taken to hospital, where he remained for some days. While in the hospital the appellant made a statement to the Police on 5 June, in the course of which he referred to the incident of the assault and said that the assailants had wished to take money from him amounting to $900. On 7 July, a little over a month later and after his discharge from hospital, he made a complaint before the Magistrate in the course of which he alleged that the assailants had broken the lock of his cupboard and taken the $900. As a result of his complaint the matter was referred to the Police for investigation and in consequence of that investigation there was every reason to believe that the statement itself was false and that it was made out of rancour arising out, not unnaturally, from the brutal assault which he had sustained at the hands of these three persons. However, as a result of that false complaint the present charge was preferred against him. Mr. Triptipal Singh, for the appellant, made no complaint as to the findings of fact by the learned Magistrate, but based his grounds of appeal solely upon objections of a somewhat technical nature.
His first ground of appeal was that there was no evidence upon which the Magistrate could find that the accused before him was, in fact, sufficiently identified as the person who had made the complaint as a result of which the charge was brought. The Magistrate before whom the complaint was made was not called as a witness, and the sole witness as to identification was the Tamil interpreter who had interpreted at the time the complaint was made to the Magistrate. In his evidence he stated:
The complaint was read over by me and explained to the accused.
Now, whilst it may well be - and I think it would have been - very much more satisfactory if he had gone on to say in his evidence:
I now identify the person in the dock as the person who made the complaint,
I am of the opinion that the reference in his evidence to the words:- "explained to the accused" is sufficient prima facie