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1962 MarsdenLR 88

ONG
ACRJ KL
WONG NYET WAH - Appellant
Versus
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR - Respondents

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 24 OF 1962
Decided On : 07/13/1962

Advocates:
YS Lee for the appellant.
Mohd Isa bin Ibrahim (Deputy Public Prosecutor) for the respondent.

JUDGMENTBY: ONG J

The appellant was tried in the Sessions Court at Kajang with two other accused persons upon a charge that they, on November 1, 1961 at a kongsi-house near the Sungei Chua Bridge, Kajang, committed extortion by putting one Low Lang in fear of injury to himself if the sum of $ 7.20 was not paid to them, an offence punishable under section 384 of the Penal Code. The third accused was acquitted at the close of the prosecution; the appellant (who was the first accused) and the second accused were called upon to enter their defence. The appellant elected to give evidence and did so. The second accused elected to say nothing in his own defence. Both were convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment. The second accused has not appealed, but the appellant appeals against both the conviction and sentence.

The relevant facts are as follows: The complainant, Low Lang, was the headman of a bridge construction gang of labourers, 7 male and 2 female, engaged in building a wooden bridge over the Sungei Chua, at the southern outskirts of Kajang, and they lived in a plank hut erected alongside the bridge. While Low was in the company of two others, Yew Ping Ying (P.W.2) and Chong Lum Ying (P.W.3), at about 8 p.m. on October 22, three visitors came to the hut. In a conversation which took place exclusively between Low and the second accused, Low was asked by that accused to join his gang for self-protection. The entrance fee was $ 7.20 and the monthly subscription $ 2 per head. Low said he had then only $ 5 and the second accused agreed to call for payment on November 1. Lows employer came to see his labourers on October 27 and the matter was reported to him. He took Low to the Kajang Police Station where Low made his report, No. 1393/61, to the O.C.P.D. On the night of October 31, the O.C.P.D. instructed a detective police constable and a police constable to set a trap, and supplied them $ 7 in marked notes. They went to the hut at about 4 a.m. and arranged with Low to remain hidden in the sleeping quarters in the loft, after handing him the $ 7 for payment. To this sum Low added $ 44 of his own, making a total of $ 51. While the labourers were resting after their mid-day meal on November 1, the second accused arrived on the scene in the company of the appellant. The second accused demanded payment from Low who said, "You better come into my room and get the money." Low then led the way into a room on the ground, and he stated that both the second accused and the appellant followed him. Inside the room he handed the $ 51 to the second accused, and then made an excuse to go out. In response to his signal the two police constables descended from their hiding place and arrested the two persons stated to be still inside the room. The money was found still in the hands of the second accused.

While there could have been no doubt about the guilt of the second accused, it is equally clear that the mere presence of the appellant on the scene is not ipso facto conclusive proof of his participation in the offence. The crucial point which had to be considered was whether, on the occasion of the earlier meeting on October 22, the demand by the second accused was made, not only while the appellant was in the immediate vicinity of the parties to the conversation, but also that it was within the hearing of the appellant, so that the demand was actually known or must have been known by him. Unless it was proved that the appellant had such knowledge he cannot by mere inference be held to have had any guilty knowledge of the purpose of the second accuseds subsequent visit to collect the money.

The law is quite clear. In the case of Gray 12 Cr App R 244, 246 Lord Reading C.J. said:

"It is not necessary that a man, to be guilty of murder, should

actually have taken part in a physical act in connection with the

crime. If he has participated in the crime -- that is to say, if he is

a confederate -- he is guilt

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