1964 MarsdenLR 219
HIGH COURT (SIBU)
CHUA, J
SEETHAPATHY
versus
SINGAPORE HARBOUR BOARD STAFF ASSOCIATION
SUIT NO. 1552 OF 1962
Decided On : 02-10-64
For the plaintiff - M. Coomaraswamy; Rodyk & Davidson For the defendants - T.T. Rajah; (T.T. Rajah)
Chua J:
The plaintiff in this case is a member of the Singapore Harbour Board Staff Association, (hereinafter referred to as the association), a trade union registered under the provisions of the Trade Unions Ordinance (Cap. 154). He sued (1) the association (2) the members of the executive council of the association declared to be elected unopposed at the election held in November 1962 (3) the members of the executive council of the association declared to be elected by vote at the election held in November 1962 and (4) Jamit Singh, the general secretary of the association. He brought the action for the purpose of obtaining (1) a declaration that the annual general meeting of the association held on 14 November 1962 was invalid; (2) a declaration that the election of the second defendants was null and void; (3) a declaration that the election of the third defendants was null and void; (4) a declaration that Jamit Singh has no power to act as general secretary; and (5) an injunction to restrain the second defendants, the third defendants and Jamit Singh from acting in their respective capacities as members of the executive council.
The constitution, rules and objects of the association are contained in the Rules and Constitution 1951, as subsequently amended from time to time (hereinafter referred to as the constitution).
Rules 8 and 12 of the constitution provide for the holding of an annual general meeting every year as soon as may be convenient after the close of the financial year on 31 March of each year.
By rr. 10(a) and 10(b) the management of the association is vested in the executive council consisting of one president, three vice-presidents, one general secretary, three other officials and eleven members. Rule 10(b) provides for the election of the members of the executive council, except the general secretary, at the annual general meeting. The rule further provides as follows:
The General Secretary who shall be the full time official of the Association shall be appointed by the remaining elected members of the Executive Council under conditions that may be decided upon by them. His duties shall be controlled and supervised by the Executive Council.
The following facts are not in dispute. Rule 10(b) was amended in 1954 by abolishing the post of honorary secretary and substituting the post of general secretary and in that year Jamit Singh was elected by the members of the executive council to be the general secretary and he continued to act as general secretary until his detention by the Government in March 1963. In 1958 the annual general meeting and the election of members to the executive council were held. In 1959 no annual general meeting and no election of members to the executive council were held. A general meeting of the association, however, was held in 1959 and approval was obtained from the members attending the meeting for the members of the old executive council, with a few changes, to remain in office and to manage the affairs of the association. No annual general meeting and no election of members to the executive council were held in 1960 and 1961 but the approval of the members attending a general meeting was obtained for the old executive council to remain in office and to manage the affairs of the association. In 1962 the then executive council fixed 14 November as the day for the annual general meeting and for the election of members to the executive council. Voting took place on 14 November followed by the annual general meeting. The second defendants and the third defendants were declared elected to the executive council. In December 1962 the plaintiff commenced the present proceedings. Before this case came on for hearing the Registrar of Trade Unions cancelled the certificate of registration of the association on 22 July 1963.
Counsel for the defendants, while conceding that normally the failure to observe rr. 8 and 10(b) was ultra vires, submitted that in the circumstances of