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2006 MarsdenLR 970

COURT OF APPEAL PUTRAJAYA
TAN HOCK KHOON – Appellant
Versus
PHUA SIEW LANG & ORS – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: J-02-485-1997]



JUDGMENT

Gopal Sri Ram JCA:

[1] The plaintiff as administrator de bonis non of the estate of Phua Si Toh ("the deceased") entered into a conditional agreement to sell a piece of land forming part of the deceased's estate. The purchase price was RM1 million. It was a condition of the sale that he should obtain consent of the High Court to effect the sale. The plaintiff applied to the High Court for consent. His application was opposed by the defendants, all beneficiaries of the deceased's estate. The judge who heard the matter dismissed it on the ground that the sale was not in the interest of the beneficiaries as the purchase price was not reasonable in view of the valuation reports produced and relied upon by the defendants.

[2] Learned counsel for the appellant criticised the approach of the learned judge as being indifferent to the special and particular facts of this case. Those facts are as follows. The deceased died intestate on 25 June 1951 following which letters of administration were issued to one Phua Kim Toh ("the 1st administrator"). The 1st administrator died on 10 October 1958 without winding up the deceased's estate. Letters of administration were then issued to one Tan Hwai Ghee ("the 2nd administrator"). The 2nd administrator died on 24 October 1986 also without winding up the affairs of the deceased's estate. It was only on 16 April 1990 that letters of administration de bonis non were issued to the instant plaintiff. At the date of the deceased's death he left behind 5 sole beneficiaries one of whom was the first administrator. All these 5 who were deceased's children are dead and they have left behind their issue who are the present beneficiaries. And they number 25. So, it comes to this. As at the date on which the plaintiff took out his summons for consent, that is to say, 20 June 1996, the deceased's estate had remained without being administered for about 45 years.

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[3] Although at the hearing before the judge the 6th, 9th, 10th, 12th and 13th defendants produced a valuation report showing the land to be worth RM1.9 million, there was no evidence of a genuine buyer produced at the hearing of the summons or any earlier. There is, mention made by the learned judge in his judgment of a statement by counsel for the remaining defendants that the 15th defendant was agreeable to purchase the subject land for RM1.3 million. But it is significant that no evidence of means was put in to show a real ability on his part to produce the purchase price. Against all this, the judge had before him a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to complete the purchase at RM1 million without vacant possession. If the sale is not put through there is no saying how many more years this estate will remain without being wound up. There is therefore merit in the complaint of learned counsel that the learned judge failed to take into account relevant considerations when exercising his discretion against the plaintiff.

[4] We now turn to the authorities. In coming to his decision, the learned judge relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Yap Yoke Luan v. Ong Wee Tok. The facts of that case were these. The administrators of the estate of a deceased had agreed to sell land belonging to the estate to the appellants. The sale was subject to obtaining leave of the Court. The administrators delayed in applying for leave, but in the meantime the appellants were allowed vacant possession of the land. The appellants subsequently obtained an order from the High Court ordering the administrators to apply to the Court for leave to sell and transfer the land. The administrators filed an application to Court for leave. The beneficiaries were cited as respondents and the appellants applied to be added as interveners. The application was dismissed by the learned judge as the beneficiaries opposed the application on the grounds inter alia that the agreed purchase price was grossly below the market value. The appellants appealed. The Federal Cou

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