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2024 MarsdenLR 483

HIGH COURT MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR
APPSMITHS SDN BHD & ANOR – Appellant
Versus
MESSRS GAVIN JAYAPAL & ANOR – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: WA-12ANCvC-140-09-2023]



Petitioner Advocates:Gan Khong Aik,Sara Idylla Isbah,Tong Min Jie ,Respondent Advocate: Harvinder Singh Sidhu Kulwant Singh

In defamation cases, the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's defenses are bound to fail; an interim injunction should not be granted if the defendant believes the statements to be true.

Headnote:(A) Evidence Act 1950 - Section 126 - Defamation - Interim injunction - The Sessions Court granted an interim injunction restraining publication of statements deemed libelous, citing risk to reputation and irreparable harm - The Court found that the Sessions Court failed to apply the proper threshold for granting such injunctions in defamation cases, particularly concerning the defences of justification and privilege - The burden lies on the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant's defences are bound to fail or that the statements are obviously untrue. (Paras 10, 11, 12, 18, 25)

(B) Interim Injunction - The principles established in previous cases dictate that an injunction should not be granted if the defendant claims the statements are true or if they are protected by qualified privilege - The Court emphasized that the burden of proof must remain with the plaintiff to show that the statements are obviously untrue. (Paras 11, 12, 17, 21)

Facts of the case:
The appeal concerns an interim injunction issued by the Sessions Court against the appellants, preventing them from publishing statements made in a client-solicitor communication which the respondents claimed were defamatory. The respondents argued that the statements would harm their reputation and business.

Findings of Court:
The Court found that the Sessions Court erred in not applying the correct legal principles for granting an interim injunction in defamation cases, particularly concerning the burden of proof and the nature of privilege.

Issues: The main issues addressed were whether the impugned statements were obviously untrue and whether the defences of justification and privilege raised by the appellants were bound to fail.

Ratio Decidendi: The Court ruled that the Sessions Court did not properly consider the burden of proof required in defamation cases, leading to an erroneous grant of the injunction. The principles established in prior cases indicate that an injunction should not be granted when the defendant's statements are claimed to be true or are protected by privilege.

Result: Appeal allowed; the interim injunction was set aside.

JUDGMENT

Roz Mawar Rozain JC:

The Sessions Court's Order

[1] This appeal is against the Sessions Court's decision on 25 August 2023 that allowed the respondents' application for an interim injunction. In essence the order restrains the appellants (and their agents) from further publishing or causing/authorising the publication of the impugned statements until the disposal of the trial. The 1st appellant was the former client of the respondents - the 1st respondent the law firm and the 2nd respondent, its sole proprietor, advocate and solicitor. The impugned statements are contained in an email sent by the 2nd appellant, director of the 1st appellant to the 2nd respondent and one Noorul Haq Zainaldin (another director of the 1st appellant/defendant), copied to Daniel Kenneth Dees (another director of the 1st appellant/ defendant) dated 16 February 2022 (client-solicitor email). The substance of the impugned statements in the client-solicitor email is reproduced herein:

"~

We did retain you for the appeal you recommended, including you ignoring the judge's instruction in order to have him strike the entire case to have this appeal. You did file this appeal without stating liberty to file afresh for striking out order, and we believe any change now from the position you've put us in will hurt our original suit and the appeal case and it will damage us severely. The appeal started by you must continue until you receive further instructions. However, please do not proceed with any work on the appeal without first getting our written approval.

~

We received a letter of engagement only on 20 Jan 2022 ie. after you commenced the case on 10 Jan 2022, and we did not agree to the fee amount you quoted beforehand, actually saying it was too high, before you shockingly withdrew with one business day's notice for action.

We also had no discussion of your posture beforehand, and were thus unaware that "SUBJECT: considering withdrawal of defamation" would result in your ultimatum. This caused us considerable unplanned expense and disruption."

[2] In coming to its decision to grant the interim injunction, the Sessions Court stated its reasons as follows:

(a) there was a real and serious risk that the appellants would continue to publish the impugned statements which are libelious in nature against the respondents;

(b) the risk that the publication of the impugned statements which are libelious in nature against the respondents would tarnish the reputation of the respondents with the Bar Council of Malaysia and State, and its field of practice as an advocate and solicitor;

(c) the respondents will experience a loss of reputation should the impugned statements be published;

(d) the order was only for a finite time - only after the disposal of trial;

(e) The respondents' loss of reputation could not be compensated if the interim injunction was not granted; and

(f) The respondents had given an undertaking as to damages.

The Factual Matrix Of The Case

[3] Before considering the submissions by the appellants and the response by the respondents, it is imperative to lay out the factual matrix of this case. The 2nd respondent through his firm, the 1st respondent had conducted matters for the 1st appellant of the following matters:

(i) Appsmiths Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Jason Kok Chin Hwa & Ors (Suit 788);

(ii) Court of Appeal [Civil Appeal No: W02-(IM)-(NCVC)-2120-11-2021] (Appeal 2120);

(iii) Kuala Lumpur High Court [Suit No: WA-23NCVC-6-01-2022] (Suit 5).

Suit 788

[4] According to the respondents' statement of claim (SoC), the following were pleaded:

(a) Instructions for Suit 788 were relayed by the 2nd appellant and Noorul Haq. Suit 788 was commenced against one Jason Kok Chin Hwa (Jason Kok) and three others. The defendants there had filed interlocutory applications to strike out the suit and for security for costs;

(b) The High Court had dismissed all the applications but had directed for the appellants to amend their pleadings. The High Court Judge had issued a ruling that subs

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