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1975 MarsdenLR 6

FEDERAL COURT KUALA LUMPUR
KETUA PENGARAH KASTAM – Appellant
Versus
HO KWAN SENG – Respondent
[Civil Appeal No: 92 Of 1975]



Petitioner Advocates:Fong Seng Yee ,Respondent Advocate: Morris Edgar,Inderjit singh

JUDGMENT

Raja Azlan Shah FJ:

[1] Ho Kwan Seng (the "respondent") was the sole proprietor of Oriental Forwarding Agency at Klang. He was granted permission to transact business relating to the import and export of goods by a senior customs officer under s 90(1) of the Customs Act, No 62 of 1967. As a forwarding agent he was statutorily required to be faithful and incorrupt (s 90(3).

[2] On 5 April 1972 the respondent was alleged to have committed two offences under the Customs Act, one under s 133(1)(a) and the other under s 135(1)(g). On 15 July 1974 he was convicted and fined $1,000 and $11,530.48 respectively. On 18 July 1974 he lodged notice of appeal. But there was no stay of execution pending appeal. On 28 December 1974 a senior officer of customs wrote a letter to the respondent notifying him of his decision to cancel the registration of the forwarding agency with effect from 4 January 1975 stating as his reason the two convictions. That was done in pursuance of s 90(4) of the Act which reads:

2

A senior officer of customs may suspend or cancel any permission granted under this section, if the agent commits any breach of this Act or of any regulation made thereunder or if he fails to comply with iny direction given by an officer of customs with regard to the business transacted by the agent.

[3] On 2 January 1975, the respondent appealed to the same customs officer not to cancel the agency as that would have adverse effect on his business as his turnover exceeded $200,000 a month. On 6 January 1975 the said customs officer wrote to the respondent notifying him that he had reconsidered the matter but his earlier decision could not be revoked.

[4] Under s 90(5) of the said Act, the respondent could, within one month from the date on which the decision was notified to him, appeal against the cancellation to the Comptroller-General, whose decision was final. He appealed to the Comptroller- General on 31 December 1974. On 21 January 1975, the Comptroller- General reshed, inter alia, "sahaya telah mengkaji perkara pembatalan kebenaran kepada Oriental Forwarding Agency menjadi wakil pengimpot- pengimpot di Pelabuhan Kelang dan berpendapat ba- hawa ke putusan pembatalan yang dibuat oleh Penolong Kanan Pengarah Kastom, Pelabuhan Kelang itu adalah wajar, sesuai dan tepat. Tidaklah ada di-dapati kekurangan dipertimbangannya itu bahkan se-kiranya beliau tidak membuat pertimbangan yang demikian beliau mungkin dianggapkan tidak cekap dalam perkhidmatannya."

[5] The respondent successfully applied to the High Court for an order of certiorari to quash the decision of the senior officer of customs The learned judge gave as his reiason that the cancellation was premature because the appeal against the convictions were still pending before the Court He therefore held that there was an excess of jurisdiction. He further held that there was an error of law on the face of the record as the excess of jurisdiction was founded on the wrong interpretation of s 90(4) of the Customs Act by the customs officer and the failure of the Comptroller- General to consider that point when dealing with the appeal before him. The learned judge seemed to think that a senior officer of customs could only cancel the agency after the appeal against the convictions had been finally determined.

[6] The Comptroller-General appealed. We allowed the appeal.

[7] The first issue that was raised in the Court below was the principles of natural justice, ie, whether they applied to the machinery to cancel the agency under s 90(4) of the Customs Act. The said Act does not provide any machinery for an inquiry. The learned judge was of the opinion that because the said Act does not provide for an inquiry, he held that the principles of natural justice 'did not apply. He seemed to have based his reasoning on the analogy of Leo Hoon Hong v. Municipal Commmissioners of the Town and Fort of Malacca, [1936] 1 MLJ 44 which decided that since the Commissioners had authority to cancel the lic

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