The Applicant was the employer of the first Respondent. The first Respondent faced two disciplinary charges of misconduct before the domestic tribunal instituted by the Applicant. The charges were in respect of alleged assault on two separate occasions upon another employee of the Applicant by the name of Mohamad Idris b. Mohamad Sidek. The first Respondent was found guilty on both charges and consequently his service with the Applicant was terminated w.e.f. 15th March 1995. Pursuant to section 20 of the Industrial Relations Act 1967 the dispute over the dismissal was referred to the Industrial Court. By Award No. 246 of 1997 handed down on 28th May 1997, the court upheld the dismissal of the first Respondent by the Applicant as being one of just cause or excuse [2] after completing the hearing before it on 3rd May 1997. However, in the said award, the court apportioned a certain degree of blameworthiness on the part of the Applicant by awarding to the first Respondent a sum of RM53,118.00. This award of the court is the subject matter of a certiorari proceeding in the above originating motion taken up by the Applicant. The first Respondent, however, filed no similar application against the Award. Hearing of the motion of the Applicant is pending. In the meantime the first Respondent on 21st November 1997 filed this summons in chambers for leave to adduce fresh evidence in the form of a letter purportedly written by the said Mohamad Idris b. Mohamad Sidek, the victim of the assault, to the Applicant dated 2nd October 1997 (a date after Award No. 246 of 1997 was handed down) withdrawing his accusation against the first Respondent on the two charges framed before the domestic enquiry and requesting the Applicant to withdraw its action against the first Respondent. No reason whatsoever was given in the letter as to the reason for the withdrawal. A copy of the said letter was extended to the first Respondent.

The law on the introduction of fresh evidence is settled by several decided cases in this country which accepted the principles laid down in the leading case of Ladd v. Marshall (1954) 3 All ER [3] 745. In that case, at the trial before the court of first instant, a witness gave her evidence which was not at all of any help to the plaintiff. The judgment in the case was given in favour of the defendant. On appeal by the plaintiff against the said decision, an attempt was made to introduce fresh evidence by this witness which would amount to the first evidence being untruthful. In her new evidence she would say that what she said at the trial was a lie and that she is now prepared to tell the truth. This application for leave made to call for further evidence in the case was disallowed by the Court of Appeal. Lord Denning L.J. at page 748 laid down three principles to be applied to justify the reception of fresh evidence which are:

"first, it must be shown that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the trial: second, the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, although, it need not be decisive: third, the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed, or in other words, it must be apparently credible, although it need no be incontrovertible." [4]

Reverting now to the present application before me, the evidence of the two charges against the first Respondent upon which the decision of the enquiry tribunal and the Industrial Court are all about, must have come from the writer of exhibit "SH-1". He gave evidence at both the venues. If he had intended to withdraw the allegation against the first Respondent, he could have done so before the two forums but he did not. But now after the decisions from the two forums based on the evidence then before them which included the evidence of the writer as the complainant relating to the charges, the first Respondent comes to this court to ask for leave to adduce t