Sharma J:

The plaintiff took out a specially indorsed writ against the defendant on 17 May 1971 for recovery of $7,245,901.38, interest and costs. The plaintiff's claim is under the provisions of the Income Tax Ordinance 1947 and Income Tax Act 1967. The defendant entered an appearance (Encl. 4) on 9 June 1971 and on 29 June 1971 filed an application (Encl. 9) for an order, inter alia, to strike out the statement of claim on one or more of the following grounds:

(a) The statement of claim 'was frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of Court.'

(b) The statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous and vexatious.

(c) The statement of claim tended to prejudice, embarrass and delay the fair trial of the action.

The aid of inherent jurisdiction of the Court was sought by the defendant for the order he was asking for in Encl. 9 under ground (a) while his sheet anchor under grounds (b) and (c) was O. 25 r. 4 and O. 19 r. 27 respectively. An affidavit (Encl. 8) of the defendant was filed in support of that application. Paragraph 1 of that affidavit was a mere paraphrase of prayer (i) of Encl. 9. The rest of the paragraphs in the said affidavit concerned prayer (ii) rather than prayer (i) of the application or were in the nature of arguments or legal submissions. There was another affidavit (Encl. 15) sworn to by one Mr. Mathai, a tax consultant giving his views -

to prove that the action is frivolous and vexatious and in abuse of the process of the Court and tends to prejudice, embarrass and delay the fair trial of the action, if any at all. (The emphasis is mine.)

The application (Encl. 9) came up for hearing on 5 July 1971 before my brother Chang Min Tat J and seems to have been very fully and elaborately argued with all the skill and learning of the Counsel as seems apparent from the well considered and very thoughtful written judgment delivered by the learned Judge on 18 December 1972. I need not reproduce passages from that judgment of Chang Min Tat J to show how well he had considered the case of the defendant. I have no doubt that that judgment will form part of the Appeal Record and so will the various enclosures to which I have made reference. In short the defendant's application (Encl. 9) was dismissed with costs.

The defendant filed his statement of defence and counterclaim (Encl. 18) on 26 December 1972. It is, however, not necessary to go into the defence at this stage except to say that a plea has been taken that the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action and that the notices of assessment are void ab initio. (I mention it merely to indicate that the defendant could always, if those pleas are sustainable, make an application under O. 25 r. 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court but that stage is not yet reached and I am, in any case, not dealing with that application.) On 16 January 1973 the plaintiff filed an application under O. 14 r. 1 for leave to sign final judgment. That application has still got to be heard by me on appeal from the order of the Senior Assistant Registrar and has no bearing on the defendant's present application.

On 9 April 1973 the defendant filed two applications (Encl. 31 and Encl. 33). Both the applications came up before me on 4 May 1973. Enclousre 31 was for leave to amend the statement of defence and Encl. 33 was for striking out the claim of the plaintiff for recovery of tax and penalties particularised in para. 3 of the statement of claim. The application was not supported by any affidavit nor was any affidavit intended to be used by the defendant at the hearing of this application. (See O. 38 r. 20). 1 asked Mr. Chin Yew Meng, Counsel for the defendant, if there was any change in circumstances or pleadings which had altered the position since the earlier application (Encl. 9) was made and dismissed on 18 December 1972. I was told that the application was still under O. 25 r. 4 but the ground for making the presen