Lord Scarman:

This is a plaintiff's appeal as to the quantum of damages in a personal injuries case from a decision by the Federal Court of Malaysia allowing the defendants' appeal from an award made in the High Court in Malaya by Ajaib Singh J.

On 4 May 1973 the appellant suffered serious personal injury in a road accident. On 16 September 1974 he issued his writ, claiming damages. It was accompanied by a statement of claim in which he alleged negligence against the two respondents (the driver and owner respectively of the vehicle with which he was in collision), and in which he claimed damages for (amongst other items) loss of the opportunity of promotion in the teaching profession. The respondents delivered their defence on 5 November 1974. There was no further pleading. Subject to a few matters which commonly arise in litigation of this class, the case was then ready for trial.

But the course of the litigation developed thereafter a most disturbing pattern of delay and interruption. The trial opened on 4 December 1975 (13 months after close of pleadings). Liability was now for the first time admitted, damages alone being left in issue. On that day the appellant called a number of witnesses. The trial then stood over for 9 months until 14 September 1976, when the appellant called a fourth witness. It was then adjourned to 7 and 8 December 1976, but it would appear from the Record of Proceedings that it was not resumed until 24 January 1978 - some 16 months later - when he called a further witness.

The pattern of a delayed and broken trial persisted. There were hearings on 27 September 1978 (8 months later): and on 26 June 1979 (9 months on). At last on 10 August 1979 (6 weeks on), the appellant closed his case, the respondents elected to call no evidence, submissions were made, and the Judge announced his award of damages.

The respondents appealed, and on 13 January 1981 the Federal Court reduced the award. The appellant now appeals to the Judicial Committee.

The time taken to hear and determine this simple, straightforward case, from close of pleadings to judgment, was a period of 4 years 9 months. In their Lordships' view such delay is totally unacceptable. Whatever the reason for it, it was a substantial obstacle in the way of justice.

After such a start - for alas, when the succeeding time spent on proceeding through two Courts of appeal is added on, that is what the time spent on trial was - it is no cause for surprise if error has crept in either at first instance, as the respondents alleged in the Federal Court, or on appeal, as the appellant alleges in his appeal to this Board.

Their Lordships stress the unacceptable factor of delay and interruption in the trial process because it has significance in their disposal of the appeal. The issue is as to the amount of damages to be awarded. Even if the appellant should succeed in establishing error on the part of the Federal Court, he may not succeed in reinstating the award of the trial Judge. If this should be the outcome of the appeal, the respondents submit that the issue of damages should be remitted, but not decided by their Lordships.

Their Lordships recognise that, in appeals as to the quantum of damages where error has been shown, it is often the better course to remit the question to the determination of the Courts of the country of origin: a recent example is to be found in the Trinidadian case, [1983] 1 WLR 585.

But there are cases where the evidence does enable the Board to reach a reasonable assessment. The Malaysian case, Jag Singh V. Toong Fong Omnibus Co. Ltd [1962] was such a case. In that case the Board was able to substitute its own assessment of general damages for personal injury for that of the Court below without departing from the principles which have always guided the Judicial Committee in this class of case. They were succinctly stated by Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, giving the opinion of the Board in that case, at p. 465:

In deciding