Mohamed Dzaiddin J:

Sometime in 1974 the petitioners who are residents of Singapore retained the respondents as their solicitors in Penang High Court originating summons No. 220 of 1974 involving the distribution of the estate of Phuah Eng Seang, deceased, under the Probate and Administration Act 1959. On 30 June 1983, the respondents informed the petitioners' solicitors in Singapore that in lieu of taxation they would like to deduct from the estate money the sum of RM45,000 and RM11,000 respectively towards their professional fees, charges and disbursements. Naturally, the petitioners instructed their Singapore solicitors to protest which they did and asked the respondents to have their bills of costs taxed. Subsequently on 7 September 1983, the respondents forwarded to the petitioners' solicitors two sets of bills of costs which were later handed to their present solicitors Messrs Shearn Delamore & Company for further action.

On 28 September 1984, Messrs Shearn Delamore & Co. filed this petition which prays for an Order of Course that the two bills of costs of the respondents be taxed on solicitor and client basis. In view of the fact that the period of more than one year had elapsed, the petitioners' solicitors filed an application by way of summons-in-chambers (encl. 7) on 18 January 1985 for an order that the time limited by s. 126 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 for the filing of this petition be extended.

Section 126(1) provides as follows:

An order for the taxation of a bill of costs delivered by an advocate and solicitor may be obtained by a petition as a matter of course by the party chargeable therewith, or by any person liable to pay the cost either to the party chargeable or to the advocate and solicitor, at any time within six months from the delivery of the bill, or, by the advocate and solicitor after the expiration of one calendar month, and within a year from the delivery.

On the facts before me, it is clear that s. 126 does not apply since the two bills costs were delivered by the respondents on 7 September 1983 and the originating petition as a matter of course was only filed after one year i.e., on 28 September 1984. On the other hand, this application comes under s. 128 of the Act which states as follows:

(1) After the expiration of six months from the delivery of a bill of costs, or after payment of the bill of costs, no order shall be made for taxation of solicitor's bill of costs, except upon notice to the advocates and solicitors and under special circumstances to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court.

Mr. Lazar, Counsel for the petitioners submitted that on the authority of Harry Lee Wee v. Haw Par Brothers International Ltd. [1980] 2 MLJ 228 the Court could exercise its inherent jurisdiction to order taxation if it can be shown that there exists "special circumstances", as it is an inherent jurisdiction of the Court to exercise control over its officers.

Mr. Ng Kong Yeam contended that under s. 128(2) of the Act the petitioners were barred from obtaining any order of taxation. Section 128(2) states as follows:

(2) No such order for taxation shall in any event be made after the expiry of one year from the delivery of the bill of costs.

Counsel further submitted that where its statutory jurisdiction is applicable the Court cannot exercise its powers under its inherent jurisdiction unless justice requires that it should be made. Alternatively, even under its inherent jurisdiction, the Court must be satisfied that "special circumstances" existed. Hence, it was submitted that on the facts as found in the affidavits, the petitioners had failed to show "special circumstances". (Symbol Park Lane Ltd. v. Steggles Palmer (a firm) [1985] All ER 167)

In order to consider the arguments of both Counsel it is necessary for me to consider both the nature of the Court's power under s. 126 and 128 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 and its power to order taxation of the solicitor's bill of costs under i