The court upheld that damages in libel cases must reflect the gravity of the libel and the plaintiff's reputation, with careful consideration before appellate interference.

Eusoff Chin CJ:

These three appeals were with consent of parties, set down for hearing together. At the outset counsel for appellant Ling Wah Press Sdn. Bhd. informed the court that he had received no instruction to proceed, and as no one from Ling Wah Press was present in court, the appeal was struck out with costs.

Encik Karpal Singh for 1st appellant (Encik M.G.G. Pillai) drew the attention of the court to a newspaper cutting where the Chief Justice when interviewed by the press two years earlier on 24 October 1996 had expressed his views that in libel cases persons of higher status would receive higher damages than those of lower status. He asked whether in view of that expression, the Chief Justice should disqualify himself from hearing these appeals. Both the Chief Judges on the panel, however, felt that each case must be dealt with on its merits and that this was no good reason to disqualify a judge from hearing a case. Otherwise, a judge who has expressed his opinion on an issue in an earlier decision would not be able to hear a case involving the same issue later on. Encik Karpal Singh withdrew his objection.

The Bar Council sent three of its members, Tuan Hj. Sulaiman Abdullah, Encik Mah Weng Kwai and Puan Anita Sockalingam to watch brief on the issue of quantum. The court allowed them to do so, as indeed the court is an open court and anyone can come in and go provided he does not disturb the court's proceedings.

The facts of the case have been clearly set out both by the High Court and the Court of Appeal in their judgments which have been reported in 1995, 1 MLJ 39, and 1995, 2 MLJ 493 respectively, and we need not repeat them here.

The High Court had awarded RM2 million against the first appellant as general and aggravated damages; RM3 million as general damages against the second appellant, Encik Hassan bin Hj. Hamzah; and RM2 million as general damages against the third appellant, Media Printex (M) Sdn. Bhd.

The Court of Appeal had upheld the awards made by the High Court.

These appeals are mainly against quantum of damages awarded. The appellants argued that they are excessive, and ought to be reduced.

It is well settled that the principle upon which an appellate court will interfere with an award of damages by a trial judge, has been laid to rest in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd . [1942] AC 601, which was followed by Dingle v. Associated Newspapers Ltd. and Ors [1964] AC 371, and that is, the appellant must show that the trial judge had acted on a wrong principle of law or has misapprehended the facts or has made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. See also Mahmood bin Kailan v. Goh Seng Choon & Anor. 1976 MarsdenLR 237 at 240.

Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Colleries Ltd had stated as follows:

Where, however, the award is that of the judge alone, the appeal is by way of rehearing on damages as on all other issues, but as there is generally so much room for individual choice so that the assessment of damages is more like an exercise of discretion than any ordinary act of decision, the appellate court is particularly slow to reverse the trial judge on a question of the amount of damages. It is difficult to lay down any precise rule which will cover all cases, but a good general guide is given by Greer LJ in Flint v. Lovell. In effect the court, before it interferes with an award of damages, should be satisfied that the judge has acted on a wrong principle of law, or has misapprehended the facts, or has for these or other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. It is not enough that there is a balance of opinion or preference.

The scale must go down heavily against the figure attacked if the appellate court is to interfere whether on the ground of excess or insufficiency.

Damages in a libel case are essentially matters of impression. The Federal Court of Australia in Humphries v. T.W.T. Ltd. [1994] 120 ALR 6