A charge must be clearly framed to specify distinct offences without duplicity; otherwise, it risks misleading the accused and causing a miscarriage of justice.

Headnote:(A) Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 - Section 3A - Criminal Procedure Code - Sections 156, 163, and 422 - Duplicity in charges - The appellant was charged for an offence involving the discharge of a weapon during a robbery. The charge was found to improperly allege two distinct offences, which misled the appellant, thus rendering the conviction a nullity. (Paras 11, 12, 33)

(B) Criminal procedure - Charge framing - The charge must state the specific offence, time, and particulars to provide fair notice to the accused. Failure to do so may result in miscarriage of justice. (Paras 7, 30)

Facts of the case:
The appellant participated in a robbery with an accomplice who discharged a firearm, leading to the charge under the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act. However, the charge alleged actions inconsistent with the offences specified, leading to claims of duplicity.

Findings of Court:
The charge’s framing caused substantial confusion that prevented the appellant from understanding the allegations, resulting in a failure of justice.

Issues: Whether the charge for the offence correctly informed the appellant of the specific allegations and applicable laws.

Ratio Decidendi: The charge did not adequately specify the offence and included elements from two distinct offences, leading to an illegality as it failed to provide the accused with adequate notice.

Result: The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence were set aside.

JUDGMENT

Jeffrey Tan FCJ:

[1] The appellant was tried and convicted by the High Court for the following two offences.

"Bahawa kamu bersama-sama seorang lagi yang telah meninggal dunia, pada 14 Januari 2008, jam lebih kurang 11.00 pagi, di Kedai Emas Gayathri Tangga Mahligai Jewellers, No 42 Lebuh Pasar, dalam Daerah Timur Laut, dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang, telah melepaskan tembakan yang boleh menyebabkan kematian semasa melakukan rompakan di mana kamu mengetahui rakan sejenayah tersebut ada di bawah jagaan atau kawalannya senjata api dan dengan itu kamu telah melakukan satu kesalahan di bawah s 3A Akta Senjata Api (Penalti Lebih Berat) 1971 yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen yang sama dan dibaca bersama s 34 Kanun Keseksaan."

[2] Against conviction and sentence for the offence under s 3A of the Firearms (Increased Penalties) Act 1971 (FIPA), the appellant appealed, but in vain, to the Court of Appeal (see Ravindran Ramasamy v. PP [2014] 1 MLRA 679; [2013] 4 MLJ 665; [2013] 8 CLJ 834; [2013] 4 AMR 502). The appellant appealed to this Court. On 22 September 2014, we unanimously allowed the appeal and set aside the said conviction and sentence. We now give our reasons.

[3] At 11.00am on 14 January 2008, the appellant and one Jayakumar a/l Muniady (Jayakumar) entered the premises of "Kedai Emas Gayathri Tangga Mahligai Jewellers" of 42 Lebuh Pasar, District of Timur Laut, with the intention to commit robbery. Once inside the jeweller's premises, the appellant proceeded, with a hammer, to smash the glass display cases/cabinets. At about the same time, Jayakumar discharged a shot from the gun in his hand. Both appellant and Jayakumar, who wore gloves, then grabbed the jewellery from the broken display cases/cabinets. But they encountered resistance from the jeweller (PW3) who threw chairs and other utensils at them. Jayakumar shot at PW3 but missed. Jayakumar and the appellant then bolted from the scene. But the appellant was apprehended not far from the jeweller's premises. Jewellery that belonged to PW3 was found on the appellant. As for Jayakumar, he made good his escape, only to be later killed in a separate shoot-out with the police on 17 March 2009. Those were the primary facts that the prosecution adduced at the trial against the appellant, and upon which the appellant was convicted for an offence under s 3A of FIPA.

[4] In his written submission, learned counsel for the appellant categorically accepted those primary facts as established facts. But learned counsel orally submitted that the charge was bad for duplicity, and that the defective charge could not be cured by s 422 of the Criminal Procedure Code (the CPC). The learned Deputy Prosecutor cited s 156 of the CPC and replied that the appellant who was able to put up his defence was therefore not misled, and that no prejudice had been occasioned.

[5] Section 163 of the CPC provides that "for every distinct offence of which any person is accused there shall be a separate charge, and every such charge shall be tried separately, except in the cases mentioned in ss 164, 165, 166 and 170". Duplicity is not allowed (Jagar Singh v. PP [1936] 1 MLRH 222; [1936] 1 MLJ 92). "As regards duplicity, the leading English authority on the subject is the case of Charles Wilmot 24 Cr AR, p 63 where the Lord Chief Justice quotes with approval the following passage from the judgment of Avory J in Rex v. Surrey Justices; Ex parte Witherick [1932] 1 KB 450 at p 452: "It is an elementary principle that an information must not charge offences in the alternative, since the defendant cannot then know with precision with what he is charged, and of what he is convicted, and may be prevented on a future occasion from pleading 'autrefois convict'." (Yap Liow Swee v. Public Prosecutor [1937] 1 MLRH 468; [1937] 1 MLJ 225). "A charge is only bad for duplicity when it alleges facts constituting two different activities; it is legitimate to charge in a single charge one activity even though th

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