Shaik Daud Ismail JCA:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Johor Bahru High Court which had on 29 July 1995, allowed an originating motion filed by the respondents herein. The respondents in their originating motion dated 17 September 1994, had applied under s. 34 of the Probate and Administration Act 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') to revoke the probate granted to the first and second appellants as the executrix and the executor of the estate of the late Kontilal Prabhulal Doshi, known as K.P. Doshi (hereinafter referred to as the 'deceased'). They also applied for the appointment of the Official Administrator, in place of the first and second appellants, as the administrator with the will annexed of the estate.

The deceased died on 1 July 1991. Investigations into his death revealed that he had been murdered and his eldest son, the first respondent, was charged with the murder. The charge was later reduced to one of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, which charge, surprisingly, is still pending in the lower court to this date.

By his will dated 30 April 1991, the deceased left all his real and personal properties to the following:

1. His lawful wife, Damayanti Kantilal Doshi (the first appellant) 25%.

2. His eldest son, Jigarlal Kantilal Doshi (the first respondent) together with his wife, Shobhana Jigarlal Doshi (the second respondent) 25%.

3. His second son, Tilaklal Kantilal Doshi (third appellant) 25%.

4. His youngest son, Jogesh Kantilal Doshi (the second appellant) 25%.

An order for the grant of probate was made in favour of the first and second appellants herein as the executrix and the executor of the estate on 15 October 1991. The grant, however, has not been extracted even up to the time of this appeal, a lapse of seven years. Delay, per se, may not be fatal but delay without an explanation, as in this case, may be sufficient ground for the beneficiaries to apply for the removal of an executor or an administrator of a deceased's estate.

The respondent's complaints listed the following in support of their originating motion:

1. Failure to take preliminary steps in the administration of the estate.

2. Failure to render accounts or periodic accounts.

3. Failure to take appropriate steps to prevent dissipation of assets.

4. Mismanagement and/or misconduct in selling assets at an under value.

5. Neglect and/or mismanagement of the company known as Alu Eoe Sdn. Bhd.

6. Misconduct in taking steps to disrupt the ongoing business of the deceased.

7. Active hostility shown towards them and the institution of endless litigation.

It is pertinent at this stage to examine the law on the power of the court to revoke a grant of probate or letters of administration. Section 34 of the Act provides that:

34. Any probate or letters of administration may be revoked for sufficient cause.

The power to revoke a grant of probate is vested in the High Court and may be exercised if the court is satisfied that there is sufficient cause to do so. In spite of this power it cannot be gainsaid that we are sensitive that the courts generally would be slow to interfere with the express wishes of a testator. Nevertheless s. 34 of the Act empowers the court to interfere if sufficient cause is shown. The crucial question is what amounts to sufficient cause. The phrase "sufficient cause" has not been defined anywhere. In Re Khoo Boo Gong, Deceased Khoo Teng Seong v. Teoh Chooi Ghim & Ors. [1981] 2 MLJ 68, the Federal Court had occasion to consider that same phrase and at p. 69 of the report the following was expressed:

The power to revoke a grant of probate or letter of administration is vested in the High Court by s. 34 of the Probate & Administration Act 1959 (Rev. 1972) and can be exercised for "any sufficient cause". However, there is no definition of what is sufficient cause. But, if in the words of Jeune, President, in the Goods of William Loveday, (1) "the real object which the Court must always keep