2025 MarsdenLR 174
HIGH COURT MALAYA KUALA LUMPUR
BADAN PEGUAM MALAYSIA & ORS – Appellant
Versus
NOOR DELLHAN YAHAYA & ORS – Respondent
[Suit No: WA-21NCvC-113-10/2022]
The prohibition against participation in a public assembly constituted an ultra vires action by police, failing to comply with the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012, yet did not result in false imprisonment as freedom was not entirely restrained.
Headnote:(A) Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 - Sections 9(1), 10(c), 11, 14(1), and 15 - Federal Constitution - Tort of false imprisonment and misfeasance in public office - Plaintiffs organized a march which was prohibited by the Police - Court found condition to prohibit the march as ultra vires, however, allowing assembly at the designated location - Determined that the police acted unlawfully but no grounds for false imprisonment as participants were allowed to leave freely - Nominal damages of RM1 awarded. (Paras 3, 55, 70, 72)
(B) Constitutional Rights - Violations claimed regarding freedom of assembly, movement, and equal protection under the law, but found no constitutional breach as assembly successfully held. (Paras 18, 26, 70)
(C) Misfeasance in Public Office - Court ruled that prohibition of the march was based on misinterpretation of law, thus no misfeasance found. (Paras 68, 70)
Facts of the case:
The Plaintiffs organized a peaceful assembly named "Walk for Judicial Independence" but were blocked from marching to Parliament by police conditions that were found ultra vires, resulting in nominal damages only. (Paras 2, 3, 72)
Findings of Court:
The Officer in Charge had acted beyond powers in prohibiting the march and failed to ensure lawful conditions that would have balanced the rights of assembly with public interest. (Paras 5, 70, 72)
Issues: Whether the conduct of the Defendants constituted a breach of the Peaceful Assembly Act, false imprisonment, or misfeasance in public office. (Paras 18, 60)
Ratio Decidendi: The Police conditions imposed were deemed ultra vires the provisions of the Peaceful Assembly Act and their actions did not amount to false imprisonment as no total restraint was established. (Paras 55, 67)
Result: Declaration issued for ultra vires actions, with RM1 nominal damages awarded. Other prayers dismissed.
| Table of Content |
|---|
| 1. violation of rights under paa 2012 (Para 1 , 2) |
| 2. chronology of events surrounding assembly (Para 16) |
| 3. plaintiffs' arguments against defendants' actions (Para 18 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26) |
| 4. defendants' arguments on the legality of actions (Para 28 , 30 , 31) |
| 5. court's findings on obligations and legal interpretation (Para 36 , 40 , 55 , 70 , 71) |
| 6. court's final judgment and order (Para 72 , 73) |
Introduction
[1] This civil suit was filed by the Plaintiffs pleading, inter alia, violation of their rights under the Peaceful Assembly Act 2012 ("the PAA 2012") and Federal Constitution , tort of false imprisonment and misfeasance in public office.
[2] The Plaintiffs had organised a peaceful assembly and march to take place on 17 June 2022, which they named: "Walk for Judicial Independence". The cause of their grievances, as pleaded in their Statement of Claim, is that the 1st Defendant, who was then the Officer-in-charge of the Police District of Dang Wangi, had prohibited the Plaintiffs, members of the Bar and some members of the public, who had assembled at a public carpark known as the Padang Merbok Public Carpark on the said date from marching to Parliament to deliver a memorandum to the then Prime Minister of Malaysia.
[3] After considering the evidence adduced during trial and submissions of learned counsel for the Plaintiffs and learned Senior Federal Counsel for the Defendants, I find that the 1st Defendant, in his capacity as the Officer-in-Charge of the Police District of Dang Wangi had acted ultra vires on 15 June 2022 and also on 17 June 2022. However, I decided that this Court ought to issue only one declaration, and not all the declarations sought by the Plaintiffs.
[4] While reading out my broad grounds, I have expressed my appreciation to counsel on both sides for their agreeing on the quantum of damages, ie that nominal damages of only RM1.00 be awarded to the 1st Plaintiff. This spared me from having to assess general damages for such a case — which is not a run-of-the-mill one.
The Parties In This Civil Suit
[5] The 1st Plaintiff is established under s 41 of the Legal Profession Act 1976 as a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal, and with power subject to the said Act to sue and be sued in its corporate name.
[6] The 2nd Plaintiff is an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya and was, at the material time, the President of the Malaysian Bar.
[7] The 3rd Plaintiff is an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya and was, at the material time, the Vice-President of the Malaysian Bar.
[8] The 4th Plaintiff is an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya and was, at the material time, the Secretary of the Malaysian Bar.
[9] The 5th Plaintiff is an advocate and solicitor of the High Court of Malaya and was, at the material time, the Treasurer of the Malaysian Bar.
[10] As mentioned at the outset, the 1st Defendant is a senior Police officer and was, at the material time, the Officer-in-Charge of the Police District ("the OCPD") of the Dang Wangi Police District in Kuala Lumpur.
[11] The 2nd Defendant is a Police officer, and was, at the material time, serving at the headquarters of the Dang Wangi Police District, under the command of the 1st Defendant.
[12] The 3rd Defendant (the Royal Malaysian Police) is one of the public services established under art 132(1)(d) of the Federal Constitution ("the Constitution").
[13] The 4th Defendant is the Inspector-General of Police of Malaysia and may be held vicariously liable for the actions of the 1st Defendant and 2nd Defendant in performing their duties as Police officers.
[14] The 5th Defendant is the Minister responsible for the 3rd Defendant.
[15] The 6th Defendant is the Government of Malaysia and is, at all material times the employer of the 1st Defendant to the 5th Defendant. Pursuant to s 5 of the Government Proceedings Act 1956 (" GPA 1956"), the 6th Defendant is vicariously liable f