JUDGMENT

Choo Kah Sing JCA:

Introduction

[1] This is an appeal against the High Court decision dated 29 August 2023 wherein the learned High Court Judge had dismissed the appellant's Originating Summons which was filed pursuant to s 103E of the Legal Profession Act 1976 ("the LPA"). The appellant sought the following orders as reproduced below:

A. bahawa bahagian keputusan Lembaga bertarikh 19 November 2021 untuk mengenakan celaan (censure) terhadap Plaintif ("Keputusan Tersebut") berasaskan Aduan Ke-7 yang dikandungi dalam Aduan No DB/14/9476 vide surat Responden bertarikh 30 Mei 2014 ("Aduan Ke-7") diketepikan;

B. Aduan Ke-7 ditolak;

C. peruntukan sewajarnya dibuat untuk kos rayuan ini; dan

D. apa-apa relif lain yang difikirkan perlu atau wajar oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini.

[2] On 20 January 2025, this Court , after having considered the oral and written submissions of the counsels for the respective parties, dismissed the appellant's appeal and affirmed the High Court Order dated 29 August 2023. The reasons for the decision are set out below.

Salient Facts

[3] The appellant's complaint centres on the decision of the Disciplinary Board ("the DB") dated 19 November 2021. The decision of the DB was the outcome of an investigation carried out by the Disciplinary Committee ("the DC") over seven (7) complaints which were filed by the 1st respondent complaining against the appellant and one Chew Swee Yoke for breach of the LPA and its Rules. The DB, after having considered the DC's recommendations, made an order against the appellant in respect of the 7th complaint as follows:

iii) In respect of the 7th complaint against the 1st Respondent, the Disciplinary Board affirmed the Disciplinary Committee's finding of liability but rejected the recommendation on punishment for fine, instead IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 1st Respondent be censured; and

[4] With regards to the other six (6) complaints, no liability was found against the appellant and Chew Swee Yoke. The appellant was aggrieved by the decision of the DB and thereby appealed to the High Court pursuant to s 103E of the LPA.

[5] Essentially, the 7th complaint is based on a letter dated 30 May 2014 which was written by the 1st respondent to the DB complaining that the appellant had breached ss 94(3)(d), (k) and (o) of the LPA and rr 18 and 31 of the Legal Profession (Practice and Etiquette) Rules 1978 ("the LPR").

[6] The complaint to the DB was that the appellant had on 16 December 2013 written a letter ("the impugned letter") addressed directly to the High Court Judge complaining against the 1st respondent's conduct, and alleging that there was "vexatious and frivolous use of the appeal procedure" by the 1st respondent and that the appellant had made libelous remarks against the 1st respondent as an opponent litigant.

At The High Court

[7] The learned High Court Judge (as he then was) found that the action taken by the appellant vis-à-vis writing the impugned letter addressed directly to the High Court Judge (Justice Noraini Abdul Rahman) who was the presiding judge on an ongoing judicial separation proceeding involving the 1st respondent himself and one Michele Kythe Lim Beng Sze, was a wrong mode to urge the High Court Judge to invoke para 17 of the Schedule (Additional Powers of the High Court ) of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 to declare that the 1st respondent a vexatious litigant.

[8] The learned High Court Judge was of the opinion that there was no necessity for the DB to formulate a proper charge against the appellant after having examined the contents of the correspondence exchanged between the appellant and the DB, which were sufficient for the appellant to know what the complaint against her was. The learned High Court Judge also found that the members of the DC did not descend into the arena during the proceedings.

[9] With regard to the question raised by the appellant as to whether the DB was under a duty to give the appellant an opportunity to be hear