JUDGMENT

Indera Mohd Arief Emran Arifin J:

(Interlocutory Application)

(Encl 13 - Application To Extend Time)

(Encl 15 - Application To Amend The Originating Summons)

A. Introduction

[1] The Plaintiff's 2 applications seek the following orders:

Encl 13 - Extension of Time

1.1 That the Plaintiff is given the extension of time to file the Originating Summons dated 2 January 2025.

1.2 That the filing of the Originating Summons on 2 January 2025 is regularized.

1.3 Costs in the cause.

Encl 15

1.4 To amend the Originating Summons to add s 37(b)(ii) of the Arbitration Act and O 69 of the Rules of , marked as Annexure A of the Application.

1.5 Costs in the cause.

B. Decision of This Court

[2] After considering the arguments put forth by the parties in the affidavits, written submissions, and at the hearing of the 2 applications, I find that this Court should allow both applications.

[3] My reasons for allowing the applications sought by the plaintiff are explained in the following paragraphs.

[4] Firstly, I find that this Court is bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Government of the Lao People's Democratic Republic v. Thai-Lao Ignite Co Ltd & Hongsa Lignite Co Ltd [W-02(NCC)-1287-2011]

[5] That case concerns the appeal against the decision of the High Court that had refused to allow the application for extension of time to set aside an arbitral award that was filed beyond 90 days as stipulated under s 37 of the Arbitration Act.

[6] In that case, the application to set aside the arbitration award was premised on the allegation that the award went beyond the scope of arbitration; therefore, the appellant in that case relied on s 37(1)(a)(iv) of the Arbitration Act.

[7] The High Court refused the application and found that it had the powers to extend time, but the delay of 9 months was unreasonable.

[8] The Court of Appeal disagreed on the issue of the time frame as being unreasonable, but agreed that the High Court did have powers to extend time. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. Ramli Ali CJA (as he then was) held:

"14. On the issue of jurisdiction, this Court is in agreement with the learned High Court judge that the High Court has the jurisdiction to grant an extension of time to set aside an arbitral award, based on the wording of s 37(4) of the Arbitration Act 2005. The Court has an unfettered discretion to grant an extension of time. The Court may extend such period of time, although the application is only made after the expiration of the said period. This is supported by item 8 of the schedule to Courts of Judicature Act 1964 which empowers the Court to enlarge or abridge the time prescribed by any written law for doing any act or taking any proceeding, although any application therefore is not made until after the expiration of the time prescribed. O 3 r 5(1) and (2) of the Rules of the High 1980, also provides for the same power to the Court ."

[9] It is also trite that for this Court to allow for the extension of time, the plaintiff must show that it is reasonable to allow the said application based on the following factors:

(a) the length of the delay

(b) reason for the delay

(c) prospect of success

(d) degree of prejudice that will be faced by the respondent.

[10] In this case, the plaintiff claims that it had missed the 90-day period only for a further period of 3 days and that this was caused by the mistake in the calculation of the time frame by its solicitors. Therefore, they contend that the respondent has suffered no prejudice as the issues to be determined as raised in the Originating Summons will not be affected by the said delay. The Plaintiff also contends that it is best that the issues raised in the Originating Summons should be determined once and for all by this Court , especially given the delay of only 3 days.

[11] The Respondent disputes the said allegations and averment. The Respondent suggests that there is no such power to extend time and that the application for the extension o