JUDGMENT

Mohd Arief Emran Arifin J:

A. Introduction

[1] This is the Defendant's application for a Marejava Injunction against the Plaintiffs that can be seen in encl 109.

[2] The Defendant's application seeks, among others, an order to prevent the Plaintiffs from removing from Malaysia or from disposing or diminish the value of any of their assets in Malaysia or overseas pending the final determination or outcome of the action. The Defendant also seeks an order for disclosure of all the Plaintiffs' assets within Malaysia or overseas.

[3] After hearing the parties, I dismissed the application as I found that the test required for a Mareva Injunction and for the disclosure of the assets of the Plaintiffs have not been satisfied by the Defendant.

B. Applicable Principles Of Law - Mareva Injunction

[4] I thank counsels for their detailed submissions pertaining to the applicable principles regarding an application for a Mareva Injunction.

[5] I find that the principles of law that should be considered by a Court of Law when dealing with a Mareva Injunction is trite. I summarized the applicable test to justify the grant of a Mareva Injunction as follows:-

(i) The Plaintiff must show that it has a good arguable case.

(ii) The Defendants must have assets within the Malaysian Court 's jurisdiction.

(iii) There is a real risk that the assets will be removed before Judgment could be satisfied.

[6] I distilled the above principles from the decision of the Court of Appeal in The Customs And Tax Adminstration Of The Kindom Of Denmark v. Saling Capital Limited & Ors; [2022] 1 MLJ 316; [2021] 7 CLJ 857, where Lee Heng Cheong JCA held:

"[23] For a Mareva application, there are three pre-requisites to satisfy before the Court may issue a Mareva injunction. They were set out by Mohamed Azmi SCJ (as he then was) in the majority decision of the Supreme Court case of Aspatra Sdn Bhd & Ors v. Bank Bumiputra (M) Bhd & Anor; [1988] 1 MLJ 97; [1987] CLJ (Rep) 50; and they are as follows:

(i) the applicant must show that it has a good arguable case;

(ii) that the defendants have assets within jurisdiction; and

(iii) that there is a risk of the assets being removed before judgment could be satisfied."

[7] I also refer to the following authorities:

(i) Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. International Bulkcarriers SA; The Mareva [1980] 1 All ER 213

(ii) S & F International Ltd v. Trans-con Engineering Sdn Bhd; [1985] 1 MLJ 62; [1985] CLJ (Rep) 280

(iii) Nimenia Maritime Corp v Trave Schiffahrtsgesellschaft GmBH & Co KG [1984] 1 All ER 398.

(iv) Lee Kai Wuen & Anor v. Lee Yee Wuen; [2022] 7 CLJ 505; [2022] 5 AMR 109

[8] I reproduce material parts from the judgment of Darryl Goon Siew Chye JCA in Lee Kai Wuen & Anor v. Lee Yee Wuen (supra):

"[93] Thus, there must either be direct evidence of a real risk of dissipation of assets or circumstances in evidence that warrants an inference of such a risk. As Mustill J stated, and it bears repeating, 'Precisely what form the evidence may take will depend on the particular circumstances of the case. But the evidence must always be there' [Emphasis Added]. It must also be emphasised that the ingredient in question is not merely the risk of dissipation of assets, but a 'real risk'. The adjective used is in our view, not without significance. It lends to emphasise that a mere risk would not do. If it were otherwise, based merely on arguable allegations, at an interlocutory stage, a great majority of cases would qualify for a Mareva injunction. In the face of unproven allegations, such a consequence would clearly be oppressive. It merits noting that the Mareva injunction, together with the Anton Piller type injunction, were described by Donaldson LJ in Bank Mellat v. Nikpour [1985] FSR 87 at p 92, as nuclear weapons of the law. The effect of these types of injunctions can be very harsh and oppressive and it is not inconceivable that in certain cases, they may have ruinous consequences.

[94] The need for evidence of a real risk of dissipat