JUDGMENT

Jamhirah Ali J:

Introduction

[1] This is an appeal by the Appellant/Defendant against the decision of the learned Sessions Court Judge (SCJ) dated 29 August 2024, which allowed the Respondent/Plaintiff's claim for defamation and dismissed the Appellant's counterclaim. The Sessions Court awarded general damages of RM50,000.00 and costs of RM10,000.00 to the Respondent.

[2] The appeal concerns a defamation claim arising from a series of social media posts made by the Appellant on TikTok, Facebook, and WhatsApp, which the Respondent claimed were defamatory, malicious, and damaging to his personal and professional reputation as a police officer.

[3] Having examined the written and oral submissions, including the grounds of judgment of the learned trial judge and the Record of Appeal, I find no appealable error. I, therefore, dismissed the Appellant's appeal. These are my reasons.

Background Facts

[4] The Respondent is a police officer attached to the Royal Malaysia Police (PDRM). The Appellant is his former partner.

[5] The Respondent's claim was based on multiple postings by the Appellant on her social media accounts, which included words, images, videos, and captions. These posts allegedly portrayed the Respondent as dishonest, immoral, and unfit to be a police officer. The posts contained vulgar language and personal insults, references to pornography, and derogatory remarks about race and religion.

[6] The Appellant denied that the statements were defamatory and raised, among other issues, questions of authorship, technical pleading deficiencies, and argued that the posts were not directed at the Respondent.

[7] The learned SCJ ruled in favour of the Respondent, holding that the impugned statements were defamatory, specifically referred to the Respondent, and were published to third parties. The counterclaim was dismissed.

The Law: Appellate Intervention

[8] It is trite that an appellate Court will not readily overturn findings of fact made by a trial judge unless it is shown that such findings were "plainly wrong". This principle is based on the understanding that the trial judge has the advantage of observing witnesses first-hand.

[9] The Federal Court in Ng Hoo Kui & Anor v. Wendy Tan Lee Peng & Ors; [2020] 12 MLJ 67; [2020] 10 CLJ 1; [2020] 8 AMR 227 reaffirmed the "plainly wrong" test, and held:

"(1) The COA erred in reversing the findings of fact of the trial judge and allowing the appeal of the respondents. The COA's observation that there was 'no judicial appreciation of the evidence' by the trial judge was unsustainable in view of the findings the trial judge had made in his judgment. The COA had erroneously applied the 'plainly wrong' test in a broad and general manner without identifying specifically why the trial judge's findings were plainly wrong on the key issues, namely the purpose of the payments made by Ng. Essentially, the COA disagreed with, and reversed, the trial judge's conclusion as to the purpose of the payment by Ng of RM6m to TEK and took the approach that it could reach a different conclusion from that of the trial judge on the facts and evidence (see paras 81, 150 & 154).

(2) It was not sufficient for the COA to reverse the findings of fact merely because on a particular point of evidence it disagreed with the trial judge's conclusion on whether one party or the other was to be believed on the evidence adduced. Although there might have been inconsistencies in the evidence - which meant that another judge might have reached a different conclusion - this was not relevant when considering if a trial judge's findings could be overturned (see para 151).

...

(5) The 'plainly wrong' test operated on the principle that the trial Court had had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses on their evidence as opposed to the appellate Court that acted on the printed records. The 'plainly wrong' test was not intended to be used by an appellate Court as a means to substitute its own decision for tha