JUDGMENT

Hamid Ismail JC:

[1] I shall refer the parties as they were in the Sessions Court .

[2] On 22nd September 2025, the accused pleaded guilty to 45 charges punishable under s 408 of the Penal Code. Those charges were registered under 11 criminal cases, ie. Criminal Case Nos: LMN-62-6-9/2025, LMN-62-7-9/2025, LMN-62-8-9/2025, LMN-62-9-9/2025, LMN-62-10-9/2025, LMN-62-11-9/2025, LMN-62-12-9/2025, LMN-62-13-9/2025, LMN-62-14-9/2025, LMN-62-15-9/2025, LMN-62-16-9/2025, LMN-62-17-9/2025, LMN-62-18-9/2025, LMN-62-19-9/2025, LMN-62-20-9/2025. Each criminal case had 3 charges.

[3] One of the charges against the Respondent reads as follows:

"That you, on 5 March 2024, at about 2.33pm, at Shell Limbang, Lot 1679, Jalan Kubong, in the District of Limbang, in the State of Sarawak, being an employee serving as a cashier at Teo Chiok Sia & Son Sdn Bhd., and in such capacity entrusted with certain property, to wit cash amounting to RM521.76 belonging to the said company, committed criminal breach of trust in respect of the said property, and thereby you have committed an offence which is punishable under s 408 of the Penal Code."

[4] Save for the date, time and amount of money involved, the 45 charges are identical in nature and the same can be summarised in the table below:

[5] The accused was convicted and sentenced to 1 year and 6 months imprisonment for each of the charges and the sentences were to run concurrently.

[6] The prosecution filed a notice of appeal in respect of sentence only to this Court . In its written submission, the prosecution argued that the sentences were manifestly inadequate if viewed with the trend of sentencing. The prosecution further argued that the sentences ought to run consecutively.

[7] In determining this appeal, I am guided by the decision of the Court of Appeal decision in PP v. Ling Leh Hoe; [2015] 4 CLJ 869; [2015] 5 AMR 325:

"The appellate Court can and will interfere in the sentence imposed by the lower Court if it is satisfied that any of the following four grounds are made out:

(a) The sentencing judge had made a wrong decision as to the proper factual basis for the sentence;

(b) There had been an error on the part of the trial judge in appreciating the material facts placed before him;

(c) The sentence was wrong in principle; or

(d) The sentence imposed was manifestly excessive or inadequate."

[8] Did the one year imprisonment sentence imposed by the Sessions Court Judge on the accused fall into any one of the matters listed out above? I am addressing this issue first.

[9] Let me state the general principle on sentencing first. The accused pleaded guilty before the learned Sessions Court Judge. Thus, it is the learned Sessions Court Judge's duty to determine an appropriate sentence to be imposed on the accused. In this aspect, the learned Sessions Court Judge had the absolute discretion to impose the suitable sentence as held in New Tuck Shen v. PP; [1982] 1 MLJ 27; [1982] CLJ (Rep) 606:

"The right to impose punishment on a guilty party is absolutely the discretion of the Court . It will exercise that power judicially but will not tolerate any encroachment or even semblance of encroachment either by the prosecution or the defence in respect of such rights."

[10] In passing the sentence, the learned Sessions Court Judge must assess all material before her because a 'sentence according to law' means that the sentence must not only be within the ambit of the punishable section, but it must also be assessed and passed in accordance with established judicial principles (PP v. Jafa Daud; [1981] 1 MLJ 315). Assessment of a sentence in accordance with judicial principles contemplates, inter alia, a consideration of the mitigating circumstances in favour of the person to be sentenced (Tan Lay Chen v. PP; [2001] 1 MLJ 135; [2000] 4 CLJ 492).

[11] It is generally accepted that an accused person should be given credit or discount for pleading guilty. But this is not a strict rule as the Court may, in