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2025 MarsdenLR 2581

HIGH COURT MALAYA SHAH ALAM
LIM FANG WOEI & ANOR – Appellant
Versus
PEJABAT DAERAH & ORS – Respondent
[Suit No: BA-22NCVC-353-08/2023]



Petitioner Advocates:Perumal Sunderan Vythilingam,Mary Nivashini ,Respondent Advocate: Lim Wei Han

JUDGMENT

Choong Yeow Choy J:

Introduction

[1] The matter before this court concerns the 3rd Defendant's application in encl 128 for further consequential orders to be made pursuant to this court's earlier order dated 1 February 2024 (encl 69).

[2] The reliefs sought by the 3rd Defendant in encl 128 are as follows:

1. Suatu perintah susulan ("consequential order") bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif perlu membuka satu akaun yang dipegangkan di atas nama-nama Plaintif-Plaintif dan Defendan Ke-3 ("Akaun tersebut") seperti yang diperintahkan oleh Mahkamah yang Mulia ini di dalam para (c) bagi Perintah bertarikh 1 February 2024 tersebut ("Perintah tersebut") dalam tempoh masa tujuh (7) hari daripada tarikh penyampaian perintah ini ke atas Plaintif-Plaintif.

2. Suatu perintah susulan ("consequential order") bahawa Plaintif-Plaintif perlu memasukkan wang sewa dan deposit tersebut ke dalam satu Akaun tersebut seperti yang diperintahkan di dalam para (c) bagi Perintah tersebut dalam tempoh tujuh (7) hari daripada tarikh pembukaan akaun tersebut.

3. Suatu perintah bahawa Defendan Ke-3 dibenarkan untuk meminda Perintah bertarikh 1 Februari 2024 (Lampiran 69) ("Perintah") menurut pindaan yang digariskan dalam warna merah dalam Perintah Terpinda Yang Dicadangkan yang dilampirkan bersama-sama dengan permohonan ini sebagai Lampiran A;

4. Kos permohonan ini dijadikan kos dalam kausa; dan

5. Relif selanjutnya atau relief lain sebagaimana Mahkamah yang Mulia ini difikirkan suai manfaat dan wajar.

[3] The Plaintiffs had, prior to this application, filed an appeal to the court of Appeal against this court's decision in encl 69, which had granted an interim injunction in favour of the 3rd Defendant. At the hearing of encl 128 on 22 July 2025, the parties informed the court that the said appeal had been fixed for hearing on 26 August 2025.

[4] In view of the pending appeal, and the potential of encl 128 being rendered academic should the appeal succeed, this court had deferred its decision on encl 128 pending the outcome of the appeal.

[5] On 27 August 2025, the 3rd Defendant informed the court that the Plaintiffs' appeals in respect of encls 3 and 37 had been dismissed by the court of Appeal on 26 August 2025, thereby affirming this court's earlier decisions.

[6] In light of the above, it became necessary for this court to determine encl 128 on its merits.

[7] On 12 September 2025, this court allowed the 3rd Defendant's application in encl 128.

[8] On 30 September 2025, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal against this court's decision. These are now the grounds of judgment in respect of the said decision.

The Respective Contentions

[9] In resisting encl 128, the Plaintiffs relied primarily on three Federal court authorities, namely:

• Badiaddin Mohd Mahidin & Anor v. Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd; [1998] 1 MLJ 393; [1998] 2 CLJ 75; [1998] 1 AMR 909 ("Badiaddin");

• Hock Hua Bank Bhd v. Sahari Murid; [1981] 1 MLJ 143 ("Hock Hua Bank Bhd"); and

• Stone World Sdn Bhd v. Engareh (M) Sdn Bhd; [2020] 12 MLJ 237; [2020] 9 CLJ 358; [2020] 7 AMR 233 ("Stone World").

[10] The essence of the Plaintiffs' position is that this court, having issued a sealed and perfected order (that is, the injunction in encl 69), is functus officio and cannot make any further orders that would in substance alter or supplement the original order.

[11] The passages from Badiaddin cited by counsel for the Plaintiffs in their written submissions were as follows:

[1] The doctrine of res judicata would apply to bar the making of the third order of 22 September 1995 ('the third order') directly concerned, because the second order of 8 October 1990 had become the truth between the landowners and the chargee, and the third order would constitute a challenge to the truth or accuracy of the second order. The High court should have exercised its inherent jurisdiction and dismissed the fresh subsequent proceeding in which the third order was made, by relying on the doctrine of res judicata even though it was not pleaded b


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