JUDGMENT

Choong Yeow Choy J:

Introduction

[1] The present Notice of Application, encapsulated in encl 16 and filed by the First, Second and Third Defendants, does not seek to determine the substantive rights of the parties in respect of the claims made in the main action. Rather, it concerns a procedural question: whether this suit ought to be consolidated with an earlier suit commenced approximately one month prior in the High Court at Kuala Lumpur.

[2] To the lay observer, the outcome of this application may seem of limited consequence, as the respective rights and liabilities of the parties will ultimately be adjudicated regardless of whether the suits proceed separately or together. However, the question raised in encl 16 bears significant implications for the effective administration of civil justice. It engages core considerations of judicial economy, the avoidance of duplicative proceedings, and the minimisation of costs and delay for both the Court and the litigants.

The Overarching Issue

[3] The singular and central issue in the present application is whether this is an appropriate case for this Court to exercise its discretion to order the transfer of the present Suit No BA-22NCvC-515-12/2024 ("Suit 515") to the High Court at Kuala Lumpur, and for it to be consolidated with Suit No WA-22NCC-768-11/2024 ("Suit 768"), pursuant to O 4 of the Rules of 2012.

The Respective Contentions

[4] The nub of the First, Second and Third Defendants' case is that both Suit 515 and Suit 768 are "two sides of the same coin". The core argument advanced by the First, Second and Third Defendants is that there is sufficient commonality warranting a consolidation of these suits.

[5] In support of their application to consolidate Suit 515 and Suit 768, the First, Second and Third Defendants highlighted the commonality point by way of the following Table of Comparison.

[6] It was asserted by the First, Second and Third Defendants that the conditions in O 4 r 1(1)(a) and (b) of the Rules of 2012, that is, the existence of "some common questions of law or fact" and the rights to relief claimed therein are in respect of or arise out of the same transaction or series of transactions" respectively have been met.

[7] The First, Second and Third Defendants substantiated their contentions with cases such as Central Securities (Holdings) Bhd v. Haron Bin Mohamed Zaid; [1979] 2 MLJ 244, Jaya Sudhir Jayaram v. Nautical Supreme Sdn Bhd; [2019] 2 MLJ 816; [2019] 6 CLJ 292; [2018] 8 AMR 209, Del E Webb International Hotel Co v. Hotel Merlin (Penang) Sdn Bhd; [1973] 1 MLJ 31b and Kumpulan Emas Berhad v. Lim Teng Lew & Anor; [2004] 2 MLJ 614; [2004] 3 AMR 422.

[8] The First, Second and Third Defendants further contended that both suits are relatively at the same stage and denied the allegation by the Plaintiff that the present application in encl 16 is done in bad faith and for an ulterior motive.

[9] The Plaintiff's contentions were premised on the following arguments, that is:

• That the facts, issues, and causes of action in both Suits are different and/or irrelevant;

• That the reliefs sought by the Plaintiff arose out of a series of different and/or unrelated transactions;

• That this consolidation application will prejudice the Plaintiff;

• That this consolidation application is made in bad faith and for an ulterior purpose.

[10] The Plaintiff highlighted what it considered as the distinct material facts in the form of the following Table.

[11] The case of Mayban Trustee Bhd v. Amalan Tepat Sdn Bhd; [2006] 3 MLJ 82; [2006] 5 CLJ 43 was cited by the Plaintiff for the proposition that when an applicant fails to state the common question of fact or law that has arisen in the two suits, the Court will be unable to accept the contention that O 4 r 1(1)(a) of the Rules of 2012 has been fulfilled.

[12] To support its contention that Suit 515 and Suit 768 do not fall within the ambit of O 4 r 1(1)(a) and (b), the Plaintiff relied on the case of Federal Land Developme