JUDGMENT

Arziah Mohamed Apandi JC:

Introduction

[1] This application concerns the Ad Interim Ex parte Mareva Injunction given on 4 June 2025.

[2] Enc. 14 is the 3rd Defendant's application dated 30 May 2025 for a variation of the Ex Parte Order dated 22 May 2025 under Enc. 7 and Ad Interim Order dated 4 June 2025 under Enc. 35 ("3rd Defendant's Variation Application").

[3] Having considered the submissions of both parties and the evidence, I allow the 3rd Defendant's application to vary para 7 of the Ad Interim Order dated 4 June 2025, subject to modifications as set out below.

[4] The 3rd Defendant operates a petroleum wholesale business that incurs substantial monthly costs, significantly exceeding the current RM50,000.00 limit. The application aims to increase this to RM1,100,000.00 per month and to allow certain one-off payments. This decision balances the plaintiff's legitimate interest in protecting assets with the 3rd Defendant's right to conduct normal business operations.

Preliminary Objection - Dismissed

[5] The 3rd Defendant's objection to the plaintiff's affidavits on language competency grounds fails. The objection rests solely on the 2nd Defendant's personal belief without contemporaneous evidence. The deponent affirmed that she understands Bahasa Malaysia, and her 28-year history directing a company that requires continuous dealings with government agencies and oil companies objectively demonstrates her language competency.

[6] Under Thien Seng Chan Sdn Bhd v. Teguh Wiramas Sdn Bhd & Anor HC, courts should not sustain preliminary objections on non-compliance grounds absent substantial miscarriage of justice or incurable prejudice. Even if technical defects existed, O 2 r 3 of the Rules of 2012 (ROC 2012) applies where no real prejudice occurred, the 3rd Defendant had filed comprehensive replies demonstrating full understanding of the plaintiff's case. Therefore, the preliminary objection is dismissed.

Applicable Legal Principles

A. Mareva Injunctions and Ordinary Business Expenses

[7] The fundamental principle governing Mareva injunctions is that they should not unduly interfere with a defendant's ability to conduct ordinary business. As established in Halifax plc v. Chandler [2001] EWCA Civ 1750:

"The purpose of a freezing injunction is not to interfere with the defendant's ordinary business or his ordinary way of life... there can be no objection in principle to the defendant's dealing in the ordinary way with his business and with his other creditors."

[8] Mareva orders preserve assets pending judgment; they do not provide security for claims or create an "untouchable pot." As Polly Peck International plc v. Nadir (No 2) [1992] 4 All ER 769 confirms, courts must balance defendants' reasonable business needs against plaintiffs' legitimate interest in asset preservation. The injunction prevents evasion of justice through improper asset dissipation, not legitimate business operations. Where the current limit renders normal business continuation impossible, variation becomes necessary to prevent the interlocutory remedy from achieving what final judgment might not complete cessation of the defendant's enterprise.

B. Test For Variation

[9]Cie Noga D'Importation Et D'Exportation SA v. Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] EWHC 602 (Comm) establishes the comprehensive test: whether the variation serves the interests of justice, requiring applicants to demonstrate its appropriateness and to adduce necessary supporting evidence. Courts must examine whether the variation is consistent with preventing defendants from evading justice by disposing of assets outside the ordinary business course, while recognising that assets belong to defendants and that injunctions should not become instruments of oppression.

[10] The test requires considering objectively the overall justice of allowing payments, including the likelihood of future judgment being unsatisfied, while acknowledging that frozen funds remain the defendant's proper