2009 MarsdenLR 626

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA)
JAMES FOONG FCJ, ABDULL HAMID EMBONG AND ABDUL MALIK ISHAK JJCA
CIVIL APPEALS NOS D-01–21 OF 2008 AND D-01–22 OF 2008
26 June 2009


Civil Procedure — Action — Cause of action — Cause of action based on fraud and conspiracy to defraud — Defendants sued jointly and severally — Whether death of one defendant would bar continuance of action against remaining defendantsCivil Procedure — Damages — Assessment of damages — Action based on fraud and conspiracy to defraud — How damages reckonedCivil Procedure — Damages — Exemplary damages — Reckoning of exemplary damages, factors for considerationCivil Procedure — Judgment — Default of appearance — Judgment in default of appearance obtained after trial — Setting aside, principles applicable — Factors to be considered — Whether absence of applicant predominant considerationCivil Procedure — Parties — Joint tortfeasors — Cause of action based on fraud and conspiracy to defraud — Whether death of one tortfeasor would bar continuance of action against remaining tortfeasorsEquity — Estoppel — Estoppel by election — Scope and nature of — Circumstances when applicableEvidence — Burden of proof — Fraud alleged in civil case — Whether higher standard of proof than balance of probabilities applicableTort — Damages — Assessments — Action based on fraud and conspiracy to defraud — How damages reckonedTort — Damages — Exemplary damages — Reckoning of exemplary damages, factors for consideration
Neither the defendants nor their counsel were present when the plaintiffs’ civil action was called for hearing in the High Court on 13 January 2008. The High Court proceeded in the absence of the defendants and/or their counsel and heard evidence in support of the plaintiffs’ claim. After deliberation, the High Court allowed the plaintiffs’ claim. The plaintiffs were awarded general damages, exemplary damages, interest and costs. The defendants’ counsel applied the very next day to set aside the judgment under O 35 r 1 of the Rules of the High Court 1980, which application was heard and dismissed by the High Court. The defendants subsequently appealed against the decision of the High Court of 13 January 2008 (‘the decision appeal’) and against the decision of the High Court dismissing their application to set aside the judgment (‘the JID appeal’). The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal refused the defendants’ application to consolidate both appeals, and instead ordered the appeals be heard one after another beginning with the JID appeal. At the commencement of the appeal, the plaintiffs’ counsel raised a preliminary objection and prayed that the defendants’ decision appeal be struck out. The plaintiffs’ counsel contended that the defendants were estopped from pursuing their decision appeal since they had elected to pursue the JID appeal.
Held, dismissing the appeal with costs:
(1)(per James Foong FCJ) For estoppel by election to apply, there must first be an election made by one party and responded by the other who was encouraged by this election to adopt or persevere a line of conduct which he otherwise would have abandoned or modified, or he has changed his tactics which he would not have adopted if not for the election. In short, there must be a positive act of election corresponded by a reaction from the other side to the act. However, in the instant case there was no evidence that the defendants had made any election in the first place. They had proceeded with the two appeals simultaneously. There was also no evidence that the plaintiffs were encouraged by any election made by the defendants to alter their conduct of the case. The plaintiffs in fact were prepared to take on the defendants in both the appeals. This principle of estoppel, being equitable in nature should only be used where justice dictates and should only be applied according to the facts and circumstances of each particular case and its operation dependent upon the conduct of the parties (see paras 10 & 16); Annie Quah Lay Nah v Syed Jafer Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors and another appeal [2007] 1 MLJ 225Meng Leong Development Pte Ltd v Jip Hong Trading Co Pte Ltd [1985] 1 MLJ 7[2009] 4 MLJ 610 at 612 and Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565Yogananthy a/l AS Thambaiya lwn Idris Osman [2006] 2 MLJ 101
(2)(per James Foong FCJ) In setting aside a judgment in default due to non-appearance by a party, a distinction ought to be drawn between an application where the judgment was obtained without a trial having proceeded, and an application where the judgment was obtained after a trial. Where the judgment is entered after trial, different rules will apply. The factors to be considered when dealing with such an application (default judgment after trial) are as identified in the English case of Shocked & Anor v Goldschmidt & Ors [1998] 1 All ER 375, as applied locally in Abdul Rafar bin Maimunni & Anor v HM Latiff bin KM Haneefa [2008] 1 LNS 157 and Ng Chek Kiam & Anor (Seng Heng Wholesale Fruit Dealer) v Best Fruits Sdn Bhd [2006] 1 LNS 267 (see paras 17–18); Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473Burns v Kondel [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 444 distinguished; Shocked & Anor v Goldschmidt & Ors [1998] 1 All ER 3752 followed; Abdul Rafar bin Maimunni & Anor v HM Latiff bin KM Haneefa [2008] 1 LNS 157 and Ng Chek Kiam & Anor (Seng Heng Wholesale Fruit Dealer) v Best Fruits Sdn Bhd [2006] 1 LNS 267 referred.
(3)(per James Foong FCJ) The defendants’ absence was the predominant consideration. Although the defendants sought to lay the blame on their solicitor’s previous employee who had allegedly failed to diarise the hearing date, an employer is responsible for the action of his employee, and thus the conduct of the defendants’ solicitors also bound the defendants. Further, the failure to diarise a hearing date is not an excuse that has been tolerated by the courts. The defendants’ solicitors indifference or lack of interest in managing their firm properly by failing to devise a system to monitor and check whether the duties or instructions given to its employees were carried out, would amount to a deliberate act or defiance of a court order if such order were given to its employee and not complied with. In the instant case, the plaintiffs had also adduced unrebutted evidence, that they had sent a letter of reminder to the defendants’ counsel concerning the hearing date (see paras 20–23); Mohd Yusof Mohamad v Electrolux Home Centres Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 866; Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Pasadena Properties Development & Ors [1991] 1 MLJ 111Lim Soh Wah & Anor v Wong Sin Chong & Anor and another appeal [2001] 2 CLJ 344 referred.
(4)(per James Foong FCJ) In the instant case, the plaintiffs’ causes of action were based on fraud and conspiracy to defraud. Concerning the fraud, the plaintiffs had claimed against the defendants jointly and/or severally. Thus, each of the defendants was individually liable to the [2009] 4 MLJ 610 at 613plaintiffs. There was no question of the first and third defendants being released by the plaintiffs on account of the death of the second defendant. In the cause of action for conspiracy, all the defendants were joint tortfeasors. Even when one of them died, the action would subsist against the surviving tortfeasors without the need to substitute the deceased defendant. In short, the action would continue against the remaining tortfeasors. The first and third defendants thus remained liable to the plaintiffs and had not been discharged. Further, there was no record that the plaintiffs had withdrawn their claim against the deceased second defendant. It was merely the High Court’s own discretion to refuse awarding any damages against the second defendant (see paras 29–30).
(5)(per James Foong FCJ) In a claim based on fraud and conspiracy to defraud, the plaintiffs should be entitled to the loss suffered as the result of the deprivation of their income or profit caused by the wrong committed by the defendants, after taking into account the foreseeability factor. In the instant case, the plaintiffs’ witness had given credible and uncontradicted evidence on how the plaintiffs’ losses were arrived at and this had been accepted by the High Court. The High Court judge had applied the correct principles in assessing general damages, which was also substantiated by cogent evidence (see paras 36–37).
(6)(per James Foong FCJ) An award of exemplary damages ought to be moderate. The resources and conduct of the parties, quantum of the compensatory award, and gravity of the wrong are also factors to be considered. In the instant case, considering the circumstances and all other relevant factors the trial judge’s award of exemplary damages was justified (see para 38).
(7)In the instant case, the High Court had declared that even if proof beyond reasonable doubt was applied, its decision would still be the same. This was a clear indication that the High Court had considered and applied the higher standard of proof in concluding that the defendants were liable to the plaintiffs (see para 43).
(8)(per James Foong FCJ) The documents filed by the plaintiffs in their additional bundle of documents were admitted by the court when they were tendered by the plaintiffs during the trial. Once admitted the documents were considered evidence. As for the oral evidence, such evidence was properly admitted by the court (see para 45).
(9)(per James Foong FCJ) Although the defendants had taken prompt and immediate action to set aside the default judgment, this paled in significance when considered in the light of the very weak excuse given for the defendants’ absence in court coupled with no real prospect of [2009] 4 MLJ 610 at 614success in their defence. Further, it is public policy that there should be finality in an action rather than having to engage the court to conduct two trials instead of one (see para 46).
(10)(per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA dissenting in part) The plaintiffs’ preliminary objection ought to be unanimously dismissed forthwith. There were no principles of law that required the defendants to be put to an election of their rights. Both the defendants’ appeals were in respect of different matters, issues and questions of law. Both decisions of the High Court were also appealable under ss 368Courts of Judicature Act 1964
(11)(per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA dissenting in part) When one party fails to appear, the High Court may proceed with the trial in the absence of that party. However, the party which appears before the court would have to prove its case on any issue for which it bore the burden of proof. In the instant case, the burden of proof was on the plaintiffs to prove their case notwithstanding the absence of the defendants (see paras 72–73); Liew Geok Lan (f) v John Loh [1993] 3 CLJ 158; Barker v Furlong [1891] 2 Ch 172Shaharuddin bin Abdul Rahman v Satisah Ismail Sdn Bhd [1982] 2 MLJ 79
(12)(per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA dissenting in part) In an application to set aside a judgment in default of appearance by the defendant after trial, different considerations will apply compared to an application to set aside such default judgment before trial. Although the court has an unfettered discretion to grant or refuse an application to set aside a judgment in default of appearance after a trial, there must be some material on which the court can exercise its discretion in favour of the applicant. The predominant consideration is not whether there is a defence on the merits but rather the reason why the defendant had absented itself. If the absence was deliberate and not due to accident or mistake, the court would be unlikely to allow a rehearing. Other relevant factors to be considered in such an application include: (i) the defendant’s prospects of success in a retrial; (ii) the delay in applying to set aside the judgment; (iii) the conduct of the defendant; (iv) whether the successful party would be prejudiced by the judgment being set aside; and (v) the public interest in there being an end to litigation (see para 80); Shocked & Anor v Goldschmidt & Ors [1998] 1 All ER 372 and Buga Singh v Koh Bon Keo [1967] 1 MLJ 16
(13)(per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA dissenting in part) In the instant case, the defendants’ solicitors’ oversight of the trial date was a genuine mistake and not deliberate. The High Court judge had erred in law when he failed to accept the reasons for the absence of the defendants and their solicitors on the date of hearing. Their absence was not intentional or deliberate (see para 101).
(14)(per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA dissenting in part) The allegations of fraud, cheating and conspiracy against the first defendant hinged entirely on the actions of the second defendant — deceased at the time of trial — as the representative, agent or employee of the first defendant. With the demise of the second defendant it was doubtful whether the burden of proof of conspiracy, fraud and cheating had been adequately proved by the plaintiffs notwithstanding the absence of the defendants on the hearing date. With the second defendant’s demise, the case against the first and third defendants could not be sustained. Further, as a joint tortfeasor, when the second defendant died, that was the end of the matter. The plaintiffs had also abandoned their claim against the second defendant. Thus, it was not possible for the High Court to decide the case against the defendants (see paras 105–107, 112–113).
(15)(per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA dissenting in part) The defendants had not delayed in applying to set aside the default judgment. They had acted promptly and timeously in filing their application (see para 114).
(16)(per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA dissenting in part) The plaintiffs’ claim was for damages and there were 354 plaintiffs in the instant case. Each one had to individually prove his or her claim before the High Court. There was no ‘class action’ suit in Malaysia. Neither was this action filed as a representative action. The High Court’s decision was not based upon any cogent evidence, either oral or through documents (see para 116).
(17)(per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA dissenting in part) In the instant case, to allow the decision appeal and remit the case back to the High Court for retrial would not deprive the defendants their opportunity to defend the action whilst at the same time the plaintiffs would still have the opportunity to continue with their claim. To deprive the defendants the opportunity of defending the claim would likely lead to a miscarriage of justice in the instant case (see paras 117 & 119);Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue Chew [2007] 3 SLR 673
(18)(per Abdul Malik Ishak JCA dissenting in part) In the instant case, there was an improper judicial appreciation of the evidence by the High Court judge. The High Court had failed to test the evidence of witnesses against the probabilities of the case since both parties were not in court to present their versions. The appellate court was thus free to reverse the findings of the trial court, which was plainly wrong in the instant case. The trial judge had misdirected himself and failed to judicially appreciate the evidence (see paras 120–122).
Defendan-defendan mahupun peguam mereka tidak hadir apabila tindakan sivil plaintif-plaintif dipanggil untuk dibicarakan di Mahkamah Tinggi pada 13 Januari 2008. Mahkamah Tinggi telah bermula tanpa kehadiran defendan-defendan dan/atau peguam mereka dan mendengar keterangan yang menyokong tuntutan plaintif-plaintif. Selepas dipertimbangkan, Mahkamah Tinggi telah membenarkan tuntutan plaintif-plaintif. Plaintif-plaintif telah diawardkan ganti rugi am, ganti rugi teladan, faedah dan kos. Pada keesokan hari, peguam defendan-defendan telah memohon untuk mengenepikan penghakiman di bawah A 35 k 1 Kaedah-Kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980, yang mana permohonan itu telah didengar dan ditolak oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Defendan-defendan seterusnya telah merayu terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi bertarikh 13 Januari 2008 itu (‘keputusan rayuan’) dan terhadap keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi yang menolak permohonan mereka untuk mengetepikan penghakiman (‘rayuan PI’). Defendan-defendan telah merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Mahkamah Rayuan telah menolak permohonan defendan-defendan untuk menggabungkan kedua-dua rayuan, dan sebaliknya memerintahkan rayuan-rayuan itu didengar satu demi satu bermula dengan rayuan PI itu. Pada permulaan rayuan tersebut, peguam plaintif-plaintif telah menimbulkan bantahan awal dan memohon agar rayuan keputusan defendan-defendan dibatalkan. Peguam plaintif-plaintif menegaskan bahawa defendan-defendan diestopkan daripada meneruskan rayuan keputusan mereka memandangkan mereka telah memilih untuk meneruskan dengan rayuan PI itu.
Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos:
(1)(oleh James Foong HMP) Untuk menggunapakai estopel melalui pilihan, pertama perlu ada pilihan yang dibuat oleh satu pihak dan dibalas oleh yang lain atas galakan pilihan ini untuk menggunakan atau memerlukan ketekunan berlakuan yang dia sebaliknya akan batal atau ubah, atau dia telah menukar taktiknya yang dia tidak akan gunakan jika bukan kerana pilihan itu. Pendek kata, perlu ada tindakan pilihan positif yang disambut dengan tindak balas daripada pihak satu lagi untuk bertindak. Walau bagaimanapun, dalam kes ini tiada keterangan bahawa defendan-defendan telah membuat apa-apa pilihan pada mulanya. Mereka telah meneruskan dengan dua rayuan tersebut serentak. Tiada juga keterangan bahawa plaintif-plaintif digalakkan melalui apa-apa pilihan yang dibuat oleh defendan-defendan untuk mengubah pengendalian mereka terhadap kes tersebut. Bahkan plaintif-plaintif telah bersedia untuk menentang defendan-defendan dalam kedua-dua rayuan. Prinsip estopel ini, yang bersifat ekuiti hanya patut digunakan di mana keadilan diperlukan dan hanya patut digunakan menurut fakta dan keadaan untuk setiap kes tertentu dan pelaksanaannya bergantung kepada perlakuan pihak-pihak (lihat perenggan 10 & 16); Annie Quah Lay Nah v Syed Jafer Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors and another appeal [2007] 1 MLJ 225Meng Leong Development Pte Ltd v Jip Hong Trading Co Pte Ltd [1985] 1 MLJ 7Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565Yogananthy a/l AS Thambaiya lwn Idris Osman [2006] 2 MLJ 101
(2)(oleh James Foong HMP) Dalam mengenepikan penghakiman ingkar akibat daripada ketidakpatuhan oleh satu pihak, perbezaaan patut dibuat antara permohonan di mana penghakiman yang diperoleh tanpa perbicaraan yang telah dimulakan, dan permohonan di mana penghakiman telah diperoleh selepas perbicaraan. Di mana penghakiman telah dimasukkan selepas perbicaraan, kaedah-kaedah berbeza terpakai. Faktor-faktor yang perlu dipertimbangkan semasa mengendalikan permohonan sebegini (penghakiman ingkar selepas perbicaraan) dikenalpasti dalam kes Inggeris Shocked & Anor v Goldschmidt & Ors [1998] 1 All ER 372, seperti mana diguna pakai di sini dalam kes Abdul Rafar bin Maimunni & Anor v HM Latiff bin KM Haneefa [2008] 1 LNS 157 dan Ng Chek Kiam & Anor (Seng Heng Wholesale Fruit Dealer) v Best Fruits Sdn Bhd [2006] 1 LNS 267 (lihat perenggan 17–18); Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473Burns v Kondel [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 444 dibeza; Shocked & Anor v Goldschmidt & Ors [1998] 1 All ER 375 diikut; Abdul Rafar bin Maimunni & Anor v HM Latiff bin KM Haneefa [2008] 1 LNS 157 dan Ng Chek Kiam & Anor (Seng Heng Wholesale Fruit Dealer) v Best Fruits Sdn Bhd [2006] 1 LNS 267 dirujuk.
(3)(oleh James Foong HMP) Ketidakhadiran defendan-defendan merupakan pertimbangan utama. Meskipun defendan-defendan telah cuba meletakkan tanggungjawab terhadap kesalahan bekas pekerja peguam-peguam mereka yang dikatakan telah gagal memasukkan tarikh perbicaraan ke dalam diari, seorang majikan bertanggungjawab terhadap tindakan pekerjanya, dan oleh itu perlakuan peguam-peguam defendan-defendan juga mengikat defendan-defendan. Tambahan pula, kegagalan untuk memasukkan tarikh perbicaraan ke dalam diari bukan alasan yang boleh diterima oleh mahkamah. Peguam-peguam defendan-defendan yang bersikap tidak mengambil peduli atau kurang berminat menguruskan firma mereka dengan sewajarnya kerana gagal mewujudkan sistem untuk mengawal dan memeriksa sama ada tugas atau arahan yang diberikan kepada pekerjanya telah dilaksanakan, akan membentuk tindak yang disengajakan atau mengingkari perintah mahkamah jika perintah sedemikian telah diberikan kepada pekerjanya dan tidak dipatuhi. Dalam kes ini, plaintif-plaintif juga telah mengemukakan keterangan yang tidak dipatahkan, bahawa mereka telah menghantar surat peringatan kepada peguam defendan-defendan berkenaan tarikh perbicaraan tersebut (lihat perenggan 20–23); Mohd Yusof Mohamad v Electrolux Home Centres Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 866; [2009] 4 MLJ 610 at 618Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Pasadena Properties Development & Ors [1991] 1 MLJ 111Lim Soh Wah & Anor v Wong Sin Chong & Anor and another appeal [2001] 2 CLJ 344 dirujuk.
(4)(oleh James Foong HMP) Dalam kes ini, kausa-kausa tindakan plaintif-plaintif adalah berdasarkan fraud dan konspirasi untuk menipu. Berkaitan fraud, plaintif-plaintif telah menuntut terhadap defendan-defendan secara bersama dan/atau berasingan. Oleh itu, setiap daripada defendan-defendan bertanggungjawab secara berasingan terhadap plaintif-plaintif. Tiada persoalan yang defendan-defendan pertama dan ketiga telah dibebaskan oleh plaintif-plaintif atas dasar kematian defendan kedua. Dalam kausa tindakan untuk konspirasi, kesemua defendan merupakan pelaku tort bersama. Jikapun apabila salah seorang daripada mereka meninggal dunia, tindakan itu masih kekal terhadap pelaku tort yang hidup tanpa perlu menggantikan defendan si mati. Defendan-defendan pertama dan ketiga oleh itu tetap bertanggungjawab terhadap plaintif-plaintif dan tidak dilepaskan. Bahkan, tiada rekod bahawa plaintif-plaintif telah menarik balik tuntutan mereka terhadap defendan kedua si mati. Hanya budi bicara Mahkamah Tinggi yang enggan mengawardkan apa-apa ganti rugi terhadap defendan kedua (lihat perenggan 29–30).
(5)(oleh James Foong HMP) Dalam tuntutan berasaskan fraud dan konspirasi untuk menipu, plaintif-plaintif sepatutnya berhak terhadap kerugian yang dialami akibat kilanan terhadap pendapatan atau keuntungan mereka yang diakibatkan oleh kesalahan yang dilakukan oleh defendan-defendan, setelah mengambilkira faktor kebolehramalan. Dalam kes ini, saksi plaintif-plaintif telah memberikan keterangan yang oleh dipercayai dan tidak bercanggah tentang bagaimana plaintif-plaintif mendapat kerugian tersebut dan ini telah diterima oleh Mahkamah Tinggi. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi telah menggunakan prinsip-prinsip yang betul dalam menaksir ganti rugi am, yang juga disahkan oleh keterangan yang meyakinkan (lihat perenggan 36–37).
(6)(oleh James Foong HMP) Award ganti rugi teladan sepatutnya sederhana. Sumber dan perlakuan pihak-pihak, kuantum award pampasan, dan seriusnya kesalahan juga faktor-faktor yang perlu dipertimbangkan. Dalam kes ini, dengan mengambilkira keadaan dan semua faktor lain, award ganti rugi teladan oleh hakim bicara tersebut adalah berjustifikasi (lihat perenggan 38).
(7)(oleh James Foong HMP) Dalam kes ini, Mahkamah Tinggi telah mengisytiharkan bahawa jikapun bukti melampaui keraguan munasabah digunakan, keputusannya akan masih sama. Ini jelas menandakan bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi telah mempertimbangkan dan menggunakan piawai bukti yang lebih tinggi dalam memutuskan bahawa defendan-defendan bertanggungjawab terhadap plaintif-plaintif (lihat perenggan 43).
(8)(oleh James Foong HMP) Dokumen-dokumen yang difailkan oleh plaintif-plaintif dalam ikatan dokumen tambahan mereka telah diterima oleh mahkamah apabila dikemukakan oleh plaintif-plaintif semasa perbicaraan. Setelah diterima dokumen-dokumen tersebut dianggap sebagai keterangan. Berhubung keterangan lisan, keterangan itu telah diterima sewajarnya oleh mahkamah (lihat perenggan 45).
(9)(oleh James Foong HMP) Meskipun defendan-defendan telah mengambil tindakan tepat dan segera untuk mengetepikan penghakiman ingkar itu, ini tidak penting apabila dipertimbangkan berdasarkan alasan lemah yang diberikan untuk ketidakhadiran defendan-defendan di mahkamah dan juga tiadanya prospek sebenar bahawa mereka akan berjaya dalam pembelaan mereka. Tambahan pula, ia adalah polisi awam bahawa kemuktamadan patut ada dalam suatu tindakan daripada mengkehendaki mahkamah menjalankan dua pendengaran (lihat perenggan 46).
(10)(oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR menentang sebahagiannya) Bantahan awal plaintif-plaintif sepatutnya ditolak sebulat suara. Tiada prinsip undang-undang yang menghendaki defendan-defendan memilih hak-hak mereka. Kedua-dua rayuan defendan-defendan adalah berkaitan perkara-perkara, isu-isu dan persoalan-persoalan perundangan yang berbeza. Kedua-dua keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi juga boleh dirayu di bawah ss 3 dan 68 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964 (lihat perenggan 60, 62 & 64).
(11)(oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR menentang sebahagiannya) Apabila satu pihak gagal untuk hadir, Mahkamah Tinggi boleh memulakan perbicaraan dengan ketidakhadiran pihak tersebut. Walau bagaimanapun, pihak yang hadir di hadapan mahkamah perlu membuktikan kesnya atas apa-apa isu yang mana beban bukti diletakkan. Dalam kes ini beban bukti terletak pada plaintif-plaintif untuk membuktikan kes mereka meskipun dengan ketidakhadiran defendan-defendan (lihat perenggan 72–73); Liow Geok Lan (f) v John Loh [1993] 3 CLJ 158; Barker v Furlong [1891] 2 Ch 172Shaharuddin bin Abdul Rahman v Satisah Ismail Sdn Bhd [1982] 2 MLJ 79
(12)(oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR menentang sebahagiannya) Dalam permohonan untuk mengetepikan penghakiman ingkar kehadiran oleh defendan selepas perbicaraan, pertimbangan berbeza akan digunakan berbanding dengan permohonan untuk mengetepikan penghakiman ingkar sebelum perbicaraan. Meskipun mahkamah mempunyai budi bicara yang tidak terhad untuk memberi atau menolak permohonan untuk mengetepikan penghakiman ingkar kehadiran selepas perbicaraan, perlu ada perkara yang mana mahkamah boleh melaksanakan budi bicaranya menyebelahi pemohon. Pertimbangan utama adalah bukan sama ada terdapat pembelaan atas merit tetapi lebih kepada sebab kenapa defendan tidak menghadirkan diri. Jika ketidakhadiran itu disengajakan dan bukan disebabkan kemalangan atau kesilapan, mahkamah tidak mungkin membenarkan perbicaraan semula. Faktor-faktor lain yang perlu dipertimbangkan dalam permohonan sebegini termasuklah: (i) prospek kejayaan defendan dalam perbicaraan semula; (ii) kelewatan memohon untuk mengetepikan penghakiman; (iii) perlakuan defendan; (iv) sama ada pihak yang berjaya akan diprejudiskan oleh penghakiman yang diketepikan; dan (v) kepentingan awam yang akan menamatkan litigasi (lihat perenggan 80); Shocked & Anor v Goldschmidt & Ors [1998] 1 All ER 372 dan Buga Singh v Koh Bon Keo [1967] 1 MLJ 16
(13)(oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR menentang sebahagiannya) Dalam kes ini, kesilapan peguam-peguam defendan-defendan tentang tarikh perbicaraan merupakan kesilapan yang tulen dan bukan disengajakan. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi terkhilaf dari segi undang-undang apabila beliau gagal untuk menerima alasan-alasan ketidakhadiran defendan-defendan dan peguam-peguam mereka pada tarikh perbicaraan. Ketidakhadiran mereka bukan disengajakan (lihat perenggan 101).
(14)(oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR menentang sebahagiannya) Pengataan-pengataan tentang fraud, penipuan dan konspirasi terhadap defendan pertama keseluruhannya bergantung kepada tindakan-tindakan defendan kedua — yang telah meninggal dunia pada masa perbicaraan — sebagai wakil, ejen atau pekerja defendan pertama. Dengan kematian defendan kedua ia diragui sama ada beban bukti konspirasi, fraud dan penipuan telah dibuktikan dengan secukupnya oleh plaintif-plaintif meskipun dengan ketidakhadiran defendan-defendan pada tarikh perbicaraan itu. Dengan kematian defendan kedua, kes terhadap defendan-defendan pertama dan ketiga tidak boleh dikekalkan. Tambahan pula, sebagai pelaku tort bersama, apabila defendan kedua meninggal dunia, perkara itu tamat di situ. Plaintif-plaintif juga telah menghentikan tuntutan mereka terhadap defendan kedua. Oleh itu, ia tidak mustahil untuk Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan kes itu terhadap defendan-defendan (lihat perenggan 105–107, 112–113).
(15)(oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR menentang sebahagiannya) Defendan-defendan tidak lewat dalam memohon untuk mengetepikan [2009] 4 MLJ 610 at 621penghakiman ingkar itu. Mereka telah bertindak dengan segera dan mengikut masa yang ditetapkan dalam memfailkan permohonan mereka (lihat perenggan 14).
(16)(oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR menentang sebahagiannya) Tuntutan plaintif-plaintif adalah untuk ganti rugi dan terdapat 354 plaintif-plaintif dalam kes ini. Setiap seorang daripada mereka perlu membuktikan tuntutan mereka di hadapan Mahkamah Tinggi. Tiada guaman ‘class action’ di Malaysia. Tindakan ini juga tidak difailkan sebagai tindakan representasi. Keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi tidak berasaskan apa-apa keterangan yang meyakinkan, sama ada secara lisan atau melalui dokumen (lihat perenggan 116).
(17)(oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR menentang sebahagiannya) Dalam kes ini, untuk membenarkan keputusan rayuan dan meremit balik kes kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk perbicaraan semula tidak akan menafikan defendan-defendan peluang mereka untuk membela tindakan itu dan pada masa yang sama plaintif-plaintif juga masih mempunyai peluang untuk meneruskan tuntutan mereka. Untuk menafikan peluang defendan-defendan membela tuntutan itu mungkin akan membawa kepada ketidakadilan dalam kes ini (lihat perenggan 117 & 119);Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue Chew [2007] 3 SLR 673
(18)(oleh Abdul Malik Ishak HMR menentang sebahagiannya) Dalam kes ini, hakim Mahkamah Tinggi tidak menghargai secara kehakiman keterangan tersebut. Mahkamah Tinggi telah gagal untuk menguji keterangan saksi-saksi terhadap kebarangkalian kes memandangkan kedua-dua pihak tidak berada di mahkamah untuk mengemukakan versi-versi mereka. Mahkamah rayuan dengan itu bebas untuk mengakaskan penemuan-penemuan mahkamah perbicaraan, yang jelas salah dalam kes ini. Hakim perbicaraan telah salah arah dan gagal untuk menghargai secara kehakiman keterangan tersebut (lihat perenggan 120–122).
Notes
For a case on joint tortfeasors, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) para 5076.
For cases on assessment of damages under civil procedure, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 2261–2281.
For cases on assessment of damages under tort, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2008 Reissue) paras 158–166.
For cases on cause of action, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 43–58.
For cases on default of appearance, see 2(2) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 3839–3880.
For cases on estoppel by election generally, see 6 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 2693–2713.
For cases on exemplary damages under civil procedure, see 2(1) Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2007 Reissue) paras 2283–2286.
For cases on exemplary damages under tort, see 12 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2008 Reissue) paras 192–194.
For cases on fraud alleged in civil case, see 7 Mallal’s Digest (4th Ed, 2009 Reissue) paras 530–547.
Cases referred to

Abdul Rafar bin Maimunni & Anor v HM Latiff bin KM Haneefa [2008] 1 LNS 157

Ang Gin Lee v PP [1991] 1 MLJ 498

Ang Hiok Seng @ Ang Yeok Seng v Yim Yut Kiu (personal representative of the estate of Chan Weng Sun, deceased) [1997] 2 MLJ 45

Annie Quah Lay Nah v Syed Jafer Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2007] 1 MLJ 225[2007] 1 CLJ 1

Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Pasadena Properties Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [1991] 1 MLJ 111[1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 606, HC

Barker v Furlong [1891] 2 Ch 172

Bell v The Midland Railway Company (1861) ER 142; 10 CB (NS) 287

Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 326, HL

Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel [1948] WN 89

Buga Singh v Koh Bon Keo [1967] 1 MLJ 16

Burgess v Stafford Hotel Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1215

Burgoine v Taylor (1878) 9 Ch D 1

Burns v Kondel [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 554

Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome & Anor [1972] AC 1027

Cheak Yoke Thong v PP [1984] 1 MLJ 311

Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 3 MLJ 352

Chong Khee Sang v Pang Ah Chee [1984] 1 MLJ 377

Cockle v Joyce (1877–1878) 7 Ch D 56

Cutler & Anor v MacPhail [1962] 2 QB 292

Delcont (M) Sdn Bhd v Motor Sport International Ltd (servant or agents at Federal Territory Labuan) & Ors [1996] 1 CLJ 450

Duke of Bedford v Ellis & Ors [1901] AC 1

‘Edison’, The (1933) 45 Ll L Rep 117

Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473

Gan Hay Chong v Siow Kian Yuh & Anor [1975] 2 MLJ 129

Gan Yook Chin (p) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1[2004] 4 CLJ 309

Haji Yahia bin Ismail v Bukah binti Mayah Pakeh, Paylak binti Saydi [1933] 7 FMSLR 86

[2009] 4 MLJ 610 at 623

Hock Huat Iron Foundry (suing as a firm) v Naga Tembaga Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 65

Hock Seng Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor v Yeoh Poh Owi & Anor [2001] 4 CLJ 1

Jok Jau Evong & Ors v Marabong Lumber Sdn Bhd & Ors [1990] 3 MLJ 427

Kingdon v Kirk (1888) 37 Ch D 141

Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565[1997] 3 CLJ 305

Leong Hong Khie v PP; Tan Gong Wai v PP [1986] 2 MLJ 206

Lim Soh Wah & Anor v Wong Sin Chong & Anor and another appeal [2001] 2 CLJ 344

Liew Geok Lan (f) v John Loh [1993] 3 CLJ 158

Maleb bin Su v PP; Cheak Yoke Thong v PP [1984] 1 MLJ 311

Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd; Sale & Frazar v Knight Steamship Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021

Meng Leong Development Pte Ltd v Jip Hong Trading Co Pte Ltd [1985] 1 MLJ 7

Mohd Yusof Mohamad v Electrolux Home Centers Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 866

Ng Chek Kiam & Anor (Seng Heng Wholesale Fruit Dealer) v Best Fruits Sdn Bhd [2006] 1 LNS 267

Oh Jin Ghee & Ors v Abdul Hameed & Ors v Cheng Chiew Chin [1998] 2 SLR 615

Packer v Denny [1986] CA Transcript 310

Palmco Holding Bhd v Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 2 MLJ 624

Popular Industries Ltd v Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 360

Redditch Benefit Building Society v Roberts [1940] 1 Ch 415[1940] 1 All ER 342, CA

Robinson v Harman (1848) ER 154; 1 Ex 850

Rookes v Barnard & Ors [1964] AC 1129

Sally Wertheim v Chicoutimi Pulp Company [1911] AC 301

Shaharuddin bin Abdul Rahman v Satisah Ismail Sdn Bhd [1982] 2 MLJ 79

Shocked & Anor v Goldschmidt & Ors [1998] 1 All ER 372, CA

Sri Jaya Transport Co Ltd v Fernandez [1970] 1 MLJ 87

Stone v Smith (1887) 35 Ch D 188

Sunley (B) and Co Ltd v Cunard White Star Ltd [1940] 1 KB 740

Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue Chew [2007] 3 SLR 673

Tajjul Ariffin bin Mustafa v Heng Cheng Hong [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 56, HC

Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 777

Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2003] 4 MLJ 332

Tay Kheng Hong v Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] MLJ 87, HC

Watt or Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC 484

Yai Yen Hon v Teng Ah Kok & Sim Huat Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 136

Yap Fook Cheong & Anor v Burkill (Malaya) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1991] 3 MLJ 160

Yogananthy a/l AS Thambaiya lwn Idris bin Osman [2006] 2 MLJ 101[2006] 1 CLJ 430

Yong Tim v Hoo Kok Chong & Anor [2005] 3 CLJ 229

Abdul Rafar bin Maimunni & Anor v HM Latiff bin KM Haneefa [2008] 1 LNS 157
Ang Gin Lee v PP [1991] 1 MLJ 498
Ang Hiok Seng @ Ang Yeok Seng v Yim Yut Kiu (personal representative of the estate of Chan Weng Sun, deceased) [1997] 2 MLJ 45
Annie Quah Lay Nah v Syed Jafer Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors [2007] 1 MLJ 225[2007] 1 CLJ 1
Asia Commercial Finance (M) Bhd v Pasadena Properties Development Sdn Bhd & Ors [1991] 1 MLJ 111[1990] 1 CLJ (Rep) 606, HC
Barker v Furlong [1891] 2 Ch 172
Bell v The Midland Railway Company (1861) ER 142; 10 CB (NS) 287
Benmax v Austin Motor Co Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 326, HL
Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel [1948] WN 89
Buga Singh v Koh Bon Keo [1967] 1 MLJ 16
Burgess v Stafford Hotel Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1215
Burgoine v Taylor (1878) 9 Ch D 1
Burns v Kondel [1971] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 554
Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome & Anor [1972] AC 1027
Cheak Yoke Thong v PP [1984] 1 MLJ 311
Cheng Hang Guan & Ors v Perumahan Farlim (Penang) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1993] 3 MLJ 352
Chong Khee Sang v Pang Ah Chee [1984] 1 MLJ 377
Cockle v Joyce (1877–1878) 7 Ch D 56
Cutler & Anor v MacPhail [1962] 2 QB 292
Delcont (M) Sdn Bhd v Motor Sport International Ltd (servant or agents at Federal Territory Labuan) & Ors [1996] 1 CLJ 450
Duke of Bedford v Ellis & Ors [1901] AC 1
‘Edison’, The (1933) 45 Ll L Rep 117
Evans v Bartlam [1937] AC 473
Gan Hay Chong v Siow Kian Yuh & Anor [1975] 2 MLJ 129
Gan Yook Chin (p) & Anor v Lee Ing Chin @ Lee Teck Seng & Ors [2005] 2 MLJ 1[2004] 4 CLJ 309
Haji Yahia bin Ismail v Bukah binti Mayah Pakeh, Paylak binti Saydi [1933] 7 FMSLR 86
Hock Huat Iron Foundry (suing as a firm) v Naga Tembaga Sdn Bhd [1999] 1 MLJ 65
Hock Seng Construction Sdn Bhd & Anor v Yeoh Poh Owi & Anor [2001] 4 CLJ 1
Jok Jau Evong & Ors v Marabong Lumber Sdn Bhd & Ors [1990] 3 MLJ 427
Kingdon v Kirk (1888) 37 Ch D 141
Lai Yoke Ngan & Anor v Chin Teck Kwee & Anor [1997] 2 MLJ 565[1997] 3 CLJ 305
Leong Hong Khie v PP; Tan Gong Wai v PP [1986] 2 MLJ 206
Lim Soh Wah & Anor v Wong Sin Chong & Anor and another appeal [2001] 2 CLJ 344
Liew Geok Lan (f) v John Loh [1993] 3 CLJ 158
Maleb bin Su v PP; Cheak Yoke Thong v PP [1984] 1 MLJ 311
Markt & Co Ltd v Knight Steamship Co Ltd; Sale & Frazar v Knight Steamship Co Ltd [1910] 2 KB 1021
Meng Leong Development Pte Ltd v Jip Hong Trading Co Pte Ltd [1985] 1 MLJ 7
Mohd Yusof Mohamad v Electrolux Home Centers Sdn Bhd [1999] 2 CLJ 866
Ng Chek Kiam & Anor (Seng Heng Wholesale Fruit Dealer) v Best Fruits Sdn Bhd [2006] 1 LNS 267
Oh Jin Ghee & Ors v Abdul Hameed & Ors v Cheng Chiew Chin [1998] 2 SLR 615
Packer v Denny [1986] CA Transcript 310
Palmco Holding Bhd v Sakapp Commodities (M) Sdn Bhd & Ors [1988] 2 MLJ 624
Popular Industries Ltd v Eastern Garment Manufacturing Sdn Bhd [1989] 3 MLJ 360
Redditch Benefit Building Society v Roberts [1940] 1 Ch 415[1940] 1 All ER 342, CA
Robinson v Harman (1848) ER 154; 1 Ex 850
Rookes v Barnard & Ors [1964] AC 1129
Sally Wertheim v Chicoutimi Pulp Company [1911] AC 301
Shaharuddin bin Abdul Rahman v Satisah Ismail Sdn Bhd [1982] 2 MLJ 79
Shocked & Anor v Goldschmidt & Ors [1998] 1 All ER 372, CA
Sri Jaya Transport Co Ltd v Fernandez [1970] 1 MLJ 87
Stone v Smith (1887) 35 Ch D 188
Sunley (B) and Co Ltd v Cunard White Star Ltd [1940] 1 KB 740
Su Sh-Hsyu v Wee Yue Chew [2007] 3 SLR 673
Tajjul Ariffin bin Mustafa v Heng Cheng Hong [1991] 4 CLJ (Rep) 56, HC
Tan Sri Khoo Teck Puat & Anor v Plenitude Holdings Sdn Bhd [1994] 3 MLJ 777
Tang Kwor Ham & Ors v Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Bhd & Ors [2003] 4 MLJ 332
Tay Kheng Hong v Heap Moh Steamship Co Ltd [1964] MLJ 87, HC
Watt or Thomas v Thomas [1947] AC 484
Yai Yen Hon v Teng Ah Kok & Sim Huat Sdn Bhd & Anor [1997] 1 MLJ 136
Yap Fook Cheong & Anor v Burkill (Malaya) Sdn Bhd & Anor [1991] 3 MLJ 160
Yogananthy a/l AS Thambaiya lwn Idris bin Osman [2006] 2 MLJ 101[2006] 1 CLJ 430
Yong Tim v Hoo Kok Chong & Anor [2005] 3 CLJ 229
Legislation referred to

Contracts Act 1950ss 7475

Courts of Judicature Act 1964ss 36767(1)6868(1)(a)(2)

Criminal Procedure Codes 307(1)

Evidence Act 1950ss 61626364656667686970717273A

Federal Court (Civil Appeals) (Transitional) Rules 1963r 13

Rules of the High Court 1980O 15 r 12, O 35 rr 1, 1(2)22(1)(2)6

Contracts Act 1950ss 7475
Courts of Judicature Act 1964ss 36767(1)6868(1)(a)(2)
Criminal Procedure Codes 307(1)
Evidence Act 1950ss 61626364656667686970717273A
Federal Court (Civil Appeals) (Transitional) Rules 1963r 13
Rules of the High Court 1980O 15 r 12, O 35 rr 1, 1(2)22(1)(2)6
Appeal from: Civil Suit No 22–85 of 2002 (High Court, Kota Bharu).
Cecil Abraham (Sunil Abraham, Teo Poh Oon, Tunku Alina Alias and Farah Shuhadah with him) (Wong Lu Peen & Tunku Alina) for the appellants.Yusfarizal Yusoff (Wan Rohimi Wan Daud, Muhd Azmi Talib and Asmadi Abu Bakar with him) (Wan Rohimi & Asmadi) for the respondents.