A party has the right to appeal the dismissal of a striking-out application if the issue addresses a jurisdictional matter that finally disposes of their rights.

[1]The primary issue in these appeals is whether the Appellants have a right to appeal the dismissals of their respective interlocutory applications to strike out pleadings in view of the recent amendments to section 68Courts of Judicature Act 1964section 68(1)(f)CJASection 68(1)(f)CJAsection 8CJA(Amendment) Act 2022, which states as follows:

“Section 68CJANon-appealable matters (1) No appeal shall be brought to the Court of Appeal in any of the following cases:

(e) where a High Court dismissed any application for a summary judgment;

(f) where a High Court dismissed any application to strike out any writ or pleading and

(g) where a High Court allowed any application to set aside a judgment in default.”

[2]The question that arises for consideration for this court is the effect of section 68(1)(f)CJACJA in relation to civil appeals?

[3]If the section is read literally, it would follow from subparagraph (f) that all decisions of the High Court dismissing applications to strike out a writ or plead ing wou ld be unappealable. However, an approach in line with section 17AInterpretation Acts 1948 and 1967

[4]Consider for example a situation where a derivative action is filed but the threshold requirements are not met. This is a preli minary point of law that does not genuinely require the adducing of further oral evidence to determine whether or not the action is validly instituted u n der the law. If the High Court does not strike out the derivative action for failure to comply with threshol d matters, it woul d follow that the matter would have to go through a full trial prior to adjudication on a point of law that could have been determ ined at the outset.

[5]The significant point to be made is that there is no requirement for further evidence and yet parties would be put to the exp ense, cost, and time of a full trial for no good reason. Similarly, with a case relating to locus or the capacity of a plaintiff to bring an action, the same result would ensue. Indeed , the strain of a prolonged and arguably unnecessary trial that is imposed on the li tigants, and more importantly the considerable delay in determining the action are relevant matters for the purposes of construing the purpose and intent of the amendment introduced vide section 68(1)(f)CJA

[6]Therefore, the question for this court is whether that was the actual intention and purpose of the amendment as it now subsists under section 68(1)(f)CJA

[7]However, would such an argument remain tenable where for example there is the necessity to determine a matter of state immunity?

[8]If a pleading which relies on state immunity is found to be insufficient to strike out a claim under Order 18 rule 19 Rules of Court 2012, it would then follow that the matter has to go through a full trial. The very purpose of state immunity as a public international law doctrine would be rendered