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2015 MarsdenLR 1085
COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA)
VARGHESE A/L GEORGE VARUGHESE, IDRUS BIN HARUN, BADARIAH BINTI SAHAMID, JJ
Amber Court Management Corporation & Ors – Plaintiff
Versus
Hong Gan Gui & Anor – Defendant
CIVIL APPEAL NOS W-02 [IM] [NCVC] 1840-10/2014 AND W-02 [IM] [NCVC] 1810-10/2014
A management corporation lacks the legal standing to sue for defamation as its powers are strictly governed by statute and do not extend to such actions.
Headnote:(A) Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318) - Sections 39, 43, 53, 76, and 77 - Defamation - The management corporation cannot sue for defamation as it is not a trading or non-trading corporation; nor can individual council members act unless specifically provided under the Act - Appeals dismissed with costs. (Paras 6, 40, 43)
(B) Legal standing - A management corporation as a statutory entity lacks the locus standi to initiate defamation actions outside expressly stated powers - Council members have no independent standing to sue as such. (Paras 22, 27)
(C) Interpretation of statutes - The Act should be interpreted narrowly concerning the powers of the management corporation, reflecting legislative intent. (Paras 7, 15)
Facts of the case:
The Plaintiffs, comprising a management corporation and its council members, sought to sue the Defendants for alleged defamatory statements made on social media. The appeal centers around the determination of their legal standing to initiate such claims.
Findings of Court:
The court upheld the lower court's decision that the management corporation did not have the authority to instigate defamation proceedings, nor did the individual council members possess locus standi.
Issues: 1) Whether the management corporation can sue for defamation under the Strata Title Act. 2) Whether individual council members have the locus to sue in defamation.
Ratio Decidendi: The court reasoned that a management corporation's powers are confined to those expressly granted by legislation; thus, it cannot pursue defamation claims. Individual members lack authority to act outside the corporation's capacity.
Result: Appeals dismissed with costs.
There are two appeals before us. Appeal 1840-10/2014 is the Plaintiff’s appeal against the decision of the learned Judicial Commissioner (JC) allowing the Defendant’s application in Enclosure 9 to strike out the Plaintiff’s Writ and Statement of Claim dated 29.04.2014, pursuant to Order 18 Rule 19(1) (a) or (b) or (c) or (d) of the Rules of Court 2012. Appeal 1810-10/2014 is the Plaintiff’s appeal against the decision of the same learned JC dismissing the Plaintiff’s application in Enclosure 14 to amend their Writ and Statement of Claim. The amendment was in respect of the intitulement to state that the action was being brought by the 2nd to the 6th Plaintiffs in their personal capacity as well as their capacity as Council members of Amber Court management corporation 2013-2014.
The Plaintiffs had filed an action in defamation against the Defendants in respect of alleged defamatory statements about the Plaintiffs posted in a facebook account belonging to the Defendants.
The 1st Plaintiff is the management corporation of Amber Court Condominium. The 2nd to the 6th Plaintiffs were Council members of the 1st Plaintiff at the time of the publication of the alleged defamatory statements.
The primary issue before the high court was whether the Plaintiffs have locus to commence an action in defamation.
The learned JC determined that the Plaintiffs had no locus to institute the suit on the grounds succinctly summarised as follows:
A management corporation as a creature of statute, cannot of its own volition extend its jurisdiction to matters falling outside its own competence. Its powers and duties are defined and limited by the Act. A claim in defamation cannot be brought by the management corporation as it is neither a trading nor a non-trading corporation.
In the Appellants’ Memorandum of Appeal, the following main grounds were raised:
The learned JC had erred in law in her interpretation of the Strata Titles Act 1985 (Act 318) (‘the Act’) in respect of the powers and competence of the 1st Plaintiff (‘management corporation’) to institute actions in defamation in particular, sections 3943 and 47 of the Act The learned JC had misdirected herself in her reference to the case of Chinese Empire Reform Association v Chinese Daily Newspaper Publishing Co Ltd [1970] XIII BCR 141, in relation to the distinction between trading and non-trading corporations.
The learned JC failed to appreciate that the Act does not require the management corporation to obtain a resolution before instituting or defending suits.
The learned JC had failed to consider that the 2nd to the 6th Plaintiffs who were Council members of the management corporation had the capacity to bring an action in defamation in their individual capacities.
APPELLANTS’ SUBMISSIONS
The crux of the Appellant’s submissions before us is that the Act should be read in a liberal rather than a restrictive way to give the Plaintiffs locus to sue and be sued on all matters, including defamation.
In support of the above contention, the Appellant refers to section 39(3) Act In addition the Appellant sought to place emphasis on the word include found in Section 43(a) of the Act In support of the above contention, reference was made to the case of Tenaga Nasional Bhd v Tekali Prospecting Sdn Bhd
On settled principles of statutory interpretation, it is clear that when an Act of Parliament employs the expression, ‘includes’ to define some other word or expression, the intention is to leave the meaning of the expression defined open ended. By contrast, when the word ‘means’ is employed to define something, there is a rebuttable presumption of statutory interpretation that Parliament intends to restrict the meaning of the expression defined.
Reference was also made to the Building and Common Property (Maintenance and Management) Act 2007 (Act 663) which provides under the heading, ‘Duties and powers of Joint Management Body’, the following:
Section 8(2) (g) to do all things reasonably necessary for the per
