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Pendahuluan

[1]Pemohon-Pemohon mengemukakan permohonan di Mahkamah ini untuk memutuskan sama ada peruntukan di bawah s. 41BAkta Dadah Berbahaya (ADB) 1952Seksyen 41BADB 1952Seksyen 41BADB 1952

“41B No bail to be granted in respect of certain offences

(1)Bail shall not be granted to an accused person charged with an offence under this Act-

(a)where the offence is punishable with death; or

(b)where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for more than five years; or

(c)where the offence is punishable with imprisonment for five years or less and the Public Prosecutor certifies in writing that it is not in the public interest to grant bail to the accused person.

(2)Subsection (1) shall have effect notwithstanding any other written law or any rule of law to the contrary.”

[2]Seksyen ini telah diperkenalkan ke dalam ADB 1952 berkuat kuasa pada 10.03.1978. Ia memperuntukkan bahawa tiada sebarang perintah atau tawaran jaminan boleh diberikan kepada Tertuduh yang dituduh di bawah kategori (a), (b) dan (c).

[3]Mahkamah Persekutuan dalam kes Public Prosecutor v Chew Siew Luan [1982] 2 MLJ 119s. 41BADB 1952

“We further note in particular that section 41Bof the Act is an entirely new section introduced by the Dangerous Drugs (Amendment) Act, 1978 (Act A426) and became operative on 10.3.78. Generalibus specialia derogant is a cardinal principle of interpretation. It means that where a special provision is made in a special statute, that special provision excludes the operation of a general provision in the general law. (See also Public Prosecutor v Chu Beow Hin [1982] 1 MLJ 135 137). The provisions of section 3Criminal Procedure Codewhich counsel for the respondent seeks to rely on has no relevance whatsoever to the matter in issue before us.

It would be erroneous to apply expressions used and provisions made in one statute to another and entirely different one in complete disregard of the latter’s express stipulations in the light of its specific purpose and object. On the other hand, it is a sound, and, indeed, a well-known principle of construction of a statute that the purport of words and expressions used in a legislative measure must take their colour from the context in which they appear. We do not therefore agree with the learned judge that it is open to a court to subject the express provisions regarding bail in Section 41BDangerous Drugs Actto the provisions relating thereto in the Criminal Procedure Code. The provisions regulating the granting of bail under the Dangerous Drugs Act must be construed in the context of that Act and not in that of the Criminal Procedure Code and to that extent the general provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code must ex necessitate yield to the specific provisions of Section 41BDangerous Drugs Actin that regard. We should perhaps also observe en passant that any other construction would result in nullifying the purport and effect of the provisions of section 41B (1) (c)Dangerous Drugs Actand render otiose and ineffective a certificate of the Public Prosecutor thereunder that it is not in the public interest to grant bail to a person accused of an offence under the Dangerous Drugs Act punishable with imprisonment for five years or less.”

[4]Hakikat s. 41BADB 1952Loy Chin Hei v Public Prosecutor [1982] 1 MLJ 31s. 388389Kanun Prosedur Jenayah (KPJ)s. 41BADB 1952

“The discretion as generally given by sections 388389394Criminal Procedure Codecourts, both the Subordinate and High Courts, by Section 41BDangerous Drugs Act. Disconcerting as it may be for us to witness the power of the courts, especially those relating to the liberty of the subject who is accused but yet to be proven guilty, being gradually whittled away by statute, yet when Parliament has expressed in unequivocal language its intention to curtail this discretionary power, the courts are not free to question its wisdom in providing for a deterrent procedure for an obviously baneful mischief to society, but must interpret and give