(1)Order 19 r 7(1) of the RHC is not a mandatory provision. Notwithstanding the word ‘shall’ in the rule, a proper reading of it shows that the court is only requiredto give judgment as ‘the plaintiff appears entitled to on his statement of claim’. The authorities show that the word ‘shall’ is not imperative but directory and that the court has a discretion to do what in the circumstances of the caseis just (see p 147C–D).[1999] 6 MLJ 140 at 141

(2)Whether or not the defendants would be entitled to enter a final or interlocutory judgment in respect of their claim would depend on whether the RM150,000 representeda liquidated demand or damages irrespective of the terminology used by the defendants to describe the amount. The court would direct its mind to the substance rather than the form of the amount claimed so that notwithstanding that a party may choose to quantifyhis loss and state a definite figure or label his claim as special damages, the court would still look at what was claimed to ascertain if they call for further investigation going beyond mere calculation. Although the defendants described the sum as specialdamages, no particulars had been pleaded of the special damages as required by O 18 r 12(1) of the RHC. The very nature of the defendants’ claim showed that they were not capable of ascertainment by simple arithmetic but require further investigation goingbeyond mere calculation. Further, when the defendants served their counterclaim, the injunction had not yet been set aside and as such the losses and damages allegedly suffered by the defendants would not have crystallized nor be capable of calculation withcomplete accuracy so as to be stated as a precise amount and pleaded as special damages (see p 148D–149G).

(3)What was claimed before the SAR as loss and damages would cover the same loss and damages referred to inthe counterclaim. The defendants in having made a conscious election to proceed with and have their damages assessed before the SAR could not now come before this court to obtain an interlocutory judgment for damages to be assessed for the very same wrong theyhad already received damages for. The doctrine of estoppel as applied to the conduct of litigation would operate to prevent them from so doing (see p 151A–151D).

[BahasaMalaysia summary

Defendan-defendan merupakan tuan punya-tuan punya berdaftar pelbagai bidang-bidang tanah. Mereka memasuki suatu perjanjian dengan plaintif di mana plaintif adalah diberikan suatu lesen eksklusif untuk menguaribatu kapur atas tanah-tanah defendan-defendan tersebut. Plaintif mengatakan defendan-defendan telah mungkir janji akan perjanjian tersebut dan memulakan prosiding terhadap defendan-defendan memohon untuk pelaksanaan spesifik akan perjanjian tersebut. Plaintiftelah diberikan suatu injuksi ex parte terhadap defendan-defendan. Pada 31 Januari 1997 mahkamah mengketepikan injuksi ex parte tersebut dan memerintahkan bahawa ganti rugi-ganti rugi ditaksirkan dan dibayar kepada defendan- defendan. Sementara itu defendan-defendanmemfailkan suatu pembelaan dan tuntutan balas kepada tuntutan plaintif. Defendan- defendan menuntut balas untuk ganti rugi khas sebanyak RM150,000 yang merupakan jumlah untuk kerugian yang dialami akibat daripada[1999] 6 MLJ 140 at 142 plaintif memperolehiinjunksi ex parte. Pembelaan dan tuntutan balas tersebut disampaikan pada 13 Januari 1997. Plaintif tidak memfailkan jawapan kepada pembelaan atau pembelaan kepada tuntutan balas tersebut. Pada 27 November 1998 PKP menaksirkan ganti rugi berkenaan dengan injuksiex parte tersebut dan mengawardkan RM14,655.65 kepada defendan-defendan. Pada 16 Januari 1999 defendan-defendan memfailkan suatu permohonan di bawah A 19 k 17(1) Kaedah-kaedah Mahkamah Tinggi 1980 untuk suatu perintah bahawa penghakiman dimasukkanterhadap plaintif untuk ganti rugi khas sebanyak RM150,000 untuk kegagalan plaintif untuk memfailkan pembelaan kepada tuntutan balas defendan-defendan. Isu-isu di hadapan mahkamah adalah: (i) sa