1998 MarsdenLR 1929
HIGH COURT (KUCHING)
MUHAMAD KAMIL J
SUIT NO 22–114 OF 1997–III/II
26 August 1998
Yap Yau Sin (Wan Junaidi & Co Advocates) for the plaintiff.
Baru Bian (Baru Bian Advocates) for the first-fourth defendants.
Walter Dior(Dior & Co Advocates) for the fifth defendant.
Baru Bian (Baru Bian Advocates) for the first-fourth defendants.
Walter Dior(Dior & Co Advocates) for the fifth defendant.
JUDGMENT
1. This is an application by the plaintiff dated18.5.1998 (enclosure 21) for an order that judgment be entered against the defendants under Order 14 rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court 1980. The said application is supported by the Affidavit of Tan Siew Kee affirmed on 8.5.1998.
2. Theplaintiff herein is a finance company incorporated in Malaysia under the Companies Act 1965 and having a registered address at Lot 4.08 - 4.10, Level 4, Bangunan Satok, Jalan Satok, 93400 Kuching. According to the plaintiff, under a Loan Agreement dated3.7.1996 entered into between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, the plaintiff granted a term loan of RM400,000.00 to the 1st defendant, subject to the terms and conditions as contained therein. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th defendants agreed to guarantee therepayment of the said loan.
3. This action was commenced by the plaintiff against the defendants, claiming for a sum of RM330,528.88 as at 13.10.1997 together with interest accruing thereon, when the 1st defendant defaulted in the paymentof the monthly instalments as required under the Loan Agreement. According to the plaintiff’s letter of demand dated 17.10.1997 addressed to the 1st defendant, it was stated, inter alia, that the instalments in arrears from 24.7.1997 to 24.9.1997 amountedto RM13,347.00.
4. In opposing the Order 14 application, the 4th defendant affirmed an Affidavit In Opposition on 13.6.1998. According to the 4th defendant, the said Affidavit In Opposition was also deposed for and on behalf of the 1st, 2ndand 3rd defendants.
5. Essentially, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants are disputing the amount of their alleged indebtedness in the sum of RM330,528.88 as claimed by the plaintiff. In the absence of any statement showing the breakdownof the figures, the abovesaid four defendants have no knowledge how the said sum was arrived at.
6. Secondly, apart from pointing out the discrepancy in the interest chargeable at 12.55% per annum as stated in the Affidavit of Tan Siew Keeand 13.55% as claimed in the Statement of Claim, the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendants also disputed the plaintiff’s Base Lending Rate, upon which the interest rate chargeable was computed.
7. The third pertinent issue raisedby the four defendants as shown in the Affidavit In Opposition concerned the guarantee coverage given by Credit Guarantee Corporation Berhad, equivalent to 80% of the facility granted by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant.
8. In his writtensubmission tendered to the court on the day of hearing, the learned counsel for the plaintiff raised a preliminary objection in that the Affidavit In Opposition affirmed by the 4th defendant on 13.6.1998, failed to comply with Order 32 rule 13(2)(b) of the High Court Rules. In support of the said objection, he referred this court to the case of PERBADANAN NASIONAL INSURANS SDN BHD v PUA LAI ONG [1996] 3 MLJ 85
9. The learned counsel for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th defendantsstrenuously objected to the raising of the preliminary objection at the hearing of this Order 14 application, on the ground that no notice was given by the plaintiff’s solicitors to the defendants pertaining to the objection.
10. In dealingwith the point of preliminary objection, the courts have in the past, stipulated that a party who wished to raise a preliminary objection should give prior notice at the earliest moment possible to the other party. Inexplicably, the intention is to avoid anyelement of surprise. In one decided case (see Mallal’s Digest (4th Edition) 1998 Reissue, Vol. 2(2) at paragraph 3823), the High Court held that the failure to give written notice to the other party’s solicitors as early as possible pertaining to thepreliminary objection would amount to waiver of the party’s right to raise the said objection. A similar observation was made by Edgar Joseph Jr. J (as he then was) in the case of JASABENA SDN BHD v BEH HENG FOO & ANOR [1985] 1 MLJ 394
“Before concluding, I have an observation to make, and it is this: Cou